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Introduction 
 
On March 11, 2011 the strongest recorded in Japan earthquake off the Pacific coast of 
North-east of the country occurred (also known as the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011 
Tohoku earthquake, and the 3.11 Earthquake) which triggered a powerful tsunami and caused 
a nuclear accident in the Fukushima Daichi Nuclear Plant Station. It was the first disaster that 
included an earthquake, a tsunami, and a nuclear power plant accident.  
The triple 2011 disaster has had immense impacts on people life, health and property, 
social infrastructure and economy, agri-food chains, natural and institutional environment, 
etc. in North-eastern Japan and beyond [Al-Badri and Berends, 2013; Biodiversity Center of 
Japan, 2013; Buesseler, 2014; Fujita et al., 2012; IAEA, 2011; IBRD, 2012; Koyama, 2013; 
Kontar et al., 2014; Nakanishi and Tanoi, 2013; NIRA, 2013; UNEP, 2012; Vervaeck and 
Daniell, 2012; Watanabe A., 2011; Watanabe N., 2013; WHO, 2013; WWF, 2013].  
Due to the scale of the disasters and the number of affected agents, the effects’ 
multiplicities, spillovers, and long time horizon, the constant evolution of the nuclear crisis, 
the lack of “full” information and models of analysis, etc. the overall impacts of the 2011 
disasters is far from being completely evaluated. Furthermore, most of the domestic 
information and publications have been in Japanese, which make it difficult for international 
public to get a full insight on the scales and diverse implications.  
The goal of this paper is to assess the socio-economic and environmental impact of 
Match 2011 earthquake, tsunami and Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan. Firstly, a short 
description of the three events is presented. Next, the overall impacts on population, health 
and displacement assessed. Third, the effects of economy are evaluated. After that, diverse 
impacts on agri-food chains are presented. Finally, the impact on natural environment is 
assessed.  
A wide range of official governmental, farmers, industry and international 
organizations, and Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) data as well as information from 
publications in media, research and experts reports, etc. have been extensively used.  
We are grateful to the Japan Foundation, which supported financially this research.  
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1. Description of events 
 
On March 11, 2011 at 14:46 Japan Standard Time2 a mega thrust undersea earthquake 
occurred off the Pacific coast of Japan widely known as the Great East Japan Earthquake 
[Japan Meteorological Agency, 2014]. The earthquake hypocenter was at a depth of 24 km 
and epicenter 130 km (38° 6.2′ N, 142° 51.6′ E) East of the Oshika Peninsula of Tōhoku 
region, Honshu island (Map 1).  
 
Map 1. Epicenter and seismic intensity       Map 2. Areas affected by March 11, 2011 quake 
of March 11, 2011 earthquake        
Source: Japan Meteorological Agency    Source: U.S. Geological Survey  
 
The earthquake was with a magnitude of 9.0 Megawatt (Mw) [Japan Meteorological 
Agency, 2011]. Its seismic intensity was 7 in the Northern part of Miyagi prefecture (Kurihara 
city), 6+ in the Southern and Central part of Miyagi prefecture, Nakadoti and Hamadori of 
Fukushima prefecture, the Northern and Southern part of Ibaraki prefecture, the Northern and 
Southern part of Tochigi prefecture, 6- in the Sothern part of coastal area, the Northern part of 
inland area and the Southern part of inland area of Iwate prefecture, Aizu region of 
Fukushima prefecture, the Southern part of Gunma prefecture, the Southern part of Saitama 
prefecture, and the North-west part of Chiba prefecture, and a lower intensity in other areas of 
the country (Map 1 and Map 2).  
The Great East Japan Earthquake was the most powerful earthquake ever recorded in 
or around Japan, and the forth most powerful earthquake in the world since 1900 [Japan 
Meteorological Agency, 2013].  
The main earthquake, lasting approximately six minutes, was preceded by a number of 
large foreshocks first major of them being on 9 March (with 7.2 Mw). Almost 1000 
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  05:46 Universal Time Coordinated	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aftershocks of magnitude 5.0 Mw or greater occurred since the initial quake by the end of 
2013 [Japan Meteorological Agency, 2014]. 
According to some estimates The Great East Japan Earthquake moved Honshu island 
2.4 m east, dropped vertically a 400 km stretch of the Pacific Ocean coastline by 0.6 m, and 
shifted the Earth axis between 10 cm and 25 cm [Chang, 2011; Deutsche Welle, March 14, 
2011]. The greatest confirmed land subsidence was in Oshika Peninsula, Miyagi (1.2 m), 
Rikuzentakata, Iwate (0.84 m), Ishinomaki, Miyagi (0.78 m), Kesennuma, Miyagi (0.74 m), 
Ōfunato, Iwate (0.73 m), Minamisanriku, Miyagi (0.69 m), Kamaishi, Iwate (0.66 m) etc. 
[Geospatial Information Authority, 2011]. Experts say that the land subsidence is permanent 
which makes such areas more susceptible to flooding during high tides. 
The Great East Japan Earthquake triggered powerful tsunamis that spread over the wide area 
from Hokkaido to Okinawa3 (Map 3 and Map 4). According to estimates an extensive coastal 
area surpassing 400 km was hit by tsunami higher than 10 m that submerged plane areas more 
than 5 km inland [Mori et al. 2011].  
 
Map 3. Great East Japan Earthquake observed tsunami heights in Japan       
   
Source: Japan Meteorological Agency  
 
The exact figures for heights of tsunami waves are not known. Official data for the 
maximum heights of tsunami are: more than 9.3 m in Souma, Fukushima prefecture (March 
11, 15:51), more than 8.5 m in Miyako, Iwate prefecture (March 11, 15:26), more than 8 m in 
Oofunato, Iwate prefecture (March 11, 15:18), and more than 7.6 m in Ishinomaki, Miyagi 
prefecture (March 11, 15:25) [Japan Meteorological Agency, 2014]. Some reports indicate 
that tsunami waves reached heights of up to 40 meters at Omoe peninsula, Miyako city, Iwate 
prefecture, and travelled up to 10 km inland in Sendai area [NHK, August 13, 2011]. This 
height is also deemed the record in Japan historically [Yoshida, 2012]. The earthquake caused 
a vertical drop in the coastline 0.6 m, which allowed the tsunami to travel farther and faster 
onto the land. 
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Map 4. March 2011 Tsunami runup heights along Japan coastline 
 
Source: Tohoku Earthquake Tsunami Joint Survey Group 
 
The tsunami raced outward from the earthquake epicenter at speeds that approached 
about 800 km per hour [Britannica, 2014]. Experts suggest that it would have taken 10 to 30 
minutes to reach the areas first affected, and then areas further North and South based on the 
geography of the coastline [Deutsche Welle, March 11, 2011]. The timing of the earliest 
recorded tsunami maximum readings ranged from 15:12 to 15:21 or between 26 and 35 
minutes after the earthquake had struck [Japan Meteorological Agency, 2011]. Tsunami have 
traveled across the Pacific Ocean to Chile and highly likely returned to the Japanese coast 
about two days later with 30-60 centimeters height [The Japan News, May 2, 2014].  
The most severe effects of the tsunami were felt along a 670-km long stretch of 
coastline from Erimo, Hokkaido, in the north to Ōarai, Ibaraki, in the South, with most of the 
destruction occurring in the hour following the earthquake [Biggs and Sheldrick, 2011]. The 
most severely affected areas were areas Kuji, Ōfunato, Rikuzentakata Kamaishi, Miyako, 
Ōtsuchi, and Yamada in Iwate prefecture, Namie, Sōma and Minamisōma in Fukushima 
prefecture, and Shichigahama, Higashimatsushima, Onagawa, Natori, Ishinomaki, and 
Kesennuma in Miyagi Prefecture4. 
The tsunami inundated a total area of approximately 561 km2 or 4.53% of the total 
territories of the six Northeastern prefectures of Honshu island [Geospatial Information 
Authority, 2011]. The most affected was Miyagi prefecture where 16.3% of the territory was 
flooded by seawaters. The worst affected by flooding were Wakayabashi and Migagino words 
of Sendai (60.4% and 4.5% of the total areas inundated), Watari-cho (47.9%), Iwanuma 
(43.9%), Shishigahama town (38.5%), Yamomoto-cho (37.5%), Higashimatsushima (36.3%) 
and other areas (Map 5, Picture 1).  
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 detail maps of areas hit by the tsunami are available at: http://danso.env.nagoya-
u.ac.jp/20110311/map/index_e.html 
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Map 5. Areas flooded by tsunami          Picture 1. Tsunami flooded areas of Sendai 
 
Source: JICA                              Source: U.S. Geological Survey 
 
The earthquake and the tsunami caused a nuclear accident in one of the world’s 
biggest nuclear power stations - the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, Okuma and 
Futaba, Fukushima prefecture (Picture 2). The tsunami arrived at the plant station around 50 
minutes after the initial earthquake. The 14 meter high tsunami5 overwhelmed the plant's 
seawalls and damaged cooling systems and control rooms (Figure 1). Three out of the six 
reactors (units 1, 3 and 4) suffered large explosions from March 12 to March 15, 2011 [Tokyo 
Electric Power Company, 2011]. Level 7 meltdowns occurred6 leading to releases of huge 
radioactivity into the environment [Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, April 12, 2011]. 
Diverse radioactive materials were released from the containment vessels of the power 
plant as a result of deliberate venting to reduce gas pressure, deliberate discharge of coolant 
water into the sea, and uncontrolled events. The official data for the radionuclides released 
into the atmosphere from Fukushima accident are presented in Table 1. 
Radioactive elements were released by the nuclear plant into: the atmosphere in the 
form of radioactive gases or radioactive particles (aerosols) dispersed into the air, a portion of 
which fell on the ground soil and formed residual radioactive deposits; the marine 
environment, directly in the form of liquid releases into the sea and indirectly due to fallout on 
the sea's surface from radioactive aerosols dispersed over the ocean.  
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 Nuclear Regulation Authority has concluded that the tsunami triggered the meltdown [NHK World, 
July 18, 2014]. It rejected the conclusion of the Diet commission (July 2012) that the earthquake 
caused the reactor to lose power-damaging pipes leading to the meltdown before tsunami hit the plant. 
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  International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) runs from 0 (indicating abnormal situation with no safety 
consequences) to 7 (indicating accident causing widespread contamination with serious health and 
environmental effects). Prior to Fukushima, the Chernobyl disaster was the only level 7 event. 
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Picture 2. Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant          Figure 1. Tsunami height at the nuclear plant	  
  
Source:  Tokyo Electric Power Company                 A - plant building; B - peak tsunami height;  
                                                                                   C – site ground level; D - average sea level;  
                                                                                   E - sea wall  
      Source: Wikipedia 
 
Table 1. Radionuclides released from Fukushima nuclear power plant (Bq)
7
 
Nuclide Half life Amount Nuclide Half life Amount 
Xe-133 5.2 days 1.1×1019 Pu-238 87.7 years 1.9×1010 
Cs-134 2.1 years 1.8×1016 Pu-239 24065 years 3.2×1009 
Cs-137 30.0 years 1.5×1016 Pu-240 6537 years 3.2×1009 
Sr-89 50.5 days 2.0×1015 Pu-241 14.4 years 1.2×1012 
Sr-90 29.1 years 1.4×1014 Y-91 58.5 days 3.4×1012 
Ba-140 12.7 days 3.2×1015 Pr-143 13.6 days 4.1×1012 
Te-127m 109.0 days 1.1×1015 Nd-147 11.0 days 1.6×1012 
Te-129m 33.6 days 3.3×1015 Cm-242 162.8 days 1.0×1011 
Te-131m 30.0 hours 5.0×1015 I-131 8.0 days 1.6×1017 
Te-132 78.2 hours 8.8×1016 I-132 2.3 hours 1.3×1013 
Ru-103 39.3 days 7.5×1009 I-133 20.8 hours 4.2×1016 
Ru-106 368.2 days 2.1×1009 I-135 6.6 hours 2.3×1015 
Zr-95 64.0 days 1.7×1013 Sb-127 3.9 days 6.4×1015 
Ce-141 32.5 days 1.8×1013 Sb-129 4.3 hours 1.4×1014 
Ce-144 284.3 days 1.1×1013 Mo-99 66.0 hours 6.7×1009 
Np-239 2.4 days 7.6×1013    
Source: Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, 2011 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Becquerel (Bq) is a unit for measuring substance's radioactivity equal to number of nuclear decays 
per second. Sievert (Sv) is a unit to quantify biological effects of radiation. Bq is converted into Sv 
through formula that factors in elements including the type of nucleus and type of radiation exposure. 
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There have been diverse estimates about the total amount of radioactive elements 
released into environment as a result of the nuclear accident. Assessments of Tokyo Electric 
Power Company8, related government agencies of Japan (Nuclear Safety Commission, Japan 
Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, and the French Institute for 
Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety for the major radioactive materials released into 
the air and the sea during the period March-September, 2011 are summarized on Table 2 and 
Table 3. 
 
Table 2. Estimates on amounts of radioactive materials released into atmosphere for 
March 12-31, 2011 as result of Fukushima nuclear plant accident (PBq) 
Organizations and dates: Rare Gas I-131 Cs-134 Cs-137 INES* 
Tokyo Electric Power Company 
(May 24, 2012) 
500 500 10 10 900 
Nuclear Safety Commission 
(August  22, 2011) 
- 130 - 11 570 
Nuclear and Industrial Safety 
Agency (February 16, 2012) 
- 150 - 8.2 480 
Institute for Radiological 
Protection and Nuclear Safety 
(February 28, 2012) 
 
2000 
 
200 
 
30 
 
- 
Reference: Chernobyl accident 6500 1800 - 85 5200 
* value obtained by converting amount of radioactivity into iodine equivalent  
Source: Tokyo Electric Power Company, Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety, 
Nuclear Safety Commission, Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency 
 
Table 3. Estimates on amounts of radioactive materials released into ocean between 
March 26-September 30, 2011 as result of Fukushima nuclear plant accident (PBq) 
Organization Period of assessment I-131 Cs-134 Cs-137 
TEPCO March 26-September 30, 2011 11 3.5 3.6 
Japan Atomic Energy Agency March 21-April 30, 2011 11.4 - 3.6 
Institute for Radiological 
Protection and Nuclear Safety 
March 21-mid-July, 2011 - - 27 
Source: Tokyo Electric Power Company, Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety, 
Japan Atomic Energy Agency 
 
According to the May 2012 nuclear power plant’s estimates the cumulative radiation 
releases amounts 538.1 petabecquerel (PBq)9 of iodine-131, caesium-134 and caesium-137, 
out of which 520 PBq was released into the atmosphere between March 12–31, 2011 and 18.1 
PBq into the ocean from March 26 to September 30, 2011 [Tokyo Electric Power Company, 
2012]. A total of 511 PBq of iodine-131 was released into both the atmosphere and the ocean, 
13.5 PBq of caesium-134 and 13.6 PBq of caesium-137. Releases of other radioactive 
nuclides into air, groundwater and ocean such as strontium, plutonium-238, 239, 240, and 
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 the operator of the Fukushima nuclear power plant 
9
 The becquerel (Bq) is the The International System of Units (SI) derived unit of radioactivity defined 
as the activity of a quantity of radioactive material in which one nucleus decays per second. 
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24110, and neptunium-23911 were also reported. At least 900 PBq had been released into the 
atmosphere in March 2011 alone. By November-December 2011 the emissions dropped from 
around 220 billion Bq immediately after the accident to 17 thousand Bq or about one-13 
millionth the initial level12.  
One year after the accident the Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear 
Safety’s provisional estimates for the total radioactive releases into the air were:  
- radioactive noble gases: 6,550 PBq (the same order of magnitude as the Chernobyl 
accident), composed mainly of xenon-133;  
- radioactive iodine: 408 PBq (about ten times less than the Chernobyl  accident), 
including 197 PBq of iodine-131 and 168 PBq of iodine-132;  
- radioactive tellurium: 145 PBq including 108 PBq of tellurium-132 with its decay 
product iodine-132, and 12 PBq of tellurium-129 with its decay product tellurium-129; 
- radioactive caesium: 58 PBq (about three times less than the Chernobyl accident), 
including 21 PBq of caesium-137, 28 PBq of caesium-134 and 9.8 PBq of caesium-136 
[Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety, 2012].  
The Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety also estimated that 
between March 21 and mid-July, 2011 around 2.7×1016 Bq of caesium-137 (about 8.4 kg) 
entered the ocean, about 82% having flowed into the sea before April 8, 2011. The later 
radioactivity represents the most important individual emission of artificial radioactivity into 
the sea ever observed.  
Given the prevailing winds at the time of accident only 20% of the atmospheric fallout 
is estimated to have fallen on land with the majority of the remainder deposited to the North 
Pacific [Morino et al., 2011]. Contaminated waters were transported far into the Pacific Ocean 
by currents causing a great dispersion of the radioactive elements13 [Buesseler, 2014]. 
Various publications show greater details about different radioactive materials 
released by the nuclear plant and their geographical dispersion [Busby, 2012; Buesseler, 
2014; Chino et al., 2011; Morino et al., 2011; Tsumune et al. 2012;	  UNSCEAR 2013 Report].  
Different assessments of radioactivity from the Fukushima plant ranged from 10-40% 
of that of Chernobyl accident while significantly contaminated area is estimated to be 10-12% 
that of Chernobyl’s. For example, the largest source of Cs137 is global fallout from weapons 
testing amounting 950 PBq (including 600 PBq in the ocean), Chernobyl accident contributed 
100 PBq, while releases from Fukushima plant are estimated to be between 4-90 PBq 
(including 10-50 PBq atmospheric and 3.6-41 PBq direct ocean) [Buesseler, 2014]. Cesium 
137 leaks from Fukushima are compared with the amount released by 168 atomic blasts 
similar to that in Hiroshima in the end in of World War II [The Telegraph, August 25, 2011]. 
Since the accident there have been continued spills of contaminated water at the plant 
grounds and into the sea. On August 20, 2013 it was announced that 300 metric tons of 
heavily contaminated water had leaked from a storage tank [Tokyo Electric Power Company, 
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 120 gigabecquerel (GBq) 
11	  7.6 terabecquerel (TBq)	  
12
 Due to human activities at the plant the emissions rose again up to 19 thousand Bq in January 2012. 
13	   	  Recently it has been announced that for the first time trace amounts of radioactive cesium-134 
emitted from Fukushima nuclear plant were detected off the northern California coast in water 
collected about 150 km off Eureka in August 2014 [The Japan News, November 17, 2014]. 
9	  
	  
2013]. On February 27, 2014 it was revealed that another leak of 110 tons of contaminated 
water occurred [The Japan News, February 27, 2014]. A new up to a ton water leaks was 
reported on April 14, 2014 [NHK World, April 14, 2014]. On June 6, 2014 TEPCO 
announced that up to 3.4 tons of radioactive water may have leaked from barriers surrounding 
storage tanks [NHK World, June 6, 2014]. Moreover, about 11,000 tons of water used to cool 
melted-down fuel leaked out of reactor buildings into underground utility tunnels, from where 
it is believed to be flowing out to sea [NHK World, June 25, 2014]. 
Furthermore, the underground tunnels of the facilities have been filled with highly 
radioactive water, which is believed to be leaking into the nearby sea after mixing with 
groundwater [NHK World, November 25, 2014]. In June 2014 TEPCO found that radioactive 
water can easily spread in a deep layer of groundwater14 and could be spilling into the ocean. 
On June 4 as much as 4,700 becquerels of tritium per liter were detected in a well near the No. 
1 reactor building [NHK World, June 25, 2014]. Water pressure in the layer was lower than 
that of a shallower layer making it easier for contaminated water to spread in the deep layer.  
After a strong typhoon in October 2014 it was found high levels of radioactive cesium 
in groundwater (up to 460,000 becquerels per liter)15 in the compound of the nuclear plant in 
wells around the reactors buildings [NHK World, October 25, 2014]. TEPCO began pumping 
up groundwater from the wells on a trial basis in August 2014 and full-scale operations in 
October16.  
Since May 2014 TEPCO has been releasing water in the ocean from “groundwater 
bypass operation”17 as more than 8,600 tons of groundwater has been discharged so far [The 
Japan News, June 28, 2014]. The first (about 560 tons) groundwater released in May 
contained 0.016 becquerel of cesium-134 per liter, 0.047 becquerel of cesium-137 and 220 
becquerels of tritium [The Japan News, May 21, 2014]. 
Consequently, the significant pollution of sea water along the coast near the nuclear 
plant persist as a result of the continuing arrival of radioactive material transported towards 
the sea by surface and ground water running over contaminated soil as well as the leakages 
and releases from the power station18.  
Furthermore, in summer 2014 TEPCO announced that more than one trillion 
becquerels of radioactive substances were released as a result of debris removal work (280 
billion becquerels per hour) at one of the plant's reactors [NHK World, July 23, 2014]. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14
 deep layer of water is about 25 meters below the surface.  
15	  800 to 900 times the previous peak level of 500 becquerels per liter.	  
16
 TEPCO plans to treat the tainted groundwater and discharge it into the ocean to deal with the 
buildup of contaminated water. Local people strongly oppose the plan and utility has yet to discharge 
water into the ocean. 
17
 intended to reduce the amount of radiation-tainted water at the plant. Groundwater is pumped up 
from 12 wells near the 1 to 4 reactors before it flows into the basement of the reactor buildings, 
temporarily stored in a tank and is released into the sea once radiation levels are confirmed to be lower 
than TEPCO standards. 
18
 In October 2014 the concentrations of Cs-134 and Cs-137 in the seawater around Fukushima nuclear 
plant in outer layer varied between 0.0013-0.4 Bq/L and 0.011-1.2 Bq/L while in lower layer they 
were between 0.0013-0.099 Bq/L and 0.0046-0.034 Bq/L [Nuclear Regulation Authority, 2014]. 
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plant is believed to be still releasing an average of 10 million becquerels per hour of 
radioactive material. 
Radioactive contamination from the nuclear plant has spread in the region and beyond 
though air, rains, dust, water circulations, wildlife, garbage disposals, transportation, and 
affected soils, waters, plants, animals, infrastructure, and population. High levels of radiation 
were detected in large areas surrounding the nuclear plant and beyond (Map 6). Besides, 
numerous anomalous “hot spots” have been discovered in areas far beyond the adjacent 
region – e.g. in the year after the accident there were about 150 reports in Tokyo alone 
[Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, 2012].  
 
Map 6. Radioactive pollution caused                       Figure 2. Fukushima prefecture towns                     
Fukushima accident (September 18, 2011)             by radiation levels, March 11-31, 2011                          
   
Source: Ministry of Environment, 2014                    Source: Fukushima prefectural government 
 
The highest radioactive contamination has been within 20-30 km from the Fukushima 
nuclear power plant where the authorities have been implementing a 20 km (800 sq. km) 
exclusion zone and other restricted areas since March 12, 2011. On March 20 the reported air 
radiation rate outside the evacuation zone ranged from 0.7 µSv/h (35-40 km to West from 
nuclear plant) to 110	   µSv/h (30 km to Northwest from the plant) [Ministry of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, 2011]. Radiation monitoring in 47 prefectures of 
Japan showed a wide variation, but an upward trend in 10 of them on March 23, 2011 
[Nuclear Regulation Authority, 2011].  
March-May 2011 soil monitoring in Fukushima prefecture showed the presence of 
radionuclides reaching up to 710,000 Bq/kg of I-131, 282,000 Bq/kg of Cs-134, 290,000 
Bq/kg of Cs-137, 270,000*6 Bq/kg of Te-129m, 100,000 Bq/kg of Te-132, 23,000*6 Bq/kg of 
Cs-136 and 4,300*6 Bq/kg of La-140 in samples from Namie town [Nuclear Regulation 
Authority, 2012]. 
More detailed surveys have found out that cesium 13719 had strongly contaminated the 
soils in large areas of eastern and northeastern Japan [Yasunaria et al.; Nuclear Regulation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19
 Two months after the accident, with disappearance of radionuclides with a short half-life (Te-123, I-
132 and I-131), the majority of residual deposits were made up by Cs-134 and Cs-137 (Institute for 
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Authority, 2011-2014]. On November 12, 2011, officials reported that long-lived radioactive 
cesium had contaminated 30,000 sq. km of the land surface of Japan while some 11,700 sq. 
km was found to have radiation levels that exceeded Japan’s allowable exposure rate of 1 
mSv20 per year21 [Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, 2011]. 
Outside Fukushima prefecture reported soil radiation of cesium-134 and cesium-137 was 
between 30,000 and 100,000 Bq/m2 in Ichinoseki and Oshu (Iwate prefecture), in Saku, 
Karuizawa and Sakuho (Nagano prefecture), in Tabayama (Yamanashi prefecture) and 
elsewhere.   
Plutonium-238 and 239+240, Strontium-89 and 90, Tellurium-129m and Silver-110m 
fallouts have been also detected in the affected regions [Ministry of Education, Culture, 
Sports, Science and Technology, 2011, 2012]. The highest levels of Pu-239 and Pu-240 
combined were 15 becquerels per square meters22 in Fukushima prefecture and 9.4 Bq in 
Ibaraki prefecture. Nevertheless, measured plutonium, and radioactive strontium, tellurium 
and silver were very small compared with the accumulated effective doses for 50 years of 
Cesium 134 and 137.  
In July-August 2011 detected concentrations of radioactive elements in river and well 
water samples in affected regions were: maximum values for river water of 1.9 Bq/kg for Cs-
134 and 2.0 Bq/kg for Cs-137, for well water of 0.85 Bq/kg for Cs-134 and 1.1 Bq/kg for Cs-
137, and Strontium 89 and 90 in river waters of 5.5×10−2 Bq/kg and 1.8×10−2 Bq/kg 
accordingly [Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, October 2011].  
The extent of radioactive contamination of air, waters and soils in Japan has been 
monitored and updating constantly23. In Fukushima prefecture the radiation levels vary 
according to location (and even within the same locality because of the numerous “hot 
spots”), it has been decreasing but it still higher than the levels before the disaster24 (Figure 2, 
Table 4, Map 7).  
In other prefectures the environmental radioactivity levels have been stable or 
decreased but mostly they are still higher than the period before the accident (Table 5). 
The National Diet of Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation 
Commission25 concluded that the Fukushima nuclear accident “cannot be regarded as a 
natural disaster.  It was a profoundly manmade disaster - that could and should have been 
foreseen and prevented. And its effects could have been mitigated by a more effective human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety, 2012). The later were contributing more than 80% of the 
activity of residual deposits after May 20, 2011. 
20
	  The sievert (Sv) is a derived unit of ionizing radiation dose in the International System of Units and 
measures the health effect of low levels of ionizing radiation on the human body.	  
21
	  On April 19, 2011 the official “safe” radiation exposure levels was drastically increased from 1 mSv 
to 20 mSv per year. Recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection limit 
for a member of the public is 1 mSv/y (for “Post-emergency situation” 20 mSv/y) and for the radiation 
worker 20 mSv/y. 
22
	  compared to a global average of 0.4 to 3.7 Bq/kg from the atomic bomb tests.	  
23
 Up to date environmental radioactivity levels can be found on http://radioactivity.nsr.go.jp/en/ 
24
 in April 2014 radioactivity levels inside 20 km zone of Fukushima nuclear plant was still extremely 
high - from 0.2 µSv/h in Nahara and Tomioka towns up to 12.5 µSv/h, 16.8 µSv/h and 28.6 µSv/h in 
Futaba, Namie and Okuma towns [Nuclear Radiation Authority, 2014].  
25
 Formed to investigate the background and cause of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster on October 
7, 2011 and chaired by Kiyoshi Kurokawa. 
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response” [The National Diet of Japan, 2012]. It was the result of collusion between the 
government, the regulators and TEPCO, and the lack of governance by these parties. They 
effectively “betrayed the nation’s right to be safe from nuclear accidents”.  
Table 4. Evolution of environmental radioactivity in Fukushima prefecture (µSv/h) 
 Ken-poku, 
Fukushima 
City 
Ken-chu, 
Koriyama 
City 
Ken-nan, 
Shirakawa 
City 
Aizu, Aizu 
Wakamats
u City 
Minami 
Aizu, 
Minami 
Aizu Town 
Soso, 
Minami 
Soma 
City 
Iwaki, 
Iwaki City 
Taira 
Direction and 
distance from 
nuclear power 
plant 
North 
west, about 
63km 
West, 
about 
58km 
South 
west, about 
81km 
West, 
about 
98km 
West south 
West, about 
115km 
North, 
about 
24km 
South 
southwest, 
about 
43km 
Normal value* 0.04 0.04-0.06 0.04-0.05 0.04-0.05 0.02-0.04 0.05 0.05-0.06 
April 2011 2.74   0.24   0.66 
March 2012 0.63   0.1   0.17 
June 11, 2013 0.35 0.18 0.13 0.07 0.05 0.15 0.09 
March 8, 2014 0.27 0.15 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.13 0.08 
*radioactivity levels surveyed in 2010 
Source: Fukushima prefectural government 
 
Map 7. Evolution of air radiation rates in 80 km zone from Fukushima nuclear power plant 
 
Source: Nuclear Regulation Authority, 2013 
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Recent disclosure of the records of interviews of the government panel investigating the 
nuclear crisis (so-called “Yoshida file”)26 also illustrates how badly the government handled 
crisis management at Fukushima nuclear power plant and how serious the situation was [NHK 
World, September 11, November 12, 2014; The Japan News, September 13, 2014]. 
Table 5. Environmental radioactivity at 1m height in prefectures of Japan (µSv/h) 
Prefecture 
(monitoring 
post) 
Before 
March 11, 
2011 
March 20, 
2011* 
March 20, 
2012* 
March 20, 
2013 
March 20, 
2014 
December 5, 
2014 
Hokkaido 
(Sapporo) 
0.02-0.105 0.027-0.028 0.028-0.033 0.034 0.037 0.039 
Aomori 
(Aomori) 
0.017-0.102 0.021-0.023 0.018-0.024 0.021 0.026 0.032 
Iwate (Morioka) 0.014-0.084 0.025-0.040 0.021-0.029 0.038 0.039 0.032 
Miyagi (Sendai) 0.0176-0.0513 0.15** 0.051-0.053 0.055 0.054 0.047 
Akita (Akita) 0.022-0.086 0.034-0.041 0.034-0.036 0.054 0.052 0.056 
Yamagata 
(Yamagata) 
0.025-0.082 0.040-0.129 0.037-0.039 0.092**** 0.092 0.089 
Fukushima 
(Fukushima) 
0.037-0.046 2.1*** 0.89 0.82 0.27 0.22 
Ibaraki (Mito) 0.036-0.056 0.159-0.263 0.074-0.075 0.077 0.079 0.071 
Tochigi 
(Utshunomiya) 
0.030-0.067 0.136-0.164 0.050 0.079 0.084 0.073 
Gunma 
(Maebashi) 
0.016-0.049 0.069-0.103 0.025-0.026 0.071 0.076 0.064 
Saitama 
(Saitama) 
0.031-0.060 0.052-0.062 0.046-0.047 0.047 0.055 - 
Chiba (Ichihara) 0.022-0.044 0.031-0.033 0.037-0.038 0.058 0.069 0.049 
Tokyo 
(Shinjuku) 
0.028-0.079 0.044-0.049 0.049-0.050 0.057 0.071 0.061 
Kanagawa 
(Chigasaki) 
0.035-0.069 0.046-0.048 0.044-0.045 0.042 0.052 0.038 
Nigata (Nigata) 0.031-0.153 0.047-0.052 0.046-0.052 0.063 0.071 0.072 
Toyama (Imizu) 0.029-0.147 0.049-0.054 0.046-0.048 0.064 0.084 0.085 
Ishikawa 
(Kanazawa) 
0.0291-0.1275 0.047-0.063 0.046-0.051 0.052 0.063 0.064 
Fukui (Fukui) 0.032-0.097 0.046-0.053 0.044-0.049 0.061 0.073 0.071 
Yamanashi 
(Kohu) 
0.040-0.066 0.044 0.043-0.044 0.051 0.056 0.051 
Nagano 
(Nagano) 
0.0299-0.0974 0.06-0.067 0.038-0.040 0.067 0.070 0.065 
Gifu 
(Karamigahara) 
0.057-0.110 0.061-0.066 0.060-0.061 0.067 0.076 0.070 
Shizuika 
(Shizuoka) 
0.0281-0.0765 0.035-0.040 0.029 0.041 0.055 0.039 
Aichi (Nagoya) 0.035-0.074 0.039-0.042 0.039 0.068 0.071 0.068 
Mie (Yokkaichi) 0.0416-0.0789 0.046-0.051 0.045-0.046 0.070 0.081 0.071 
Shiga (Otsu) 0.031-0.061 0.034-0.037 0.031-0.032 0.065 0.081 0.074 
Kyoto (Kyoto) 0.033-0.087 0.039-0.045 0.037-0.038 0.048 0.063 0.054 
Osaka (Osaka) 0.042-0.061 0.042-0.046 0.042-0.043 0.080 0.083 0.091 
Hyogo (Kobe) 0.035-0.076 0.036-0.037 0.036-0.037 0.072 0.091 0.073 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26
 former manager of the power plant Masao Yoshida, former Prime Minister Naoto Kan and 17 others 
was relised in September 2014, and more 56 in November 2014. The government plans to disclose 
interviews with all 772 government and TEPCO officials if interviewees give approval. 
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Nara (Nara) 0.046-0.080 0.048-0.053 0.047-0.048 0.077 0.062 - 
Wakayama 
(Wakayama) 
0.031-0.056 0.031-0.033 0.031-0.032 0.081 0.083 0.094 
Tottori 
(Touhaku) 
0.036-0.110 0.063-0.075 0.062-0.063 0.071 0.073 0.081 
Shimane 
(Matsue) 
0.033-0.079 0.038-0.041 0.037-0.039 0.056 0.054 0.067 
Okayama 
(Okayama) 
0.043-0.104 0.049-0.053 0.048-0.049 0.067 0.082 0.075 
Hiroshima 
(Hiroshima) 
0.035-0.069 0.048-0.053 0.046-0.049 0.086 0.081 0.093 
Yamaguchi 
(Yamaguchi) 
0.084-0.128 0.094-0.096 0.091-0.095 0.080 0.075 0.083 
Tokushima 
(Tokushima) 
0.037-0.067 0.037-0.039 0.037-0.038 0.069 0.070 0.070 
Kagawa 
(Takamatsu) 
0.051-0.077 0.053-0.054 0.054-0.057 0.063 0.067 0.067 
Ehime 
(Matsuyama) 
0.045-0.074 0.047-0.051 0.046-0.048 0.084 0.098 0.098 
Kochi (Kochi) 0.019-0.054 0.026-0.030 0.025-0.026 0.035 0.041 0.044 
Fukuoka 
(Dazaifu) 
0.034-0.079 0.036-0.040 0.036-0.037 0.066 0.060 0.070 
Saga (Saga) 0.037-0.086 0.040-0.049 0.040-0.041 0.064 0.048 - 
Nagasaki 
(Omura) 
0.027-0.069 0.028-0.033 0.030-0.031 0.074 0.053 0.065 
Kumamoto 
(Uto) 
0.021-0.067 0.027-0.032 0.027-0.028 0.049 0.043 0.066 
Oita (Oita) 0.048-0.085 0.049-0.053 0.040-0.050 0.057 0.055 0.065 
Miyazaki 
(Miyazaki) 
0.0243-0.0664 0.026-0.028 0.026 0.060 0.034 0.038 
Kagoshima 
(Kagoshima) 
0.0306-0.0943 0.034-0.039 0.034 0.056 0.047 - 
Okinawa 
(Uruma) 
0.0133-0.0575 0.020-0.021 0.023-0.031 0.021 0.022 0.034 
* Minimum and maximum readings; ** Tohoku University data; ***MEXT data; ****March 24 data 
Source: Nuclear Radiation Authority       
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2. Human damages and health effects 
 
The March 2011 earthquake and resulting tsunami killed almost 15,900 people27, 
injured more than 6,100 and destroyed the lives of thousands more (Table 6). The majority of 
deaths were from tsunami and among elderly.28 The biggest number of victims has been from 
Miyagi, Iwate and Fukushima prefectures where whole communities were wiped out by the 
powerful tsunami.  Three and a half years after the disaster 2,601 people are still listed as 
missing and search for them has been continuing.  
 
Table 6. Number of confirmed deaths, missing and injured person associated with 
March 2011 earthquake (February 10, 2014) 
Prefectures Deaths Missing Injured Prefectures Deaths Missing Injured 
Hokkaido 1 - 3 Gunma 1 - 39 
Aomori 3 1 111 Saitama - - 45 
Iwate 4,673 1,142 213 Chiba 21 2 229 
Miyagi 9,537 1,283 4,145 Kanagawa 4 - 138 
Akita - - 4 Nigata - - 3 
Yamagata 2 - 29 Yamanashi - - 2 
Fukushima 1,607 207 182 Nagano - - 1 
Tokyo 7 - 117 Shizuoka - - 3 
Ibaraki 24 1 712 Mie - - 1 
Tochigi 4 - 133 Kochi - - 1 
Total 15,884 2,636 6,147 
Source: National Police Agency 
 
What is more, official data for the “disaster related deaths”29 have been growing 
reaching 3,076 in 10 prefectures by the end of March 2014 [NHK World, May 6, 2014].  The 
majority of victims are from Fukushima prefecture (1,691), followed by Miyagi prefecture 
(889) and Iwate prefecture (441).  
June 25, 2014 data for Fukushima prefecture show that 1,729 people have died as a 
result of lingering effects of the accident exceeding the 1,603 deaths caused directly by the 
disaster [Fukushima Minpo News, June 26, 2014]. Nevertheless, it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to identify a relationship between deaths and the accident due to the long period of 
time that has lapsed30.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27
 Latest figure is 15,889 (September, 2014). 
28
 Around 94.2% of deaths are tsunami related. Around 600 are assumed to have died from 
earthquake-related stress and chronic disease, around 265 should be earthquake-collapse related, and 
around 230 could be related to other causes such as fire, landslides etc. Around 56% of the dead were 
over 65 years old [Vervaeck and Daniell, 2012]. 
29	  They are recognized by a panel of experts (including medical doctors and lawyers) set up by each 
municipality, and a sum of 5 million yen is paid as consolation money to family for death of a main 
income earner (half sum for other family members). 
30	  government intends to provide municipal authorities with information on accident-related deaths in 
an “aggressive manner” to help standardize norms for identifying such fatalities.	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Deaths associated with the disaster include people who died as a result of having to 
change their environment and lifestyle, and live as evacuees away from home, family, 
business and community for a long period time. Many of the Fukushima victims are from 
municipalities near the damaged Fukushima nuclear plant. For instance, in Minamisoma, 
Namie and Tomioka, which partly or fully have been off-limits due to high radiation, 
accordingly as many as 447, 317 and 225 deaths have been indirectly blamed on the disaster.  
What is more, at least 97 people affected by the disaster have died unattended31 in 
temporary housing units in Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures, and experts say that the 
number of solitary death cases would likely increase in future [The Japan News, March 2014].  
Officials linked the number of suicide deaths to disaster of 2,916 as of September 
2013 [LDP, 2014]. In 2013 disaster related suicides in Fukushima32, Miyagi and Iwate 
prefectures were associated with deteriorating health of 22 of them, money problems of nine 
more, and family issues of five.  
Many farmers from the affected areas and beyond who saw their businesses and 
livelihood destructed also suffered stress and anxiety [Murayama, 2012; Watanabe, 2011]. 
For instance, a 64-year-old farmer in Sukagawa was pushed over the edge since he lost 
“everything he had ever worked for during his life”33. One day after the government imposed 
a ban on the sale of cabbages he took his life [The New York Times, March 29, 2011]. 
Another dairy farmer in 50s killed himself on the land he struggled to maintain since tsunami 
and nuclear crisis began few months after the disaster [CNN, June 14, 2011]. 
There have been also many reports for affected survivors from disaster exposed to a 
high risk or suffering from various diseases after the accident – injuries, respiration problems 
due to dust an contamination, dehydration, exhaustion, shocks, etc. In a number of places 
rapidly spreading pneumonia epidemic (mostly among elderly) was registered due to 
overpopulated rooms, poor oral hygiene, destructed facilities, and lack of specialists and 
sufficient care [HNK World, July 28, 2014]. For instance, in the three months after the 
disaster in Kesenuma, Motoyashi and Otomo hospitals 225 were admitted suffering from 
pneumonia, 52 of whom consequently died. Similarly in Ishinomaki 122 were hospitalized in 
days after the disaster at rate 7 times higher than the normal one. 
What is more, as a result of long stay in temporary accommodations many 
experienced diverse health problems. For instance, in Ishinomaki, where there are 6000 
people living in such accommodations, there has been increasing number of complains and 
sicknesses due to molt and bacteria multiplied in temporary houses [NHK World, July 23, 
2014]. 
Another factor for increased health risk has been caused by radiation exposure after 
the nuclear accident. The levels of radiation exposure of population varied according to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31
 There is no precise definition of the Japanese term “kodokushi” (meaning “solitary death”) and 
officials do not record statistics on such deaths. 
32
 Disaster related suicide rate has been on the rise in Fukushima [The Japan News, March 13, 2014]. 
33	  The farmer was reported to have lost his house in the earthquake but had a field of 7,500 organically 
grown cabbages ready for harvest when the government prohibition was announced.  
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direction from the Fukushima plant and the time spent in contaminated zones34. Major 
pathways humans were exposed to radioactive materials after the accident were: external 
exposure from radionuclides deposited on the ground; external exposure from radionuclides in 
the radioactive cloud; internal exposure from inhalation of radionuclides in the radioactive 
cloud; and internal exposure from ingestion of radionuclides in food and water [World Health 
Organization, 2012]. However, the gap between our understanding of the biological effects of 
radiation in humans and the determination of regulatory values in too wide [Fukumoto, 2013]. 
Workers in the nuclear plant have suffered the highest exposures35. According to the 
data 167 workers received radiation dose more than 100 mSv36, which is the level expert 
demonstrated measurably increases risks of cancer [United Nations Scientific Committee on 
the Effects of Atomic Radiation, 2014]. For additional 20,000 TEPCO workers37 and for 
roughly 150,000 citizens from the fallout zone exposures were lower. For instance, in Namie 
town and Iitate village, nearby communities where the evacuation was delayed, residents 
received 10 to 50 mSv. There are still occasional reports for radiation overexposure of 
workers at the plant [NHK World, May 8, 2014]. Furthermore, working in some areas38 
and using some new methods (e.g. pouring cement into underground tunnels) are likely 
expose workers to more radiation than originally expected [NHK World, November 25, 
November 28,2014].  
Experts estimates that for adults in Fukushima prefecture the average lifetime effective 
doses to be of the order of 11 mSv or less, and the first-year doses to be one third to one half 
of that [United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, 2014; 
World Health Organization, 2012]. For children and other vulnerable groups (old people, sick 
persons) these doses have been much higher (Table 7). 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34
 Biological effect (danger) of radiation vary according to the quility, energy, dose (how much one 
absorb), and the dose rate (the time one is exposed to a dose) of radiation, and the organs exposed and 
dose rate [Fukumoto, 2013].  
35
 Reported maximum combined cumulative effective dose for TEPCO workers is 678.80 mSv while 
the avarage for 31,383 workers and contractors from March 2011 to December 2013 is 12.61 mSv 
[Tokyo Electric Power Company, 2014].	   
36
 Cumulative exposure limit for workers responding to nuclear emergencies is 100 mSv. Three days 
after the accident, government raised the limit for workers at Fukushima plant to 250 mSv and kept it 
for 9 months [NHK World, July 10, July 30. 2014]. 
37
 Expert report asked the government to conduct a lifelong survey on 19,000 people who worked in 
immediate aftermath of the accident to see whether their exposure to radiation causes cancer or other 
illnesses. Such survey would provide important knowledge on radiation's impact on health and serve 
as a guideline for residents of Fukushima prefecture [NHK World, May 16, 2014]. 
38	  E.g. operator expected to lower radiation level to 1 millisievert an hour in No.3 reactor upper part 
but it found out that even after cleaning up radiation could reach 60 millisieverts an hour in some areas 
and over 10 mSv in many others. 
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Table 7. Estimated average effective radiation doses in different regions of Japan (mSv) 
Age groups in 2011 Fukushima 
prefecture 
Miyagi, Gunma, Tochigi, 
Ibaraki, Chiba and Iwate  
 Rest of Japan 
1 YEAR EXPOSURE 
Adults 1.0 - 4.3 0.2 – 1.4 0.1 – 0.3 
Child 10 year old 1.2 - 5.9 0.2 – 2.0 0.1 – 0.4 
Infant 1 year old 2.0 - 7.5 0.3 – 2.5  0.2 – 0.5 
LIFETIME EXPOSURE 
Adults 1.1 - 11 0.2 – 4.0 0.1 0.6 
Child 10 year old 1.4 - 16 0.3 – 5.5 0.1 - 0.8 
Infant 1 year old 2.1 -18 0.4 – 6.4 0.2 – 0.9 
Source: United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, 2014 
 
Thanks to the timely undertaken measures by the authorities (warnings, protection, 
evacuation, monitoring, decontamination, treatment), the radiation levels for the general 
population have been well below the norms required to damage human health39. Nevertheless, 
there have been debates and great concerns about the risks for people exposed to lower doses 
since risks are lower and hardly to detect [Akiyama et al., 2012; Fisher et al., 2013; 
Foodwatch, 2011; Hasegawa, 2013; Pacchioli, 2014; Rosen, 2013].  
According to an official report 180,592 people in the general population were screened 
for radiation exposure in March 2011 and no case was found which affects health (Nuclear 
and Industrial Safety Agency, 2011). The World Health Organization anticipated that there 
would be no noticeable increases in cancer rates for the overall population, but somewhat 
elevated rates for particular sub-groups [World Health Organization, 2013]. For example, 
infants of Namie town and Iitate village were estimated to have a 6% increase in female 
breast cancer risk and a 7% increase in male leukemia risk.  
The latest UN report of more than 80 international experts also pointed out that no 
deaths or serious illnesses have so far been reported from the radiation exposure from the 
nuclear accident. It concluded that no discernible increased incidence of radiation-related 
health effects (e.g. rate of cancer) are expected among exposed members of the public or their 
descendants” [The Japan News, April 3, 2014; NHK World, May 28, 2014]. However, it 
warned that “an increased risk of thyroid cancer can be inferred for infants and children” 
stressing the need for continued research40. The maximum radiation dose for a year after the 
Fukushima crisis began was estimated at 9.3 mSv for adults in areas near the Fukushima plant 
and at 13 mSv for 1-year-old infants.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39
 Since April 2011 the maximum annual allowable radiation exposure to let evacuees return to the 
areas near nuclear plant is 20 mSv. For Fukushima schools a target of exposure dose 1 mSv/y was set 
up which should be used in decision making on limiting outdoor activity at schools. 
40
 November 2014 interim report of expert panel, based on a survey of some 370,000 people aged 18 
or younger in Fukushima prefecture, also suggests that that thyroid cancer cases are unlikely to be 
linked to exposure to radiation from the nuclear accident calling for more child thyroid checks 
[Fukushima Minpo News, November 15, 2014; NHK World, November 27, 2014].	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People living and working in different locations of the affected regions have been 
exposed to diverse levels of radiation41. What is more, even in the same locations the radiation 
level often differs due to the different precision of instruments or local hot spots. In addition, 
people are constantly exposed to small amount of no harmful natural background radiation – 
it is approximately 2.1 mSv per person in Japan, including 0.3 mSv from space, 0.33 mSv 
from land, 0.48 mSv from Radon etc. and 0.99 mSv from food [National Institute of 
Radiological Science, 2014]. 
In addition, confusion has been also spreading among municipalities tasked with 
radiation cleanup under changing government decontamination policy42 [Fukushima Minpo 
News, July 22, 2014]. Under the new policy, the government will determine decontamination 
needs by using radiation exposure data collected from individual dosimeters (which tend to be 
lower than the current safe dose) leading to reduction areas of government-mandated 
decontamination. 
Some municipalities welcome that new policies since it will allow to scale down 
decontamination efforts in areas where radiation levels are unlikely to go down significantly. 
However, others are worried that residents will be confused. For instance, according to Date 
officials, the city measured the radiation exposure of its 52,000 citizens wearing dosimeters 
(July 2012-June 2013) and results showed that per-year exposure levels for nearly 70% of 
them (even in areas where aerial radiation levels exceeded 0.23 microsievert per hour) was 
less than 1 millisievert in total [Fukushima Minpo News, July 22, 2014]. Moreover, Tamura 
officials declare that city will not change its decontamination plan, since if the cleanup 
projects are scaled back, it would cause anxiety among residents. Some experts43 also suggest 
that new approach is inappropriate since many residents have deliberately stayed indoors and 
if they start to go out like they used to, the individual radiation doses might go up. 
The official monitoring of agricultural and food products conducted after April 2012 
indicates that the violation rates on new food safety standard (1 mSv/year) have been much 
less than 1% [Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 2014].  
What is more, surveys in most affected regions indicate that the annual radiation intakes 
from foods have been below 1 mSv/year (Figure 3). For instance, according to the 
September–October 2012 survey the estimated annual radiation doses from radioactive 
cesium in foods were in safety limit (Figure 4).  It ranges from 0.0009 to 0.0057 mSv/year 
being highest in Miyagi prefecture and certain regions of Fukushima prefectures. At the same 
time, annual radiation doses from radioactive potassium (naturally occurring in foods) were 
between 0.14 and 0.22 mSv/year as no significant changes found comparing to before the 
accident. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41
 Government maintains that radiation exposure on residents in Fukushima Prefecture are no different 
from those of similar surveys in other prefectures [The Japan News, May 18, 2014]. 
42
  Government has been decontaminating areas whose aerial radiation reading is 0.23 microsievert per 
hour or more, based on its policy of keeping annual radiation exposure for individuals at 1 millisievert 
or less. 
43
 E.g. Keizo Ishii, director of the Research Center for Remediation Engineering of Living 
Environments Contaminated with Radioisotopes, Tohoku University. 
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Figure 3. Estimation on annual dietary intake of radionuclides for September-October 
2012 in Japan (mSv/year) 
 
           Source: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare 
Figure 4. Evolution of effective dose from Cs-134 and Cs-137 in foods in Nakadori area 
of Fukushima 
 
           Source: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare 
 
Furthermore, radiation doses from radioactive cesium have been found to be decreasing 
over time - for 15 studied areas it was lower comparing to previous estimates for September-
November 2011 (0.0024–0.019 mSv/year) and February-March 2012 (0.0009–0.0094 
mSv/year). Likewise, in Fukushima prefecture (Nakadōri Area) the effective dose from 
radioactive cesium in foods has been decreasing constantly and it is less than 1% of the 
maximum allowed level44 [Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 2012]. 
According to a large panel of experts the radiation uptake in such ranges is not 
harmful for the human health (Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 2012). Furthermore, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44
 From 0,01 mSv/y in September-November 2011 it dropped to 0,038 mSv/y in September-October 
2012. 
0	   0.02	   0.04	   0.06	   0.08	   0.1	   0.12	   0.14	   0.16	   0.18	   0.2	   0.22	  
Hokkaidō	  
Iwate	  
Miyagi	  
Fukushima	  (Hamadōri)	  
Fukushima	  (Nakadōri)	  
Fukushima	  (Aizu)	  
Tochigi	  
Ibaraki	  
Saitama	  
Tokyo	  
Kanagawa	  
Niigata	  
Ōsaka	  
Kōchi	  
Nagasaki	  
K-­‐40	  
Cs-­‐134	  &	  
Cs-­‐137	  
21	  
	  
“health effects” from extra cumulative exposure above the official limit are difficult to be 
verified based on the current available knowledge45. Therefore, even if people are exposed to 
more than “around 100 mSv” of the extra cumulative exposure, it will not necessarily mean 
they will have adverse health effect [Koizumi, 2011].  
Some publications also demonstrate that the additional dose of Fukushima 
radionuclides received by consumers of Pacific Bluefin tuna can be estimated to result in two 
additional fatal cancer cases per 10,000,000 exposed people [Fisher et al. (2013]. 
November 2013-February 201 survey of the Fukushima Consumer Cooperative found 
out that the levels of radioactive cesium in home-cooked meals in the prefecture were slightly 
above the limit for radioactive cesium46 for 4% of participating households [Fukushima 
Minpo News, March 7, 2014]. Nevertheless, the internal exposure to radioactive materials of 
all screened household members was below the 300Bq threshold for human radiation 
exposure. 
Despite that in many places the radiation level and overall artificial exposure are less 
than the level in some onsens47 or certain medical check-ups, many show a great concern on 
current figures48. That worries have been further enforced by the controversial opinions of 
experts in the filed, slow process of decontamination in some areas and ecosystems (e.g. 
forests, farmlands), unresolved issue with safe disposal of contaminated debris in certain 
areas, some deficiency of the food safety control systems, continuing radiation leakages in the 
nuclear plant, etc. 
It is known that when a large amount of radioactive cesium enters ecosystem and agri-
food chain, it quickly becomes ubiquitous, contaminating water, soil, plants, animals, foods, 
etc. Radioactive cesium bioaccumulates, bioconcentrates, and biomagnifies as it moves up the 
food chain. Routine ingestion of foods contaminated with “low levels” of radioactive cesium 
has been shown to lead to its bioaccumulation in the heart, endocrine tissues, kidneys, small 
intestines, pancreas, spleen and liver. This process occurs much faster in children than in 
adults. Our interviews with local residents have found out that the cases of diverse complains 
and hospitalization in Fukushima has been increasing since the nuclear disaster.  
What is more, it is believed that the health effects of the radiation release have been 
“primarily psychological rather than physical effects”. Many consumers and producers alike 
“lose peace of mind” having food with (lower than official safety limit but nevertheless) 
radiation contamination. As one Fukushima farmer was cited to say “his family is taking 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45
 there is a limitation to verify the effect arising from additional radiation exposure (including 
carcinogenesis and other influences since); difficulty to distinguish explicitly the effect of radiation 
and other effects; population of epidemiological studies were not large enough; and inaccuracy of 
estimated radiation exposure [Koizumi, 2011]. 
46
 the highest level detected in one household of 2.6 Bq/kg for Cesium 137 and 1.1 Bq/kg for Cesium 
134. 
47	  hot springs regularly visited by many Japanese.	  
48
 It is true in other countries as well – e.g. a recent US report on the lessons from the Fukushima crisis 
of the National Academy of Sciences notes that poor communication between the central government 
and local governments, as well as a lack of clear standards about radiation levels that require 
decontamination led to public distrust in the government [NHK World, July 25, 2014]. 
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extreme care to protect their health by choosing only “safe” food, resulting in “a nerve-
wracking lifestyle.” [Kakuchi, 2013]. 
Furthermore, long periods of evacuee life, lost property and employment have caused 
many people to grow isolated or develop physical or mental problems. For instance, evacuees 
from Namie reported that their health deteriorated after evacuating and they feel more irritable 
compared to before [Pushpalal et al., 2013]. Stress has been causing disputes among evacuees, 
lack of sleep, and increased smoking or drinking to alleviate psychological pain. Depression 
and family collapse have been also increasing. More than a half of evacuated live apart from 
the extended family, which is another reason for frustration.  
A 2014 survey indicates that 68% of evacuated households in Fukushima prefecture 
have one or more members with health problems such as lack of sleep or depression [NHK 
World, April 30, 2014]. Data from the Fukushima Center for Disaster Mental Health shows 
that consultations for emotional instability, such as irritation, depression and mood swings, 
increased 50% since 2012, forming 19% of total health consultations [The Japan Time, March 
1, March 1, 2014]. Official survey has also found that almost 34% of children in Iwate, 
Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures who were aged 3 to 5 at the time of March 2011 
earthquake now suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder such as sleeping disorders, 
flashbacks etc. [The Japan News, March 2, 2014]. 
It was also reported that many elderly men cannot cook, so they became unable to 
maintain a balanced diet or develop a habit of turning to alcohol, and as a result they can 
easily fall ill [The Japan News, March 20, 2014). All these problems have been further 
aggravated by the lack of enough specialized doctors, health care centers and social workers 
in all affected areas. 
Data show that the suicide-prevention hotline in Fukushima prefecture received record 
18,194 calls in 201349 and consultations related to the 2011 disasters still stand out from the 
other issues [Fukushima Minpo News, June 5, 2014]. The content of consultations has also 
changed over time - unlike the first days of the disasters, when new supply lines were in dire 
need, nowadays callers often discuss issues regarding mental distress. In 2011 almost 12% of 
all calls were related to the quake and nuclear crisis. In 2012 the later fell to just bellow 5% 
but counselors spent more hours talking to each person on average. Most recent topics range 
from arguments between spouses over whether to leave Fukushima, to the way fathers feel 
estranged from families after being forced to move out of the house to find work. Sense of 
loss and isolation, as well as pessimism about life in general, have recently stood out, while 
many used to mention “a sense of unity” and “preciousness of life” in the early stage of the 
disasters50. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49
 In 2011 the hotline handled fewer calls than 2010 (13,677 versus 16,649) because the telephone 
network had been damaged by the quake and Koriyama’s office remained out of service for about a 
month afterward [Fukushima Minpo News, June 5, 2014]. In 2012 the number of calls was up 30% 
(17,881). 
50
 According to experts the rise in calls is an alarming sign indicating that aftereffects have reached 
every corner of residents’ lives and reflecting the diversity of the mental problems rooted in March 11.  
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Free legal consultations service for the disaster victims51 has also been on a rise – e.g. 
in fiscal 2013 totaled 48,418 nationwide (up 12.6% from the previous year) as more than 80% 
(39,288 cases) were in Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures [The Japan News, 
September 11, 2014]. Family legal troubles, including divorce and inheritance, topped the list 
at 39.2%, followed by financial troubles such as loans between friends at 25.4%, multiple 
debts, including double loan problems, accounted for 13.7%, and real estate issues such as 
land purchases by municipalities aimed at post- disaster reconstruction were 10.5%. 
Healthcare has also been a major issue for the more than 30,000 people who have 
worked at the nuclear plant since the accident [NHK World, May 8, 2014]. There are reports 
that Fukushima disaster workers self medicating with alcohol to deal with stress, PTSD, 
depression, negative work environment, poor wages, wage- skimming, substandard living 
conditions and fear about future [McCurry, 2013].  
Surveys of the Fukushima Labor Bureau demonstrated that 68% of business operators 
involved in radioactive decontamination work have been violating the law [Fukushima Minpo 
News, March 13, 2014]. According to the officials 446 business operators were involved in 
1,105 cases of legal violations, out of which 67% with labor conditions (such as failure to pay 
wages), and almost one third with health and safety (such as a lack of safety training, failure 
to conduct prior checks on the amounts of radiation at work sites, etc.). Only for April to 
August 2014 there were 130 complaints of unpaid wages and inadequate safety measures for 
workers employed to decommission the Fukushima plant [NHK World, September 22, 2014]. 
Some people are also concerned about the deteriorating work quality as the number of 
staff unfamiliar with working at nuclear plant environment52 increases [The Japan News, 
October 21, 2014]. According to TEPCO 25 workers experienced some work-related 
difficulties, such as injury or heat stroke in 2012, but that figure increased to 32 in 2013. What 
is more, in March 2014 a 55--year-old man died after he was buried in soil while excavating 
it53.  
Consequently, the Nuclear Regulation Authority announced it will consider revisions 
to the law for protecting nuclear plant workers' health in emergencies responding to calls in 
negotiations that started 3 years ago with the Tokyo Occupational Safety and Health Center54 
[NHK World, July 10. 2014]. The later stresses that such revision is vital for ensuring that 
nuclear plant workers are better prepared for emergencies and that workers must be informed 
of how radiation exposure could affect health and decide in advance whether to give consent. 
The number of workers taking part in the decommissioning and other work at the 
Fukushima nuclear plant has doubled to more than 5,700 in the past year [HNK World, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51
 System provides free legal consultations to any quake victims who visit Japan Legal Support Center 
offices without any prerequisites (e.g. income). The government intends to extend the service period 
by three years after expiration date (end of March 2015). 
52
 manpower shortages have occurred because veteran workers left Fukushima unsatisfied with 
short-term contracts and working environment. At the same time there are many employed from other 
regions of the country where it is dificult to find job with no experience in working at nuclear plant. 
53
 the first fatality since decommissioning work started. 
54
 Nationwide information center on occupational safety and health issue. Until middle of 2014 the 
nuclear regulator maintained that it is not in charge. 
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September 29, 2014]. According to TEPCO contractors hire most of them55 and they are 
responsible for labor safety56 [NHK World, July 17, September 29, 2014].  
Furthermore, the Nuclear Regulation Authority recently approved a proposal to study 
raising the emergency radiation exposure limit beyond the current legal accumulative limit of 
100 mSv [NHK World, July 30, 2014]. It will decide on the level by referring to the overseas 
standards as well as on how to get prior consent from workers and train them for such cases.  
Therefore, the entire long-term health impact of the triple disaster is hardly to be 
assessed presently.  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55
 more than 10,000 workers are registered on TEPCO contractors' lists. 
56	  TEPCO recently started to take measures to improve working conditions – e.g. it is constructing a 
large rest building on the premises that can accommodate 1,200 people. 
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3. Evacuation and migration 
 
The earthquake, tsunami and the nuclear accident have caused a large evacuation 
involving some 470,000 (the third day after the earthquake) and over 320,000 displaced 
persons on a longer-term basis [Reconstruction Agency, 2014].  
By March 15, 2011 the official number of evacuated people overpassed 440,000 
(World Health Organization, March 15, 2011). The greatest number of evacuees and stranded 
persons were from Miyagi, Fukushima and Iwate prefectures where they accounted for a good 
portion of the entire population (Table 8). The number of refugees moved to other prefectures 
was also quite considerable – 52,000 in Fukushima prefecture, 7,500 in Miyagi prefecture, 
and 1,500 in Iwate prefecture [Pushpala et al., 2013]. 
 
Table 8. Number of evacuation centers and evacuees, March 17, 2011 
Prefectures Evacuation centers Evacuees Stranded Share of population, % 
Aomori 32 367 - 0.03 
Iwate 386 48,439 ≈10,000 4.39 
Miyagi 1,063 191,467 >6,050 8.37 
Yamagata* 28 2,712 - 0.23 
Fukushima 556 131,665 98 6.3 
Ibaraki* 185 7,567 - 0.25 
Tochigi 148 1,028 - 0.05 
Nigata* 51 2,674 - 0.11 
Total >2,398 385,919 >16,150 2.56 
* including evacuees from Fukushima and/or Miyagi 
Source: World Health Organization, 2011                             
 
Immediately after the nuclear accident the government recommended57 evacuation of 
about 78,000 people living within a 20-km radius of the power plant and sheltering in own 
homes of about 62,000 others living between 20 and 30 km from the plant. In April 2011, the 
evacuation of about 10,000 more people form areas further to the Northwest of the plant was 
recommended (so called “Deliberate Evacuation Area”) because of the high levels of 
radioactive material on the ground58.  
On April 22, 2011, Fukushima prefecture was divided into following areas (Map 8):  
1) Restricted Area in 20 km radius around the nuclear plant where entry is 
prohibited (excluding those engaged in emergency response).  
2) Deliberate Evacuation Area other than Restricted Area, where annual 
cumulative radiation dose was expected to reach 20 mSv per year. Overnight stay is 
prohibited but it is permitted to pass through or commute to workplace (in case continued 
operation is approved by local authority).  
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 Evacuation order was placed on March 15, 2011. A high percentage of residents of Minamisoma, 
Kawamata and Iitate received information from TV, radio or the internet [The National Diet of Japan, 
2012]. The Mayor of Namie recounted that he made desision for evacuation on March 12 after learing 
from tv and there was not directives from government [Pushpalal et al., 2013]. 
58
 Population of 11 municipalities in six towns and villages (Tomioka, Okuma, Futaba, Namie, 
Katsurao and Iitate) of about 81,000 had to be evacuated from the no-entry zone after nuclear disaster. 
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3) Evacuation prepared areas in case of emergency59 - 20-30 km radius from 
Fukushima nuclear plant where certain groups (pregnant women, with special needs) are not 
permitted.  
4) Specific Spots Recommended for Evacuation - sites with a cumulative dose of 
20 mSv/y and above. 
 
Map 8. Restricted, Deliberate evacuation,            Map 9. Present status of evacuation and  
and Specific spots areas (September 30, 2011)       restricted areas (March 30, 2014)
60
 
 
Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade and        Source: Reconstruction Agency, 2014               
Industry, 2011            
 
In the end of 2011 the government decided to rearrange the areas to which evacuation 
orders have been issued into following categories (Map 9):  
1) Areas to which evacuation orders are ready to be lifted - it is confirmed that the 
annual integral dose of radiation will definitely be below 20mSv. People can pass through the 
areas along main roads, return home temporarily (staying overnight is prohibited), and enter 
the areas for the purpose of public benefit. They can also resume businesses such as 
manufacturing and conduct related maintenance, repair, or transport activities. Resuming 
farming	  depends on the degree of limitation on rice planting and the extent to which radiation 
has been removed from the ground. For hospitals, welfare facilities, or shops, work is limited 
to that for preparation for resuming businesses.  People are not required in principle to take or 
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 Lifted on September 30, 2011. 
60
	  On April 1, 2014 the evacuation order for a portion of Miyakoji District, Tamura City was lifted, 
which was the first complete lifting in the initial “no go zone” within a 20-km from the nuclear plant. 
On October 2014 evacuation advisory was lifted for the bulk of Kawauchi village within 20 km of the 
nuclear plant. The status of western part of the village also changed to a zone preparing for lifting of 
evacuation advisory. According to many these will be a test wether people would be ready to return 
back to areas surrounding nuclear plant [Fukushima Minpo News, October 1, 2014]. 
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carry out protection measures, such as screening or measures to control the radiation dose 
when they enter the areas temporarily. 
2) Areas in which residents are not permitted to live – the annual integral dose of 
radiation is expected to be 20 mSv or more. People can temporarily return home in the areas 
(but staying overnight is prohibited), pass through the areas along main roads, and enter the 
areas for the purpose of public benefit, such as for repairing the infrastructure or conducting 
disaster prevention-related work. Entry is not recommended but allowed during daytime. 
3) No entry areas - the annual integral dose of radiation is expected to be 20 mSv or 
more within five years and the current integral dose of radiation per year is 50 mSv or more. 
People are legally required to evacuate from the areas, for which physical barriers to entry 
such as barricades are placed at the boundaries of the area. People may temporarily return 
home to meet domestic needs and requirements as far as possible, while those who are in 
charge thoroughly screen people for radiation, control individual doses of radiation, and 
require the people entering the zone to wear protective gear. 
4) Restricted area – 20 km radius from the Fukushima plant (other than areas 1, 2, 3). 
5) Specific spots recommended for evacuation.  
The evacuations greatly reduced (by up to a factor of 10) the levels of exposure that 
would otherwise have been received by those living in evacuated areas [United Nations 
Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, 2013]. 
The overall number of evacuees has decreased significantly and in February 2012 
there were 342,509 evacuees living in 1,200 municipalities in 47 prefectures around the 
country [National Policy Unit, 2012]. Most of them (94.1%) were in temporary and public 
housings61, hospitals etc., some 4.9 % lived with relative, friends etc., 97 stayed in hotels and 
similar facilities, and only 58462 remained in evacuation centers (community hall, school etc.) 
in 2 prefectures.  
The reconstruction process has been progressing rapidly, as most evacuees were 
moved to temporary built houses by September 201163. Some evacuees have moved to 
permanent homes and return to a normal life. Vital infrastructure such as major road, railway, 
harbors, and telecommunications network have been quickly restored, and essential public 
services such as hospitals, schools, water and energy supply etc. quickly re-established. In 
recent months there has been considerable progress (decontamination, lifting evacuation 
orders, rebuilding, re-opening administration, hospitals, schools, train services, etc.) in some 
parts of the evacuation zone around the crippled nuclear plant as well [NHK World, April 1, 
April 24, June 2, 2014; The Asahi Shinbun, April 7, 2014; The Japan News, June 1, 2014].  
At the same time diverse national and local initiatives for building disaster resilient 
towns have been in progress, including the collective relocation of residential areas to safe 
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 By July 2011 there were built 46,081 units of temporary housing (about 88% of planned number) 
and 73% of evacuees had moved into 73% of the temporary housing available [World Health 
Organization, July, 2011]. 
62
 Compared with 41,143 in June 2011 [Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. 
63	  At the same time only 99 evacuees were reported living is shelters in July 2013 and none since then 
[Reconstruction Agency, 2014].  
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places such as higher ground in 276 districts in 26 municipalities64, and the readjustment and 
leveling of land for residential areas in 58 districts in 19 municipalities [Reconstruction 
Agency, 2014]. Latest data indicates that while 81% of planed housing reconstruction started 
merely 11% have been completed65 [Reconstruction Agency, 2014].  
There are still more than 247,000 evacuated people living in temporary housing and 
other makeshift facilities nationwide (Figure 5). What is more, a significant number of them 
live outside home prefectures – e.g. in the end of August 2014 as many as 47,149 former 
Fukushima residents are living outside the prefecture, 6,974 people from Miyagi prefecture, 
and 1,513 from Iwate prefectures. Furthermore, many evacuees have been moved multiple 
times before settling to a “permanent” place or returning home66 [NHK, August 4, 2014].  
 
Figure 5. Evolution of number of evacuees in post disaster years 
 
 
Source: Reconstruction Agency, National Police Unit 
 
In August 2014, a great portion of the evacuees still lives in “temporary housing, etc.” 
(93.38%) as most of them are in “private sector houses” (110,339 people in 46,221 houses), a 
significant portion “in temporary houses” (93,017 people in 42,590 houses), and the rest in 
“public houses, etc.”  (21,979 people in 8,201 houses) [Reconstruction Agency, 2014].  
In Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures more than 90,000 people live in 
makeshift housing [The Japan News, September 12, 2014]. In the end of July 2014 the 
occupancy rate of temporary housing stood at 79% in Iwate prefecture, 80% in Miyagi 
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 It is estimated that 22,000 households need to be resettled to higher ground or further in land in the 3 
disaster prefectures, including 6,900 in Ishinomaki, 3,000 in Higashi Matsushima, and 2,000 in Sendai 
[Yonekura, 2013]. The resettlement project budget for 5 years is 350 billion yen (out of 19 trillion yen 
of the overall Reconstruction budget). 
65	  Construction of public houses in most affected 3 prefectures is expected to complete in 2015 and 
private houses in 2017. 
66
 For instance, in the year after the accidents approximately 70% of the residents of Futaba, Okuma, 
Tomioka, Naraha and Namie had to evacuate four times or more [The National Diet of Japan, 2012]. 
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prefecture, and 78% in Fukushima prefecture, while only a faction of planned public housing 
were completed - 12.7% in Iwate, 9.8% in Miyagi and 7.3% in Fukushima prefecture.  
Continued use of the makeshift facilities67 has been an issue as their conditions rapidly 
deteriorate (damages, bacteria, etc.). Recent deadly mudslides also caused fear about the 
safety of makeshift housing residents since some of these houses were built in sediment 
related “caution zones”68 [The Japan News, November 2, 2014]. 
The construction of public housing has remained slow, with only about 10% of 
planned 30,000 new low-rent units completed in most affected Miyagi, Iwate and Fukushima 
prefectures by the end of August, 2014 [NHK World, September 10, 2014]. According to the 
officials selecting locations and acquiring land plots take time as well limited availability of 
workers and building materials have been delaying factors. Recent data indicate that about 
330 of the completed units in 19 municipalities are unoccupied while in other locations 
applicants outnumber the available units69. 
The progress in projects to relocate tsunami stricken communities has also been slow 
and merely 10% of the areas planned for relocated communities had been developed by the 
end of January 2014 [NHK World, March 11, 2014]. A new town is coming to existence in 
Tamaura-Nishi district of Iwanuma (Miyagi Prefecture), where residential land has been 
developed for a collective relocation project [The Japan News, September 11, 2014]. About 
60% of about 1,800 people who lived in the city’s six districts along the tsunami hit coast will 
move into the housing units. The new town will have 336 residences, including 178 publicly 
operated housing units scheduled to be completed by the end of the fiscal 201470. Bus services 
started in October 2014, but a large supermarket is set to be opened in summer 2015. 
The post disaster reconstruction has been much more delayed in Fukushima prefecture 
[The Japan News March 11, 2014]. A mid October public opinion poll indicated that for 86% 
of voters reconstruction work “has not progressed at all,” or “has not sufficiently progressed” 
[The Japan News, October 28, 2014]. 
More than three and held years after the accident about 127,000 Fukushima prefecture 
residents are still displaced, of which 101,000 are from the “Evacuation Order Area”71 
[Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. The number of evacuees within Fukushima prefecture is 
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 In principle, people are allowed to live in the temporary housing for up to two years but	   the 
maximum period was extended to five years in Iwate and Miyagi under a special measure for areas hit 
by large-scale disasters, and until the end of March 2016 in Fukushima. 
68
 in August 2014 a wave of mudslides swept away houses in such caution zones in Hiroshima. In 
Miyagi and Iwate prefectures 52 still live in temporary housing and prefectural governments are 
considering the transfer residents in such areas to other locations. 
69	  vacancy is attributed to the changing needs of evacuees during delayed reconstruction – e.g. many 
people started rebuilding their lives by finding jobs and homes in communities where they had moved 
while some simply cannot afford to move again. 
70
 some people have already started to live in 27 newly built residences, 120 housing units are 
currently being constructed, while other residences have yet to be built. 
71
 Including 32,000 from Evacuation lifting preparation area, 23,000 from Residence restricted areas, 
and 25,000 from Returnnig back difficult areas [Reconstriction Agency, 2014]. 
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81,00072, and most of them (92,59%) are living in temporary houses (including private), 
4,94% are in employees houses, etc., and the rests are staying in houses of relatives and 
friends. 
Furthermore, around 45,000 of Fukushima evacuees are still evacuated outside73 the 
prefecture [Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. Most of them are in Tokyo (6,300), Yamagata 
(4,700), Nigata (4,100), Ibaraki (3,400) and Chiba (3,300) prefectures. Available data show 
that 81% of them live in the temporary housing complexes including apartments or civil 
servants housings, and the rest stay with relatives and friends [Fukushima Prefecture 
Government, 2014].  
About 40% of the first batch of public housing for people displaced by the Fukushima 
nuclear disaster will not be ready by the end of fiscal 201574, forcing those who evacuated to 
wait longer for permanent homes [Fukushima Minpo News, August 5, 2014]. According to 
the prefecture it takes longer than expected to conclude deals with landowners of construction 
sites for large housing complexes while work to transform forests and rice paddies into 
residential land is also going slowly. 
The cleaning up and disposal of enormous amount of earthquake and tsunami debris 
has been largely completed in Miyagi and Iwate prefectures but still legging behind in 
Fukushima prefecture [Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. Decontamination of lands, houses, 
roads etc. in the evacuation and other contaminated zones has been a complex and slow 
process with less than a half of houses decontaminated in the three most affected prefectures.  
About 70% of monitored 58 municipalities in 7 prefectures had completed or almost 
completed decontamination by the end of March 2014 while remaining 16 failed to meet 
initial deadline as 12 cities and towns have sought extensions from 1 to 3 years of government 
funding for the clean up [NHK World, May 15, 2014]. 
The decontamination has not been proceeding as planned in evacuation zone as well 
[NHK World, June 10, 2014]. The Environment Ministry was planning to finish 
decontaminating 11 cities, towns and villages by the end of March 2014 but extended the 
decontamination period for 6 of them by 2 to 3 years.  
About 17,500 households were registered in the high-radiation evacuation zones as of 
April 2014 [NHK World, June 25, 2014]. All 24,500 former residents in 7 municipalities in 
no-entry zone remain evacuees [NHK World, June 23, 2014]. In no entry areas there are 9,100 
homes designated as unsuitable for living for a long period of time since radiation exposure 
exceeds 50 millisieverts per year. The government has yet to decide whether to conduct full-
scale operations to remove the radioactive materials because it is unclear whether 
decontamination will be effective and feared that workers may be exposed to high levels of 
radiation. 
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 about 24,000 people of them evacuated to Iwaki and an increasing number have resettled in the city 
[The Japan News, October 28, 2014]. 
73
 only reported number to the government. It is assumed that the actual number should be higher. 
74
 In August 2014 the prefectural government revealed that 1,600 housing units of the first 3,700 
planned will likely face delays up to 9 months (residents were scheduled to move in by March 2016). 
Additional 1,190 more expected to be built in the same period are likely to be delayed by a year. 
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What is more, experimental decontamination75 results show that current 
decontamination technology has limits and considerable time would be needed to clean up 
tainted areas. Radiation levels in some areas near the damaged nuclear plant have been more 
than halved due to decontamination but still remain high [NHK World, June 10, 2014]. For 
instance, radiation levels in residential districts of Namie town averaged 3.26 to 8.47 
microsieverts per hour (about 40 to 50% of the pre-decontamination levels) and in Futaba 
town averaged 3.01 to 4.46 microsieverts per hour (about 20 to 30% of the 
pre-decontamination levels). These figures are more than 10 times higher than the government 
set level (0.23 microsieverts per hour) that requires decontamination. Consequently, the 
government will consider whether to carry out full-scale decontamination of such areas after 
asking former residents whether they hope to return to hometowns as well as receiving 
suggestions on reconstructing the no entry areas. 
This estimate suggests that decontamination work may reduce radiation levels at no 
entry zones below the government set maximum annual threshold of 20 millisieverts in 10 
years [NHK World, June 23, 2014]. In places with an annual radiation reading of 100 
millisieverts, decontamination would lower levels to a range of 9 to 19 millisieverts by 2021 
while areas with 50 millisieverts would see a drop to between 6 and 11 millisieverts76. 
Nevertheless, radiation levels in no-go zones are expected to remain far above the 
internationally recommended safe level even a decade after the nuclear disaster77. 
Besides, the progress in decontamination work does not necessarily mean residents’ 
return is smooth [The Japan News, October 28, 2014]. For example, evacuation instructions 
were lifted in eastern parts of the Miyakojimachi district in Tamur in April 2014 but only 
about one third of the 354 registered residents have returned until October (mostly elderly). 
This is largely because living circumstances in the district have not returned to previous 
state78.  
August 2014 survey in Namie and Tomioka indicated that 50% of former residents 
have made decision “never return to hometowns” [NHK World, October, 2014]. The later 
figure was much higher than in 2013 indicating that some “undecided” have taken decision 
not to return for a good because of difficulties (e.g. lack of infrastructure, sufficient 
government support, etc.) and risks79. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	   carried at 6 locations in October 2013 -  January 2014 in areas regarded as unsuitable for living 
(annual exposure to radiation exceed 50 millisieverts). 
76
 Based on a hypothetical model in which a person spends 8 hours a day outdoors and lives in a house 
built of wood. In case decontamination does not take place, the annual radiation reading of 100 
millisieverts would naturally drop to 37 millisieverts by 2021, and a reading of 50 millisieverts would 
drop to 19. 
77
 According to the International Commission on Radiological Protection the average person should 
not be exposed to more than one millisievert annually. 
78
	  Before the disaster residents were able to reach hospitals and large commercial facilities in Okuma 
in about 30 minutes by car, which is still in evacuation zone.	  
79	  In 2013 one third of evacuees from Namie responded that they will never return because “there is no 
hope of radiation levels decreasing”, “the nuclear accident will not be brought under control”, and “”it 
will be difficult to rebuild social infrastructure” [Pushpalal et. al., 2013]. Among those who want to 
return, 70% stated that certain conditions would have to be met before they return such as decrease in 
32	  
	  
In December 2013 the government compiled new guidelines for helping people 
affected by the nuclear accident including financial assistance for residents who plan to return 
home because their evacuation orders have been lifted and those who need to move 
elsewhere. For residents of areas where evacuation orders are still in place, the government 
will cover the cost of purchasing homes if people want to start new lives elsewhere, and 
provide a lump sum compensation for the mental distress they could suffer after 2017. 
Many evacuees have been refusing to return back even after decontamination is 
completed because of the persisting high radiation in forests around houses, and some hot 
spots in neighboring areas. That is especially true for the younger generation who chose to 
stay away because of the health risk, and destructed business and community infrastructure 
(schools, medical facilities), etc.  
In some cases (e.g. Kawauchi village) there has been a drop in the radiation levels80 
and improvements in infrastructure but the government postpone removal of the evacuation 
advisory after consultations with and opposition by residents [The Japan News, July 14, 
2014]. Residents in the area where the evacuation advisory was lifted on October 1, 2014 
numbered 275 of 139 families, out of total, 48 people of 22 families have applied for long-
term stays at their homes81 [Fukushima Minpo News, October 1, 2014]. 
For some places there is no clear timetable for the end of decontamination and 
rebuilding process. Consequently, evacuees have been rebuilding their new life and business 
in other places. For instance, 67% of the Okuma evacuees who answered a government 
questionnaire in October 2013 said they did not wish to return home under current conditions 
[NHK World, July 3, 2014]. They have been asking for more public support to acquire new 
houses outside hometown not seeing any prospect of restoring infrastructure, as radiation 
levels remain high, and their houses and farmland ruined. Evacuees are also having concerns 
about the safety of an intermediate storage facility for nuclear waste, which will be built in the 
town.  
According to the evacuees the compensation from TEPCO and other financial aid they 
have been receiving is not enough to rebuild their lives [NHK World, July 3, 2014]. They 
asked the Okuma government to request more state compensation for evacuees who have 
given up returning home rather than for decontamination. They also called on the municipal 
government to present support measures for them as the head of the district suggesting “the 
town government should work not only for evacuees hoping to return home but also for those 
giving up the idea”.  
In many places diverse organizations have been set up to support residents who will 
return. For instance, a community-based organization has been set up to support residents who 
will return to Naraha town after the evacuation order is lifted82 [NHK World, June 30, 2014]. 
The support organization (including three officials and volunteers) will provide services such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
radiation levels, rebuilding infrastructure for daily living, and having a certain percentage of other 
residents also returning. 
80
 by an average of 63% from tprior to decontamination work and bellow government safety standards. 
81	  53.5% of the village population (2,758) live inside the village on a temporary or permanent basis. 
82	  early 2015 after decontamination work is over.	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as keeping the houses in order, weeding residents' gardens, building ties among residents, and 
consultations on radiation exposure. 
Data suggests that more and more evacuees have been settling down permanently 
away from hometowns [NHK World, June 25, 2014]. Residents of evacuation zones are 
entitled to tax reductions if they acquire a new house or land while they have to live elsewhere 
and such was given to nearly 1,400 applicants during the fiscal year that ended in March, 
201483. 
Major reasons for the slow progress of reconstruction and returning back of the 
evacuees have been: a slow pace of decontamination of lands, existing hotspots and restricted 
mobility in evacuated areas, difficulties of land acquisition for building cites, series 
difficulties in safe disposal of contaminated soil and debris, population fears regarding 
radiation hazards, lack of job opportunities, unrestored critical services and infrastructure, 
problems for attracting bids from contractors, spikes in construction material prices and 
manpower shortages, absence of communities consensus for certain projects, uncertainty for 
future developments, etc. [The Japan News, March 4, March 11, April 3, April 4 and April 11, 
2014; Hasegawa, 2013; Matanle, 2012; NHK World, March 11, May 8, May 29, 2014].  
According to the mayors in most affected prefectures many among them do not expect 
reconstruction work to be completed by the end of fiscal 2015 [The Japan News, March 4, 
2014]. Many residents of evacuated towns and villages require “more decontamination” 
before allowed returning home [The Japan News, April 3, 2014; NHK World, May 8, 2014)]. 
Some part of the population also think that more efforts have to be concentrated on areas that 
were damaged by the earthquake (rather than the tsunami and radiation) that need to be rebuilt 
[The Japan Times, March 19, 2014]. 
All these issues have caused further pressure to accelerate reconstruction process and 
pledge by the government people to feel not only “the hard side of reconstruction, but also 
reconstruction of their hearts” [Abe, 2014]. It has also lead to a shift from the previous policy 
(December, 2013) of “eventually having all those who were forced to live as evacuees return 
home” and include support measures for evacuees who have decided to live elsewhere than 
their hometown”. 
In June 2014 the Reconstruction Agency announced that the government is granting 
about 80 million dollars to Fukushima prefecture and its 16 municipalities to assist local 
rebuilding projects (such as designing public rental housing for returning residents who had to 
evacuate), for resumption of farming and industrial activities, etc. [NHK World, June 17, 
2014]. That money is part of about 1.6 billion dollars earmarked by the government to help 
local governments jump start projects in areas where evacuation orders have been being lifted 
hoping that will speed up rebuilding efforts in areas that experienced delays because of 
evacuation orders. Fukushima prefectural government estimates that ¥3.9 trillion will be 
needed for reconstruction work over a 10-year period from fiscal 2016 [The Japan News, 
October 28, 2014]. 
The process of evacuation and reconstructions has been associated with a number of 
challenges such as: failure for timely evacuation from certain highly contaminated areas, slow 
response of authorities, lack of sufficient public information in the first stages of the disasters, 
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  more than twice the number of cases in the previous year.	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mistrust to public and private institutions, multiple displacements of many evacuees, divided 
communities and families, bad communication between different organizations, lack of 
financial resources, insufficient manpower and building materials, ineffective use of public 
funds, discrimination toward some evacuees, emotional conflicts between evacuees (about 
“self-evacuation”, compensations, rebuilding modes), insufficient and unequal compensation, 
substandard labor conditions for decontamination workers, increased number of individual 
and organized criminal cases, numerous lawsuits against TEPCO and authorities, revisions in 
national energy, disaster prevention etc. policies, etc. [Akiyama et al. 2012; Fukushima Minpo 
News, February 17, March 13, 2014; Hasegawa, 2013; The Japan News, March 4, March 6, 
March 11, March 12, March 27, April 4, 2014; The Japan Times, March 13, 2014; NHK 
World, March 13, June 12, 2014; Manoliu, 2014]. 
The 2011 disasters occurred at areas that had been facing problems of depopulation 
and aging [Nemoto, 2014]. Populations of prefectures hardest hit by the disasters have 
continued to decline during the last 3 years [NHK-World, March 11, 2014]. In Iwate, Miyagi 
and Fukushima prefectures total population dropped by more than 132,000 between March 1, 
2011 and February 1, 2014. In the first year the population declined by about 85,000 as many 
people died or were evacuated, in the second year, the number fell by 29,000, and the third 
year by 17,00084.  
Fukushima prefecture has seen the largest population decline in post disaster years - 
86,077 people since March 1, 2011 (Figure 6). What is more there has been significant 
decline in age groups up to 65, and increase in older population85. 
Most people especially younger one have been reluctant to return to home places due 
to the health risk, lack of basic infrastructure and services, reduced employment opportunities 
etc. What is more, the overall population has been decreasing due to out-migration since the 
nuclear accident (Figure 7). 
The most recent data show that Fukushima prefecture saw its population fall at a 
slower pace of 0.72% in 201386, which is seen by officials as an indicator that the impact of 
the nuclear accident has softened [The Japan News, June 25, 2014]. On the other hand, 
Miyagi prefecture registered a 0.06% increase apparently due to a rise in the number of 
people moving to take part in reconstruction work. 
In 2011 Fukushima's fertility rate fell 0.04 point from the previous year to 1.48 and 
another 0.07 point to 1.41 in 2012 [Fukushima Minpo News, June 5, 2014]. In 2013 the 
number of newborn babies in the prefecture was 14,546 last year or up 776 from 2012. The 
total fertility rate stood at 1.53 which was the levels prevailing in the years immediately 
before the disasters. The later increase was the largest among all Japanese prefectures and 
boosted prefectural rate to the 15th highest level across the nation (from 33rd in 2012). 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  Populations began rising recently in some stricken areas (e.g. Iwanuma, Miyagi) due to progress in 
community relocation projects as well in urban and inland areas such as Sendai and Morioka.	  
85
 Currently, 27.3% of the total population is older than 65, of which 53.6% older than 75. 
86
 On the backgrownd of the drop of 0.19% for the country as a whole.  
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Figure 6. Population dynamics in Fukushima prefecture in post disaster years 
 
Source: Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
 
Figure 7. Number of intra-prefectural migrants, in-migrants, out-migrants and net 
losses in population in Fukushima prefecture 
 
Source: Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
 
All that has been a consequence of policy measures of the prefectural government to 
cope with a population decline including improved childbearing and rearing environment 
offering free medical care for young people aged 18 or less, increasing indoor play areas and 
expanding a scheme for detecting radioactive materials in school lunch meals, among other 
things.  
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4. Economic damages and impacts 
 
The earthquake, tsunami and the nuclear accident have caused immense damages in 
North-eastern Japan and beyond (Picture 3 and Picture 4). They affected directly 62 
municipalities in six prefectures, among them 28 in the three worst affected prefectures87 
[International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2012].  
 
Picture 3. Tsunami hit lands and property           Picture 4. Debris from earthquake and tsunami 
 
Source: Associate Press, March 11, 2011                  Source: 
 
The latest figure shows that 1,220,360 buildings in 20 prefectures have been damaged 
from the earthquake and tsunami, out of which 10.43% totally collapsed, 22.35% half 
destroyed, and the rest partially damaged, flooded or burned down (Table 9). The biggest 
property damages have been registered in Miyagi, Fukushima, Ibaraki, and Iwate prefectures.  
Most of the totally and half destroyed buildings were from coastal municipalities - 
94% and 75% accordingly88. According to experts 42% of damages to buildings come from 
the earthquake, 39% from the tsunami, and 19% from the nuclear disaster [Daniell et al., 
2011]. 
In addition, there have been reports for numerous damaged roads, bridges, dikes, 
railways and landslides in 14 prefectures (Table 10).  
In the three most affected prefectures the March 2011 disaster left approximately 
2,580,000 households without electricity supply, around 420,000 households without gas 
supply, about 1,660,000 households without Liquefied Petroleum gas supply, and 
approximately 2,300,000 with interrupted water supply [Government of Japan, 2012]. 
The triple disaster has cased destruction of many businesses, which incurred big direct 
and indirect losses in certain sectors (manufacturing, energy, transport, agri-food, etc.) and 
supply chains in Japan and worldwide [Fujita et al. 2012; Government of Japan, 2012; OECD, 
2013; UFJ, 2011].  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87
 computer servers in some municipalities were seriously damaged or destroyed, resulting in a loss of 
essential data. 221 public officials died or remain missing from 17 municipalities in 3 prefectures. 
88
 coastal municipalities generally go much inland and therefore not impacted by the tsunami. 
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Table 9. Number of property damages associated with March 2011 earthquake 
(February 10, 2014) 
Prefectures Totally 
collapse 
Half 
collapse 
Totally 
burn 
down 
Partial 
burn 
down 
Flooded  
above 
floor 
Flooded 
bellow 
floor 
Partially 
damaged 
Non 
dwelling 
houses 
Hokkaido - 4 - - 329 545 7 469 
Aomori 308 701 - - - - 1006 1402 
Iwate 19107 6598 33 - 6 18554 4368 
Miyagi 82911 155086 135 - 7796 222893 28893 
Akita - - - - - - 3 3 
Yamagata - - - - - - 2 96 
Fukushima 21235 73388 77 3 1061 338 167211 1117 
Tokyo 15 198 1 - - - 4847 1101 
Ibaraki 2628 24327 31 1799 779 185795 19949 
Tochigi 261 2118 - - - - 73246 295 
Gunma - 7 - - - - 17246 - 
Saitama 24 199 1 1 - 1 1800 33 
Chiba 801 10121 15 157 731 54931 660 
Kanagawa - 41 - - - - 459 13 
Nigata - - - - - - 17 9 
Yamanashi - - - - - - - 4 
Shizuoka - - - - - 5 13 9 
Mie - - - - 2 - - 9 
Tokushima - - - - 2 9 - - 
Kochi - - - - 2 8 - - 
Total 127290 272788 297 3352 10218 747989 58426 
Source: National Police Agency 
 
Table 10. Places with infrastructure damages associated with March 2011 earthquake 
(February 10, 2014) 
Prefectures Damaged 
roads 
Damaged 
bridges 
Landslides Break of 
dikes 
Damaged 
railways 
Aomori 2 - - - - 
Iwate 30 4 6 - - 
Miyagi 390 12 51 45 26 
Akita 9 - - - - 
Yamagata 21 - 29 - - 
Fukushima 187 3 9 - - 
Tokyo 295 55 6 - - 
Ibaraki 307 41 - - - 
Tochigi 257 - 40 - 2 
Gunma 36 - 9 - - 
Saitama 160 -  - - 
Chiba 2343 - 55 - 1 
Kanagawa 160 1 2 - - 
Gifu 1 - - - - 
Total 4198 116 207 45 29 
Source: National Police Agency 
 
There have been considerable damages in agriculture, fishery and forestry sectors. 
Around 23,600 hectares of farmland were washed away or flooded by the tsunami as well as 
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considerably salinized by the seawaters [Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries, 
2014]. In Aomori, Iwate and Miyagi prefectures approximately 4,550,000 poultry, 5,850 
hogs, and 750 beef cattle were drowned, crushed or starved [Tohoku Regional Agricultural 
Administration, 2011]. In addition, large areas of farmland have been contaminated, and 
many livestock, crops and other products destroyed or devaluated due to the Fukushima 
nuclear disaster [Bachev and Ito, 2013; Koyama, 2013; Watanabe, 2013].  
In total 28,612 fish vessels, 1,725 common use facilities and 319 harbors were 
damaged by the disaster [Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries, 2014]. In Miyagi, 
Iwate, and Fukushima prefectures an estimated 90% of the fishing boats were rendered 
unusable by the tsunami [The Japan Times, April 28, 2011] and almost all fishing-ports 
destructed [Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries, 2014]. Similarly, there were 
desolation of forest lands in 458 points, damaged facilities for forest maintaining and 
conservation in 275 points, damaged forest roads in 2,632 points, damaged forests amounting 
1,065 ha, damaged cultivating facilities for forest products in 476 points, and damaged of 
processing and marketing facilities, etc. in 115 points [Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and 
Fisheries, 2014]. 
Furthermore, enormous amount of rubble and debris have been created by the 
earthquake and tsunami. In affected 239 municipalities of 13 prefectures the total amount of 
disaster debris is estimated to be about 20 million tons and tsunami deposits around 10 
million tons [Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. The debris (some of them radioactive) has been 
an enormous obstacle to rescue and impeded reconstruction.  
In the most affected Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima prefectures the amount of debris 
and tsunami deposits reached 22.63 million tons [Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. In Miyagi 
prefecture the amount of tsunami-related debris was 19 times greater than a normal year’s 
waste while in Iwate prefecture it was 11 times greater [International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, 2012].  
The amount of debris washed out by the tsunami in the three prefectures is estimated 
to be about 5 million tons, 70 % of which deposited on seabed along Japan coasts and the 
remaining 30% becoming floating debris89 [Ministry of Environment, 2012]. The debris and 
tsunami deposits in these prefectures have been stored in almost 1,700 temporary cites, debris 
account for more than 60% of the total amount, and around two-third of all debris and tsunami 
deposits are in Miyagi prefecture (Table 11). 
What is more, the nuclear accident has contaminated huge areas of lands, property 
infrastructure, and debris in Fukushima and neighboring prefectures (Map 10). Heavily 
contaminated areas are located in 101 municipalities of 8 prefectures, and divided into: 
“Special Decontamination Area” (overlapping with Evacuation Order Area), where 
decontamination and waste management is done by the Government, and “Intensive 
Contamination Survey Area”, overseen by the local municipalities. 
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 Some debris have been collected or sunk. Therefore floating debris still drifting are less than 1.5 
million tons.  
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Table 11. Amount of total and treated debris and tsunami deposits in Iwate, Miyagi and 
Fukushima* prefectures (January 31, 2014) 
Prefectures Total amount 
(10000s tons) 
Debris Tsunami deposits 
Amount Treated (%) Amount Treated (%) 
Iwate 556 400 97 145 93 
Miyagi 1,874 1,121 98.7 739 98 
Fukushima 349 174 68.4 78 44 
Total 2,778 1,694 95.2 961 89 
* exclude evacuation area 
Source: Ministry of Environment, 2014 
 
Map 10. Special decontamination (red) and          Figure 8. Estimated economic damages of 
Intensive contamination (yellow) areas                 the March 2011 earthquake (trillion yens) 
 
Source: Ministry of Environment, 2014                  Source: Cabinet Office of Japan, June 24, 2011 
 
In October 2011, the government announced that it will spend at least 1 trillion yen 
($13 billion) to clean up the vast areas contaminated by radiation from the Fukushima nuclear 
disaster as country faces the prospect of removing and disposing 29 million cubic meters of 
soil from a sprawling area in Fukushima and four nearby prefectures [Reuters, October 20, 
2011]. 
Furthermore, evacuated zones have become home to an increasing number of wild 
animals like rats, boars and their offspring with domestic pigs, which have been causing huge 
(unaccounted) damages to empty houses and farms [NHK World, July 11, 2013, May 6, 
2014]. 
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The initial official estimate for the direct economic losses from the March 2011 
disaster was about 16.9 trillion yen ($210 billion USD) or 4% of the Gross Domestic Product 
of Japan90 (Figure 8). The greatest share of damages (61.5%) was for “Buildings, etc. 
(Housing, offices, plants, machinery, etc.)”, followed by “Others (including agriculture, 
forestry and fisheries)” (17.7%), “Social infrastructure (river, road, harbors, drainage, and 
airport, etc.)” (13%) and “Lifeline utilities	  (water service, gas, electricity, and communication 
and broadcasting facilities” (7.7%). Anticipated damage in the sector “Agriculture” accounted 
for 11.24% of the total amount. 
Most damages have been concentrated in Fukushima, Iwate, and Miyagi prefectures 
where there was a significant destruction of the basic infrastructure and the economic activity 
(Figure 9 and Figure 10).  In March 2011 the Index of Industrial Production in the country 
and the most affected areas dropped considerably – with 15% and 35% accordingly (Figure 
11). In March 2011 the Index expressing Status of Activity declined 30% in Iwate prefecture, 
40% in Fukushima prefecture and 80% in Miyagi prefecture comparing to the previous month 
[National Institute for Research Advancement, 2013]. 
 
Figure 9. Trends in index for expressing status of recovery of basic infrastructure 
(February 2011=100) 
 
Source: National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA), 2013 
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 That is more than twice than the 1995 Great Hanshin Eartquake wich caused damage of 
approximately ten trillion yen ($102.5) billion or 2.5% of Japan's GDP at the time [Wikipedia, 2014]. 
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Figure 10. Trends in index expressing status of activity (February 2011=100) 
 
 
Source: National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA), 2013 
 
 
Figure 11. Index of industrial production  
 
Source: Reconstruction Agency, 2014                
 
The insured losses from the Great ast Japan Earthquake were estimated at ¥2,750 
billion, or 16% of total direct economic losses91 [Raghieri and Ishiwatari, 2014]. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91	  Residential assets represented 78% of insured losses. Rice is greatly insured in Japan but insurance 
almost did not cover rice production losses (disater happened before rice-growing season). In Miyagi 
prefecture the agricultural insurance scheme has covered damages to green-houses of ¥1 billion.	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insurance payouts stemming from the quake had reached ¥1,234.6 billion as of May 201292 
[Takabe and Inui, 2013]. In addition, ¥360.3 billion (as of December 2012) monetary 
donations were distributed to the affected by the disaster via the Japanese Red Cross, the 
Central Community Chest of Japan and local authorities in affected areas. 
There are approximately 80,000 businesses in the tsunami-affected areas, 740,000 in the 
earthquake-affected areas, and 8,000 in the evacuation zones of the Fukushima nuclear plant 
[Tokyo Electric Power Company, 2012]. The most of them have seen their businesses 
severely destructed after March 2011 [Reconstruction Agency, 2014].  
The basic economic indicators demonstrate that considerable part of the local economy 
in disaster areas have recovered to approximately pre-disaster levels. Nevertheless, many 
challenges still remain especially for small and middle size enterprises and certain sectors 
such as agriculture, fishery, food processing etc.  
Up-to-date merely 36.6% of the recipients of Group subsidies for recovery and 
development of facilities (549 groups of approximately 10,000 business operators) report they 
have recovered sales above the level before the disaster [Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. 
Similarly, only 63% of damaged by tsunami agricultural lands have been restored for farming 
and 78% of destructed fishery processing facilities resumed operations.  
The overall value of agricultural, forestry and fisheries products in Fukushima 
prefecture has declined considerably, and there has been no or only a slight recovery in these 
sectors of the economy (Figure 12). The high level of radiation has caused some Fukushima 
forests to be abandoned and there is concern about the long-term management of forestry 
resources [NHK World, May 6, 2014]. 
 
Figure 12. Dynamics of values of agricultural, forestry* and fishery* products in 
Fukushima prefecture 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries                    * multiplied by 10 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	   General Insurance Association of Japan designated specific total loss zones, based on satellite 
imagery, and any total loss claims filed from the area did not require additional confirmation speeding 
up the payout process. Out of ¥1,200 billion generated by the 741,000 claim payments made, 60% was 
paid within two months and 90% within five months [Raghieri and Ishiwatari, 2014].	  
0	  
500	  
1000	  
1500	  
2000	  
2500	  
2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	  
Agriculture	  
Forestry	  
Fishery	  
43	  
	  
Summer festivals are significant event in Japan in terms of keeping tradition and as 
attracting tourists and overall economic benefits. Data show that visitor figures for 14 major 
summer festivals in Tohoku six prefectures fell by 1.01 million or 6.5% from the previous 
year [The Japan News, July 24, 2014]. Despite that numbers have been rising with 14.96 
million visitors in 201393, this is still 4.2% fewer than in 2010. In 2013 visitors to the Sendai 
Tanabata, Morioka Sansa Odori and Soma Nomaoi festivals declined, respectively to 2.06 
million (down 12.5%), to 1.3 million (down 3.6%) and 167,000 (down 22.4%) comparing to 
the pre-disaster period. 
Tourism was an important part of the Fukushima economy and the number of overnight 
stays in hotels and other accommodations dropped more than 65% in March 2011 comparing 
to the same period of 201094 [Tourist Agency, 2014]. There has been some recovery in certain 
parts of the prefecture (Figure 13) but the overall level is far bellow the pre-disaster period – 
in December 2013 it was still 26% bellow (comparing to 0.3% up nationwide).  
 
Figure 13. Number of overnight stays in hotels and other accommodation in Naukomi, 
Fukushima prefecture 
 
Source: Tourist Agency, 2014 
 
By March 2012 as many as 644 companies in 40 prefectures had been forced into 
bankruptcy by the disaster, including 157 service companies, 150 manufacturers, and 113 
wholesalers [The Japan Times, March 11, 2012]. They left behind liabilities of ¥925.4 billion 
and had employed 11,412 people. April-September 2014 data show that the number of 
corporate bankruptcies in Japan fell but rose in Tohoku (and Shikoku) for the first time in six 
years [The Japan News, October 10, 2014]. 
In order to support firms in Fukushima prefecture, which are under the weight of so-
called “double loans”, the Corporation for Revitalizing Earthquake Affected Business (a unit 
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 In addition, 6 prefectural capitals of the region have been hosting the Tohoku Rokkon-sai (Festival 
of the six souls in Tohoku) in rotation since 2011 to support disaster reconstruction efforts which draw 
200,000 visitors a year [The Japan News, July 24, 2014]. 
94
 At the same time the national figure declined around 35%. 
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of the Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan) set up a special team (May 2014) to extend 
support  [The Japan News, June 6, 2014]. Firms95 need enhanced assistance since they have 
difficulty developing long-term plans for business restoration due to the ongoing nuclear 
crisis. 
Furthermore, land prices96 in disaster hit prefectures grew or slowed the pace of 
reduction in the last year97 as an increasing number of residents moved to higher ground from 
coastal areas [The Japan News, July 2, 2014]. In Miyagi prefecture the average land price 
grew 2.4%, marking the steepest growth in the country’s 47 prefectures. In Fukushima land 
prices rose 0.8% rising for the first time in 22 years98.  
Some $30 billion has been paid to 84,000 nuclear accident refugees and around $20 
billion to 300,000 tsunami survivors in the Tohoku region [World Nuclear Association, 2014]. 
The evacuees received JPY 100,000 ($1,030) per month in psychological suffering 
compensation, which is tax-exempt and paid unconditionally. In October 2013, about 84,000 
evacuees received the payments as an average family of four got about JPY 90 million 
($900,000) in compensation from TEPCO. The average compensation for real estate was JPY 
49.1 million ($490,000), JPY 10.9 million ($110,000) for lost wages, and JPY 30 million 
($300,000) as “consolation money” for pain and suffering [Asahi Shinbun, October 26, 2013].  
In mid April 2011 a Panel to address compensation for nuclear related damage acting as 
intermediary99 established “Guidelines for determining the scope of compensation for damage 
caused by the accident”100. The government and nuclear plant operators also established the 
Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation101. Some JPY 900 billion ($11.5 
billion) were released to the company through bonds issued to the Nuclear Damage 
Facilitation Fund to cover compensation payments102. In February 2012 the government 
approved a further JPY 690 billion ($8.9 billion) in compensation support from the Nuclear 
Damage Liability Facilitation Fund giving the government voting rights103. In the end of July 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95
 Principal repayments began in summer 2014 for some afflicted companies that received loans from 
the government financial institutions.	  
96
  “Rosenka” or prices of land facing major streets, used to calculate inheritance and gift taxes. 
97	  although the average price for the country fell for the 6 straight year (dropped by 0.7% on average in 
2013) with exception of the 3 major metropolitan areas (Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya). 
98
 Land prices in evacuation zones have been appraised at zero due to difficulty in conducting on-site 
surveys. 
99
 established within the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, led by Law 
Professor Yoshihisa Nomi of Gakushuin University, Tokyo. 
100
 According to the Law on Compensation for Nuclear Damage and Law on Contract for Liability 
Insurance for Nuclear Damage the TEPCO liability is exclusive and absolute regardless of fault 
[World Nuclear Association, 2014]. The government may relieve the operator of liability if it 
determines that damage results from “a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character” (which it did 
not do here). 
101
 It received JPY 7 billion ($91 million) in public funds and JPY 7 billion from 12 nuclear plant 
operators, including TEPCO’s of JPY 2379 million ($30 million). 	  
102	   a more comprehensive business plan was introduced in March 2012, involving compensation 
payments of JPY 910 billion ($11.6 billion) annually.	  
103	   for JPY 1 trillion (about $12.5 billion) paid through the Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation 
Fund.	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2012 TEPCO sold the government 50.11% of the voting and 25.73% no voting rights shares, 
and became government-controlled company. 
In June 2013 TEPCO requested a further JPY 666 billion ($6.7 billion) in government 
support through the Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation Fund, bringing the total amount to 
JPY 3.79 trillion ($38 billion). More than half of the request (some JPY 370 billion, $3.7 
billion) resulted from the re-evaluation of the evacuation zone around the damaged plant and 
a re-examination of the estimated amount regarding compensation for mental damages, loss or 
depreciation of valuables such as housing lands and buildings. About JPY 43 billion ($431 
million) was due to a higher estimate of compensation coming from damages by “harmful 
rumors” to the agriculture, forestry, fisheries, food processing and distribution industries104.  
By mid May 2014 TEPCO had paid JPY 3808 billion ($38 billion) in compensation, 
fairly evenly split between businesses and individuals, based on decisions of the Nuclear 
Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation, and covered by loans from the Nuclear 
Damage Liability Facilitation Fund [World Nuclear Association, 2014]. Some $16 billion was 
distributed evenly among 85,000 evacuees ($188,200 each person including children). In 
December 2013 the government raised the upper limit of financial assistance from JPY 5 
trillion to JPY 9 trillion ($86 billion).  
By the end of November 2013 TEPCO received 2,035,000 applications from individuals 
and businesses for compensations related to the Fukushima nuclear accidents, and paid a total 
amount of 3,168.7 billion yen [Nomura and Hokugo, 2013]. Until the end of January 2013 the 
biggest amount of compensation was paid to “Natural Persons” (48.5%)105, followed by 
“Legal Persons and Sole Proprietors” (30.9%), and “Groups Representing Members” (20.6%) 
such as Agricultural Cooperatives, Fishery Cooperatives, Fukushima Prefecture Residents 
Health Care Fund106, and Others [Nomura and Hokugo, 2013].  
The greatest compensation payments were for demands from Fukushima prefecture 
(75%), followed by Kanto region (17.1%), Hokkaido and Tohoku region (4.6%), and Other 
regions (3.2%).  “Mental anguish” and “Damage from incapacity of work” took the largest 
portion of compensation payments to Natural persons (Figure 14). Most compensation 
payments to Legal Persons and Sole Proprietors107 were for “Lost earning” (94.5%), and for 
applicants from Evacuation Areas (other than agriculture), Tourisms and Service industries 
(Figure 15). 
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  As restrictions on shipment of foodstuffs from affected area continue an additional JPY 240 billion 
($2.4 billion) was included to cover for the further compensation claims. 
105
 TEPCO has been paying 100,000 yen (USD990) a month to each residents who was forced to 
evacuate – figure calculated by referring to the approximate 120,000 yen monthly benefit that is paid 
through automobile liability insurance to hospitalized as a result of traffic accident [Pushpalal et al. 
2013]. Local government argue that figure is low and ask for monthly compensation for psychological 
duress be increased to 350,000 yen. 
106
	   Fund received by Fukushima prefectural government for financing long-term healthcare of 
residents. 
107
	  not including  payments to farmers, fishermen and others who apply through “Group Representing 
Victims”. 
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Figure 14. Share of TEPCO payments to Natural Persons by damage categories (%) 
 
Source: Nomura and Hokugo, 2013 
 
Figure 15. Share of TEPCO payments to Legal Persons and Sole Proprietors by damage 
categories (%) 
 
Source: Nomura and Hokugo, 2013 
 
The nuclear disaster and the suspension of nuclear reactors has been also a severe blow 
for the nuclear industry in the country. For instance, TEPCO logged a net loss of ¥173.26 
billion, against the year before profit of ¥437.93 billion, due to a special loss of ¥218.8 billion 
for compensation for the crisis at Fukushima nuclear power plant [The Japan News, August 1, 
2014]. It logged a group recurring profit of ¥52.51 billion in April-June 2014 against a loss of 
¥29.49 billion a year before, marking the first profit for the period in 4 years108. Meanwhile, 
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  It reflects electricity rate increase under system allowing power firms to pass higher fuel costs for 
thermal power generation on to customers. Consequently, group sales in the first quarter of fiscal 2014 
51.9	  
24.6	  
4.9	  
4.5	  
1.6	   1.4	  
1.3	   1.2	  
8.5	  
Mental	  anguish	  
Damage	  from	  incapacity	  of	  work	  
Loss	  or	  reducYon	  of	  property	  value	  
Damage	  demanded	  by	  simplified	  
form	  for	  evacuaYon	  expenses	  
Injury	  or	  death	  
Damage	  from	  evacuaYon	  to	  area	  of	  
"voluntary	  evacuaYon	  comensaYon"	  
Temporary	  access	  expenses	  
EvacuaYon	  and	  homecoming	  
expenses	  
Others	  
28.1	  
21.2	  
18.1	  
6.8	  
6.7	  
4.5	   14.5	  
Other	  tah	  agriculture	  in	  the	  
EvacuaYon	  Areas	  
Tourism	  industry	  
Service	  industry	  
Manifacturing	  
Processing	  and	  distribuYon	  
Agriculture	  
Others	  
47	  
	  
four other regional power suppliers109 suffered group recurring losses of ¥74.7 billion, due 
largely to hefty costs for fuel for thermal power generation with total recurring losses110.  
The macroeconomic impact of the March 2011 disaster has been also significant (Figure 
16). Country’s real Gross Domestic Product contracted almost 4% during January-March 
2011 (comparing to 2010), and Japan has been experiencing a trade deficit as a result of the 
increased import.  
 
Figure 16. Evolution of GDP, export and import of Japan 
 
Source: Statistics Bureau, MIAC, 2014 
 
Nevertheless, the share of Tohoku region and the three most affected prefectures in 
Japan’s GDP and population is small - 8% and 4% accordingly	   [Statistics Bureau, 2012]. 
Besides, the disaster created a big demand for jobs, incentives for investments, and potential 
for economic growth associated with the recovery and reconstruction businesses (relief, 
rebuilding, decontamination, innovation etc.). 
What is more, there has been a huge government budget for recovery, reconstructions, 
compensations and development. Following the disaster, the Government approved two 
supplementary budgets of 6.14 trillion yens for relief and recovery (May and July 2011), and 
launched a ten-year reconstruction program (focusing on Fukushima, Miyagi and Iwate 
prefectures) with expended budget of 25 trillion yens for the period 2011-2015 [Government 
of Japan, 2012; Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
rose 9.1%, labor costs grow 18.5% (booked expenses in advance to ease salary cuts from July), while 
fuel costs fell 1.8% thanks to an improvement in thermal power generation efficiency. 
109	  Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Kansai Electric Power Co., Kyushu Electric Power Co. and Okinawa 
Electric Power Co.	  
110	  smaller than the combined year before recurring losses of ¥233 billion at nine of the 10 utilities. 
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For instance, the government has promoted the “Japan As One’ Work Project” as 
countermeasures against employment during the restoration stage, which resulted in the job 
placement of over 64,000 people in the disaster-hit 3 prefectures by October 2011 [Ministry 
of Health Labor and Welfare, 2011]. With the compilation of the Project 580,000 jobs are 
expected to be generated. 
Subsequently, there has been a rapid recovery of infrastructure and economic activities 
in the country, including the most affected regions. By March 2013 the Index expressing 
status of recovery of basic infrastructure in Miyagi, Iwate and Fukushima prefecture reached 
91%, 88% and 81.1% accordingly (National Institute for Research Advancement, 2013). At 
the same time the national Activity Status Index augmented by 14.8% comparing to the pre-
disaster period, with appositive dynamic in Iwate prefecture (1.6%) and staying still bellow 
the pre-disaster level in Miyagi (93.6%) and Fukushima (82.2%) prefectures. 
There has been a sizeable or complete recovery of damaged lifeline infrastructure in 
the months after the disaster – e.g. 96% of Electricity, 86% of Gas, 95% of LP Gas, 99% of 
Fixed line and Wireless phones, 100% of Mail delivery and Gas stations (as of October 2012), 
98% of Water and 90% of healthcare facilities (as of March 2012) and 92% of public school 
facilities (as of March 2013) [Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. 
Similarly, there has been substantial progress in recovery and reconstruction of long-
term infrastructures such as land, transportation networks, utilities, fish processing facilities, 
etc. (Figure 17). 
 
Figure 17. State of full-scale recovery and reconstruction of public infrastructure after 
Great East Japan Earthquake (July, 2014)* 
 
*farmland, and healthcare, school, and fish processing facilities (March, 2014), Aquaculture facilities 
(December 2012) 
Source: Reconstruction Agency, 2014      
 
The progress of reconstruction of different type of public infrastructure has not been 
similar in different affected areas. For instance, in Fukushima prefecture reconstruction 
started in 85% of planed cites, and in 65% have already completed (Figure 18). In Aizu and 
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Nakadori regions progress has been substantial – in 100% and 99% of planed cites (26 and 
536 accordingly) construction has been completed. On the other hand, in coastal Hamadori 
region in a fifth of planed (1,537) cites reconstruction has not started yet [Reconstruction 
Agency, 2014]. 
 
Figure 18. Progress in reconstruction of public infrastructure in Fukushima prefecture, 
July 1, 2014 
 
Source: Reconstruction Agency, 2014 
 
There has been also a constant recovery of sales of all industries in most affected 
prefectures (Figure 19). However, the rate of post-disaster recovery has not bee similar in all 
sectors of affected industry. There is a fast and above pre-disaster recovery of construction 
industry. On the other hand, the recovery in wholesale, service, and food processing industries 
has been slower. For instance, comparing with the same period of 2010 for January-March 
2014 the number of guests in hotel rooms in affected 6 prefectures was 14.3% lower, and in 
most affected 3 prefectures 10.6% lower while there was a growth of 1.4% nationwide 
[Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. 
Economy of the three main affected prefectures has been showing a positive 
employment trend, with the ratio of job offers to jobseekers consistently higher than the 
national average since early 2012 [Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. For instance, in Fukushima 
prefecture the later ration jumped from 0.42 in 2010 to 1.24 in 2013. This trend in affected 
regions is particularly true when it comes to jobs in public welfare, construction, 
transportation industries, the service sector, as well as certain specialist skills jobs.  
Furthermore, there has been a boom in technological innovations and the new sectors 
such as energy saving, renewable (solar, wind, biofuel) energy, nuclear safety, debris 
cleaning, processing and disposal, research and development, robotics, ITC, no-soil and solar 
sharing farming etc. with huge investments of leading players, numerous new comers, joint 
ventures, etc. [Asiaone News, June 26, 2013; Fukushima Minpo News, November 7, 2014; 
JETRO, 2013; NHK World, June 12, 2012, June 30, July 8, July 25, 2014; The Japan Times, 
March 23, 2014].  
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Figure 19. Percent of sales recovery comparing to pre-disaster state in “Group subsidy 
recipients”, July 2013 
 
Source: Reconstruction Agency, 2014 
 
For instance, academic and corporate experts developed a technology to eliminate 
90%-95% of radioactive cesium from fly ash resulting from the burning of combustible 
garbage111 in Fukushima prefecture as a demonstration plant for cesium elimination opened in 
Hirono town [Fukushima Minpo News, November 7, 2014]. 
Leading telecommunication and internet corporation SoftBank intends to invest in 
solar and wind power generation in Northeast Japan [NHK World, June 20, 2014]. Similarly, 
the Tokyo metropolitan government is going to invest 100 million yen in a project to build a 
mega solar power plant in the Matsukawa district of Fukushima city [Fukushima Minpo News 
July 1, 2014].  
The government has decided to create a research center112 in Fukushima prefecture 
operated jointly by members of industry, government and academia, to bring experts together 
from all over the world to develop improved technologies for decommissioning the crippled 
reactors at Fukushima nuclear plant [The Japan News, June 20, 2014]. The plan pledges to 
bring together 200 domestic and overseas experts with knowledge of reactor 
decommissioning at the joint research center from five countries113  
Nevertheless, there have been differences in the progress of recovery between 
Fukushima, Miyagi and Iwate prefectures. In Fukushima prefecture the overall progress has 
been lagging behind with regard to the recovery of economic activity, including production, 
consumption, and distribution [National Institute for Research Advancement, 2013]. In the 
three prefectures there has been also unlike speed in the infrastructure recovery by individual 
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 In an experiment, the plant reduced radioactive cesium content of fly ash from 5,100 to 309 Bq/kg.  
112
 Operations of tentatively called “international joint research center for safe decommissioning” 
would start in fiscal 2016. 
113
 including United States and Russia who were involved in efforts following the 1986 Chernobyl 
disaster and the 1979 Three Mile Island crisis. 
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cities, towns and villages. The later have been mostly associated with differences in the 
recovery of rail systems, treatment of debris, education and medical care.  
For instance, in Fukushima prefecture merely 68% of debris and 44% of tsunami 
deposits outside the evacuation areas has been treated [Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. In the 
Special Decontamination Area114 the progress of implementation of planned decontamination 
work also differ substantially (Figure 20).  
 
Figure 20. Progress in implementation of decontamination work in Special 
Decontamination Area by September 30, 2014 (per cent)  
 
Source: Ministry of Environment 
 
Similarly, there is a considerable difference in the progress of decontamination in 
Municipality Decontamination Areas115 in Fukushima and other prefectures (Figure 21). 
Furthermore, while the decontamination of public facilities (administration facilities, schools, 
parks and sport facilities, etc.) has been entirely or largely completed116 reaching the end of 
full decontamination will likely take few more years [Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. 
Besides, recent media reports indicate that some of the land along the coastal area 
flooded by the tsunami remains unused [NHK World, September 11, 2014]. Municipal 
governments hit by the disaster have purchased land in the inundated areas hoping the 
financial assistance will help former residents move to higher ground away from the sea. 
However, according to 25 municipalities in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima prefectures they 
have so far purchased a total of 2,600 ha117 but 37% remains untouched because 
municipalities have no idea how to utilize the land, pieces of land are scattered making it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114	  responsibility of the central government.	  
115	  responsibility of local governments in 94 municipalities, including 36 in Fukushima prefecture, 19 
in Ibaraki prefecture, by 9 in Chiba and Gunma prefectures, by 8 in Miyagi and Tochigi prefectures, 3 
in Iwate prefecture, and 2 in Saitama prefecture [Reconstruction Agency, 2014].  
116
 E.g. for public facilities, shools, etc. 90% in Fukushima prefectures and 100% outside Fukushima 
prefectures [Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. 
117	  for about 2.1 billion dollars.	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difficult to put them to use, and businesses hesitate to move into the areas that were once 
flooded by tsunami.  
 
Figure 21. Progress of decontamination of Municipality Decontaminated Areas, as of 
March 2014 (percent) 
 
Source: Reconstruction Agency, 2014 
 
There have been also some new challenges associated with the reconstruction and 
decontamination. The government’s employment measures seem have resolved 
unemployment problem but they have been turning job seekers away from the traditional local 
industries like fisheries, agriculture, etc. According to the Kesennuma Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry “local companies are beginning to be restored but the government’s emergency 
employment measures have begun to choke off the local key industries” [The Japan News, 
March 01, 2014]. In Kesennuma construction workers are now paid about ¥10,000 a day, and 
those getting jobs via the government’s emergency employment program (e.g. patrolling 
temporary housing units) receive about ¥8,000 a day, while the fishery processing firm pays 
only about ¥6,000. 
What is more, there has been a huge proportion of the unused budget for the 
reconstruction – it was announced that 35.3% of the ¥7.51 trillion budget set aside in fiscal 
2013 to rebuild disaster areas was left unused118 [The Japan News, July 31, 2014]. The 
proportion of the unspent funding was almost unchanged from fiscal 2012 (35.2%), indicating 
that the country has made little progress in overcoming delays in implementing reconstruction 
projects.  
According to the Reconstruction Agency funds were unutilized because it took time to 
obtain local consent for reviews of reconstruction plans and to acquire land as well as because 
bidding for many reconstruction projects ended in failure due in part to price hikes for 
construction materials [Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. The budget implementation rate stood 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118
 Reconstruction budget for fiscal 2013 consisted of the special account budget for reconstruction 
programs and funds carried over from fiscal 2011-2012. Of the total, ¥4.86 trillion was executed. Of 
the unused funds, ¥1.96 trillion will be carried over to fiscal 2014 and ¥691.7 billion will be used to 
finance projects other than those originally planned. 
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at 62.8% for projects to assist disaster victims and at 77.5% for projects to revitalize 
industries. But the rate was low, at 47% for reconstruction projects related to the nuclear crisis 
at Fukushima nuclear power plant. 
OECD ranked the March 2011 earthquake as the costliest disaster in Japan’s post-war 
history with 3.5% of GDP in property damage not including the costs of nuclear accident 
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2013). There has been a 
considerable contraction of the real GDP growth in 2011 and 2012 comparing to the pre-
disaster projections of the national and international organizations (Table 12). 
 
Table 12. Macroeconomic impact of Great East Japan Earthquake  
Growth of Gross Domestic Product FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 
Bank of Japan - January 2011 (%) 3.3 1.6 2 
OECD – December 2010 (%) 3.7 1.7 1.3 
Real dynamics (%) 1.3 -0.4 -0.3 
Change real – projected (percentage points) - (2 - 2.4) - (2 - 2.1) - (1.6 – 2.4) 
Source: Bank of Japan, OECD 
 
Recent experts estimates also indicate that the overall macroeconomic impact of the 
disaster (on stock prices, housing prices, and so on) has not been so huge119 when compared 
with the effects of previous crisis such as real estate bubble in 1990 and fall of Lehman 
Brothers in 2008	  [Kawaguchi, 2014]. Most contemporary problems of the Japanese economy 
have been attributed to other factors (structural problems, inefficient policies, weak yen) 
rather than the 2011 disaster [The Japan News, April 23, 2014; OECD, 2013]. 
According to the initial prediction, the March 2011 earthquake is likely to be the 
costliest natural disaster120 in the world history [Kim, 2011]. One year after the disaster the 
direct economic loss from the earthquake and tsunami was estimated to be between 237 and 
303 billion USD, and from the nuclear power plant incident around $65 billion [Vervaeck and 
Daniell, 2012]. Indirect losses were assessed between 185 to 345 billion USD across the 
earthquake, tsunami and nuclear plant. 
According to the initial estimates of property damages and income losses are 
contrasted with the amounts shouldered by the insurance industry, TEPCO, donors and the 
government, those directly affected will on average have to come up for about 23% of the 
overall losses (Table 13). That catastrophe might turn out as the most expensive but the 
burden for the insurance industry will likely be lower121 since the low proportion of 
individuals with earthquake insurance in Japan122.  
Nevertheless, there is still uncertainty about the full costs related to the nuclear accident. 
The process of compensation of victims, decommissioning of the nuclear plant, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119
 calculated losses in Net Present Income accounts for 3.5 trillion yen for 2011-2012 or about 1% of 
GDP [Waldenberger and Eilker, 2014]. 
120
 Later it was fund out that the nuclear disaster was a “man made” disaster which could have been 
prevented. 
121
 E.g.	  in the case of the hurricane Katrina (2005).	  
122
 End of March 2010 only 23% of all private households were insured, including in Miyagi 33%, in 
Fukushima 14%, and Iwate 12% [Waldenberger and Eilker, 2014]. 
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decontamination, rebuilding businesses and social life in affected areas will last many years 
and incur enormous costs.  
 
Table 13. Estimated distribution of costs related to the Great East Japan Earthquake 
        Organizations and type of costs Amount (billion 
yen) 
Share of 
B 
Share of 
C 
Property and Life Insurances  2,295 9.3 10.2 
TEPCO 151 0.6 0.7 
Government 16,133 65.7 72 
Donations 298 1.2 1.3 
Total (A) 18,877 76.8 84.2 
Damage through property losses -16,900   
Costs for cleanup operations -845   
Income losses 2011 -6,822   
Total losses (B) -25,412   
Income losses for 2011 and 2012 -4,670   
Medium-term losses (C) -23,260   
Short-term difference (B – A) -6,535 23.2  
Medium-term difference (C – A) -4,383  15.8 
   Source: Waldenberger and Eilker 
 
For instance, the total number of applications and lawsuits for damages, and the type 
and requested amount of compensations from TEPCO are not publicly known123. According 
to the recent information TEPCO has paid about ¥3.53 trillion in compensation using 
government bonds while the total amount of compensation is estimated to be about ¥4.91 
trillion [The Japan News, March 12, 2014]. According to the company available funds are not 
sufficient for compensation of the amount of payouts required [Tokyo Electric Power 
Company, February 24, 2014]. Nevertheless, the government will eventually pay all TEPCO’s 
debt since it was placed under effective state control since June 2012 [The Japan News, 
March 27, 2014].  
What is more, the estimated amount of compensation has been growing up each time 
the governmental panel has issued new guidelines. Besides, there have been reported 
thousands applicants and claimants seeking compensation or resolution of disputes on 
compensation from TEPCO or authorities through court or other ways [The Japan News, 
March 12, 2014; The Japan Times, March 13; 2014; NHK World, March, 17, May 8, May 26, 
May 27, 2014].  
For example, in 2014 the Center for Settlement of Fukushima Nuclear Damage 
Claims124 made proposals to settle claims filed by groups of residents of Namie Town and 
Iitate Village [NHK World, October 22, 2014]. However, TEPCO has rejected it saying 
blanket compensation without consideration for individual circumstances would not ensure 
equality. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123
 Despite our request to TEPCO we have not been provide with information about the number, type 
and amount of applications for compensations. 
124
 Until end of August 2014 more than 8,000 cases were settled by the Center [NHK World, 
September 2, 2014]. 
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Increased number of false claims and swindling compensation funds for millions of 
yens has been also reported125 [NHK World, June 2, 2014; The Japan News, August 3, 2014]. 
In addition, there are lawsuits against the central and local governments related to 
earthquake and tsunami damages. For instance, families of 23 schoolchildren from Okawa 
Elementary School, Ishinomaki city suits prefectural and local governments for the deaths of 
their children’s claiming that the arrival of tsunami was foreseeable because of issued warning 
but school did not evacuate children to higher ground [The Japan News, May 19, 2014]. 
Similarly, a man claims his wife died because the Meteorological Agency initially predicted 
the ensuing tsunami would be much lower than it actually was (3 minutes after the 
earthquake) and updated warning did not reach his wife due to the poor condition of the city's 
address system [NHK World, March 13, 2014]. 
Recently a district court in Sendai has ruled that the death of a woman five months after 
the earthquake was related to the disaster126 [NHK World, December 9, 2014]. The family 
considered the death to be disaster-related and applied for compensation but the municipal 
government rejected it. For the first time the court ruled against a local government's decision 
of this kind stating that the extremely poor living conditions caused by the disaster were a 
burden to the woman's mind and body and led to her death. 
Similarly, a group of residents from a Iitate village is seeking state arbitration for a rise 
in compensation so all villagers can be entitled to equal damages127 regardless of radiation 
levels of areas [NHK World July 22, November 14, 2014]. According to the residents from 
the two zones with lower contamination the difference is dividing them. They ask the Center 
for Settlement of Fukushima Nuclear Damage Claims to urge TEPCO to pay equal damages. 
The residents also seek the payment of consolation money (about 30-thousand dollars per 
person) since they were exposed to more radiation because the evacuation order was not 
issued until more than one month after the meltdown. Evacuees also call for around 172,000 
dollars per person in compensation for ruining their village lives. About a half of all Iitate 
residents (2,837) joint the group.  
Finally, there are unknown amount of private costs related to dispute and compensation 
associated with the triple disaster. For instance, about 30 residents of Urayasu City (northeast 
of Tokyo) whose homes were damaged by massive liquefaction in the March 2011 
earthquake128 filed a lawsuit against the real estate company (Mitsui Fudosan) due to failure 
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 Tokyo police arrested 2 men who under name of a dummy company defrauded TEPCO of 40,000 
dollars making a false claim that staffing agency suffered a sales drop because it received fewer job 
orders from hotels in Fukushima prefecture. Police believe other people were involved as well who 
submitted fake applications to steal more than 200,000 dollars in total [NHK World, June 2, 2014]. 
Police have also arrested four people on suspicion of defrauding TEPCO of ¥12 million in nuclear 
compensation [The Japan News, August 3, 2014]. They included an official of a Tokyo NGO that does 
paperwork on behalf of clients for claiming damages from harmful rumors - not operating event 
company in Koriyama faced cancellations from customers due to concerns over radiation exposure.  
126
 a 85-year-old remained in heavily damaged house for about a month and died from pneumonia. 
127
 Entire village is designated for evacuation, but it is categorized into three different zones, each with 
a different radiation level and differing amounts of compensation. The evacuees want the current 
monthly compensation per capita more than tripled to 350,000 yen (3,000 dollars) per month.  
128	  Liquefaction caused by the quake damaged about 27,000 houses [NHK World, October 8, 2014].	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to reinforce ground when it developed the area more than 30 years ago129 [NHK World, 
October 8, 2014]. 
Central government offered Fukushima prefecture, and the two candidate towns for 
interim storage facilities of highly radioactive waste (Okuma and Futaba) a total of ¥374 
billion (2.2 billion dollars) over 30 years as financial assistance for regional development and 
restoration of local residents’ lives [The Japan News, July 31, 2014; NHK World, July 30, 
2014]. First year’s payment includes ¥90 billion for the local governments for rebuilding lives 
of local residents and for regional development (measures to repair damage to public image) 
while remaining ¥50 billion is for reconstruction of infrastructure in Okuma and Futaba 
(water supplies, sewerage systems and roads)130. In addition, the government will continue to 
pay for 30 years allowances to areas hosting power plants planning to add ¥1.1 billion to the 
current ¥6.7 billion a year as subsidy131 which is normally paid to municipalities hosting 
nuclear plants and typically used to develop local communities and improve residents’ 
health132.  
(Some) Experts underline the uncertainty related to the total costs of the nuclear 
disaster since their level has been expanding constantly [Okuyama, 2014]. Early in 2014 the 
government estimated it would take JPY11.16 trillion and 40 years to clean up the Fukushima 
site [World Nuclear Association, 2014]. It is largely made up of more than 2.5 trillion yen for 
decontamination, 1.1 trillion yen for interim storage facilities, 2 trillion yen for reactor 
decommissioning and contaminated water treatment, and over 5 trillion yen for compensation 
from TEPCO133.  
Up to date huge challenges in decommissioning the nuclear rectors have been 
associated with changes in timetables and costs tags. The current timetable calls for the 
process of removing spent fuel assemblies from the storage pool to begin in fiscal 2017, and 
removing melted fuel to begin 3 years later. However, the Government and TEPCO officials 
recently announced that they are planning to delay the start of removing spent fuel units until 
fiscal 2019 (by 2 years) and the start of removing melted fuel till 2025 (by 5 years) [NHK 
World, October 30, 2014]. 
The latest experts estimate to clean up areas designated as uninhabitable134 is for 6.6 
billion US dollars including fees for transportation and storing contaminated soil [NHK 
World, June 10, 2014]. The 2013 estimated cost of decontaminating other areas were 19.2 
billion dollars including spending for setting up the initial storage sites and follow-up 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129
 The plaintiffs demanded that the company pay compensation totaling about 7.8 million dollars but 
the court has turned down residents' claim. Similar lawsuits have been filed elsewhere. 
130	  Government plans to pay out the initial ¥140 billion as a lump sum when facilities are constructed 
so that the local governments can use money flexibly by setting up funds or through other measures.	  
131	  total ¥7.8 billion a year or ¥234 billion over 30 years.	  
132	  Local authorities are not satisfied with the amount of money offered and asked government to 
increase the sum. The government also indicated that it would stop paying subsidies for the offline 
Fukushima Daichi nuclear plant, located 10 km south of the damaged Fukushima Daiichi, which local 
people are calling to be decommissioned. 
133
 In December 2011 damage costs were forecasted to be “merely” 5.8 trillion yen for things such as 
compensation for residents, decontamination, and nuclear reactor cooling. 
134	  Government has not decided yet whether to conduct cleanup operations in such areas. 
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checking of radiation levels. The government calculated that building intermediate storage 
facilities to keep contaminated soil for up to 30 years would cost about 10.4 billion dollars 
including the funds needed to buy land for such facilities. Finally, the decommissioning of 
nuclear reactors has just begun and it would take 30-40 years costing 20 billion dollars [NHK 
World, August 2, 2014]. 
Experts find the latest Cost Verification Committee’s estimate “over-optimistic” and 
predict that nuclear disaster costs are bound to increase further135 [Okuyama, 2014]. It is 
assessed that more and more public funding has been injected but the support for victims is 
being stopped or reduced. If compensation is conducted in good faith, damage costs could 
become as high as the annual tax revenue of the nation, or 43 trillion yen [Okuyama, 2014].  
Furthermore, some of the economic costs and impacts from the March 2011 disaster 
could hardly be measured in quantitative (e.g. monetary) terms such as: lost lives and piece of 
mind, destroyed livelihood and accumulated with many generations capital (community 
relations, permanent crops, livestock herds, established brands, networks), degradated natural 
resources (lands, waters, biodiversity, landscape, eco-systems), labor health implications 
(reduced productivity, increased healthcare costs) etc. [Bachev and Ito, 2013]. Particularly, in 
the first five months of 2014 police have recorded 90 cases of burglary in 8 municipalities 
surrounding the crippled nuclear plant, which totaled about 1,200 since 2011 [NHK World, 
June 12, 2014]. 
Excessive use of aging nuclear power plants is problematic both in terms of safety and 
cost [The Japan News, October 20, 2014]. In the wake of the March 2011 crisis, a new rule 
has been adopted that puts a reactor’s operating life at no longer than 40 years in principle136. 
Major utilities have set aside cash reserves to fund decommissioning costs but if a plant closes 
ahead of schedule and the reserve fund fails to cover decommissioning costs, a utility could 
face a huge financial burden. What is more, if reactors are decommissioned, host 
municipalities will be unable to receive subsidies from the central government and there will 
be negative impacts on local economy.  
Finally, the 2011 disasters has led to increased public concerns about disaster 
preparedness and management efficiency, and fundamental revisions of country’s disaster 
management, nuclear safety and energy policies. The later has been result of the 2011 
experience and the post disaster reconstruction and development as well as some recent 
natural disasters like huge mudslides in Hiroshima (August 2014), unexpected volcanic 
eruption at Mount Ontake (September, 2014), strong Typhoon Vongfong (October 2014), and 
a 6.7 eartquake in Nagano prefecture (November 2014).   
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 E.g. unpecedented construction of ice walls as a temporary method of halting groundwater flow 
into reactor buildings is under way which will cost ¥31.9 billion [The Japan News, June 6, 2014]. 
Power consumption of 45.5 million kilowatt-hours of electricity equivalent to that of 13,000 ordinary 
households, running more than ¥1 billion annually will be needed to keep the underground walls 
frozen. Implementation of this progect is associated with many dificulties and its efficiency uncertain. 
136	  Depending on approval by the Nuclear Regulation Authority, the operation of a nuclear facility 
could get a one-time maximum extension of 20 years. Of the nation’s 48 reactors, seven are about 40 
years old. 
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Recent surveys indicated that 35% of industry sites see liquefaction risk [The Japan 
News, June 24, 2014], 76% of the public is concerned about aging infrastructure [The Japan 
News, July 2, 2014], over 70% of schools see risk of tsunami [The Japan News, April 7, 
2014], around half of the municipalities within 30 km from nuclear power plants have yet to 
draw up plans for evacuation in the event of a nuclear accident [NHK World April 19, 2014], 
some prefectures failed to supply the iodine tablets required for people living within 30 km of 
nuclear power plants [NHK World, May 9, 2014], less than a half of companies in Tokyo 
store food and provisions for emergencies in spite of a legal requirement for businesses to 
prepare for possible large-scale disasters137 [The Japan News, May 26, 2014], nearly 30% 
(more than 17,000 districts) in mountainous regions as well more than 30% (about 6,300) of 
fishing villages in the country could become inaccessible in the event of a major earthquake 
or other natural disasters [NHK World, October 22, 2014], volcano experts are calling for a 
review of the Nuclear Regulation Authority’s safety requirements and taking into 
consideration the limitations of volcanic eruption prediction [NHK World, November 3, 
2014], etc. 
A panel of nuclear experts138 monitoring reforms at the TEPCO maintains that the 
utility's nuclear safety culture “has not yet reached desired level in terms of preparing for the 
unexpected” [NHK World, May, 1, 2014]. TEPCO management problems led to troubles with 
systems used to purify contaminated water, repeated water leaks, and preparations for cleanup 
work. The experts recommend that the utility make sure workers are fully aware that they are 
dealing with a special plant, which caused an accident, and to learn from measures taken at 
overseas nuclear facilities. 
All these have been associated with new public and private measures to modernize 
infrastructure, enhance safety and disaster preparation, shift to renewable and energy saving 
technologies, etc. 
For instance, the Government set concrete numerical targets to promote the nation’s 
countermeasures to prepare for disasters and reduce damage on a long-term basis [The Japan 
News, May 16, 2014]. The two plans are compiled based on the basic law (December 2013) 
to make Japan more resilient against disasters139 and include measures such as: enhancing 
information and telecommunications networks, building road networks to enable drivers to 
take detours in the wake of major disasters and boosting the oil supply system, raise the 
completion rate of sea embankments from the current 31% (2012) to 66% by fiscal 2016, etc. 
Similarly, government obliges local governments to compile evacuation rules that limit 
the time for operating floodgates and tide gates in coastal areas140 in the event of tsunami [The 
Japan News, November 2, 2014]. In addition, multiple nuclear disaster drill has been held in 
vulnerable regions of the country (including Kawauchi, Fukushima prefecture) under the new 
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 E.g. metropolitan ordinance (April 2013) obliges all companies to store drinking water and food for 
3 days for employees as a measure to help those who unable to go home after disater. 
138	   independent advisory panel set up after the 2011 accident and chaired by the former US Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission Chairman Dale Klein.	  
139
 a basic plan on making Japan disaster ready and disaster resistant, and a 2014 action plan 
concerning numerical targets of respective measures. 
140
 There are about 27,000 floodgates and tide gates nationwide and 75% of them need to be manually 
closed if quake tremors are detected. In March 2011 eartquake 198 firefighters died or went missing 
and 30% were working to close such gates. 
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disaster preparedness guidelines141, which highlighted existing problems [NHK World, 
November 3, 2014; The Japan News, November 22, 2014]. 
The new policy is that in the process of disaster preparation and responses the needs and 
desires of local people are to be addressed – e.g. in the process of reconstruction, land 
relocation planning, seawalls building, etc. 
For instance, 2011 disaster seriously damaged or destroyed 60% of seawalls with length 
of about 300 km in Miyagi, Iwate and Fukushima prefectures. The central and prefectural 
governments are currently pushing a project to build 390 km of new seawalls with ¥800 
billion from state coffers [The Japan News, June 23, 2014]. However, many communities are 
opposed142 to the project as local residents consider the proposed walls “too high” leaving less 
land available along the coasts, adversely affecting fisheries, and block ocean views, and 
affect negatively fishery and tourism industries on which local residents depend. What is 
more, cost-effectiveness of the seawalls is to be more carefully estimated143. Some 
communities have already lowered the planned height of seawalls, while taking such 
measures as transferring houses to higher ground and building seawalls in locations further 
inland.  
Some experts suggest that it is important to recover, preserve and expend coastal 
ecosystems such as coastal forests and igune not only as important ecological and cultural 
assets but as an effective measure for reducing damage from natural disasters144 [Ogata and 
Pushpalala, 2013].  
The Cabinet Office has set up a new section dedicated to helping local municipalities 
prepare for accidents at nuclear power plants consisting of 50 workers from the Secretariat of 
the Nuclear Regulation Authority and other relevant government ministries and agencies 
[NHK World, October 14, 2014]. 
In November 2014 the Diet approved a bill to join an international treaty on sharing the 
costs of compensation in a nuclear disaster145 [NHK World, October 24, November 19, 2014]. 
The government expects the treaty to encourage foreign companies to join the cleanup and 
decommissioning of reactors at the Fukushima nuclear power plant. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141	   revised after Fukushima accident. Such drills have been organized every year since the 1999 
accident at a nuclear-processing plant in Ibaraki Prefecture.	  
142
 E.g. in Miyagi prefecture approval for the project is to be received from 40 of 276 communities 
where the construction of new seawalls is planned. Under its plan, Miyagi Prefecture will raise the 
height of seawalls from the pre-disaster average of 4 meters to 7.5 meters. However, that height will 
be insufficient to block gigantic tsunami such as in March 2011, which occurred once in a millennium.	  
143
 The higher the seawall the more effective it is as a safeguard against tsunami. Higher seawalls are 
more expensive to construct, ruin scenic views, take a toll on the environment, and entail higher 
maintenance costs. The life of concrete seawalls is roughly 50 years, which makes rebuilding 
inevitable at some point in the future. 
144
 In 2011 disasters they prove particularly effective in reducing impact of tsunami, preserving houses 
from damages and debris.  
145
 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage obliging signatories to set aside 
47 billion yen (about 400 million dollars) for compensation in the event of a nuclear accident. If the 
total damage surpasses this amount, other countries will provide funds to supplement it. The pact 
stipulates that a lawsuit for compensation can only be filed in a country where a nuclear accident 
occurred, and liability for damages is concentrated against a nuclear power plant operator. 
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There has been a response in private sector as well. For instance in October 2014 the 
Nuclear Risk Research Center was established as a part of the Central Research Institute of 
Electric Power Industry (run jointly by Japanese power companies) [NHK World, October 1, 
2014]. The center's aim is to pinpoint associated risks, including those at plants that have met 
government requirements to restart, and help power companies fix the problems. According to 
the Center chief146 “Japan has been slow to introduce risk analysis because most people think 
everything that meets government requirements is safe, and such attitudes must change to 
ensure safety”. 
The insurance industry is set to raise earthquake insurance premiums by an average 
15.5% which is the first hike in 18 years [The Japan News, June 29, 2014]. Meanwhile, the 
proportion of newly concluded fire insurance contracts in fiscal 2013 (including earthquake 
damage coverage147) rose 1.6 percentage points from the previous year to a record high of 
58.1%148 [The Japan News, August 26, 2014]. Miyagi prefecture saw the highest proportion 
(85.2%), as the pace of growth was the steepest in Hyogo (3.2 points), and third in Iwate, 
Tochigi, Kyoto, Tottori, Kagawa and Ehime prefectures (2.6 points). 
The Fukushima accident has triggered many anti-nuclear protests in Japan during 2011 
[BBC News, 2011; Slodkowski, 2011] and afterwards. The previous Government of 
Yoshihiko Noda ordered all nuclear reactors to be stopped for safety checks, considered to 
freeze plans to build new reactors, questioned whether private companies should be running 
nuclear plants, and focus on reducing dependence from nuclear and promotion of renewable 
energy149. 
After the 2011 accident all nuclear reactors were shut down for maintenance or 
refueling, and for the stress tests demanded by the government. Only two were restarted (in 
the Ohi facility) but shut down on September 14, 2013 leaving all 48 commercial nuclear 
reactors off-line. Since then the Nuclear Regulatory Authority has received safety-screening 
applications for 19 reactors at 12 nuclear plants [NHK World, June 10, 2014].  
  Nuclear power accounted for 30% of the nation’s electricity generation before the 
nuclear crisis while now nearly 90% of the power generated by nuclear plants is being 
compensated for by thermal power [The Japan News, April 12, 2014]. The shortage of 
energy, the high energy150 and fuel import151 costs, and security risk from relying on imported 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146	  George Apostolakis, specialized in analyzing risks at nuclear plants, served on the US Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission until June 2014. 
147	   Earthquake insurance, offered as an option to fire insurance, covers damage to housing and 
household goods from temblors, tsunami and volcanic eruptions. 
148
 As of the end of March, the number of earthquake insurance contracts in force stood at 15,838,144, 
up 5.2% from a year before. That is all-time high for the 11th straight year.	  
149	  Energy White Paper (October 2011) calls for a reduction in the nation’s reliance on nuclear power 
omitting a section on nuclear power expansion in the previous year’s policy review. 	  
150
 Electricity rates TEPCO charges households have risen by 40% from before the crisis, while Kansai 
Electricity Power Co. have increased by nearly 30% [The Japan News, April 12, 2014]. Electricity 
bills for households have jumped about 20% and for businesses about 30% [The Japan News, May 30, 
2014]. According to experts as things stand now, the additional rate hikes are inevitable. 
151
 In 2013, imports of fossil fuels including liquefied natural gas as a percentage of GDP stood at 
5.7% - higher than in 2008 (5.5%) when the prices of resources soared, and in 1974 (5.4%) during the 
first oil crisis [The Japan News, June 18, 2014]. 
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energy have been pressing current government to speed up safety inspections and resuming 
operations of nuclear plants [The Japan News, July 18, November 7, 2014; NHK World, May 
13, 2014]. In addition, the Government has been calling for power conservation without 
setting numerical power-saving targets anymore152 [The Japan News, May 16, November 3, 
2014; NHK World, July 1, 2014].  
Power suppliers have been worried about the possibility of electricity shortages and 
being hit by glitches153 [The Japan News, May 18, June 30, 2014], while most companies 
have been expending energy conservation technologies and products [The Japan News, May 
18, 2014]. Nevertheless, eight of the 10 regional power utilities, including TEPCO, continue 
to secure recurring profits154 due to postponement of equipment renovation and higher 
efficiency in thermal power operations [The Japan News, November 1, 2014]. 
The schedule for safety inspections is uncertain and no nuclear reactors restarted by 
the end of 2014 due to lack of readiness155, uncompleted formal procedures156 or strong 
opposition by local governments and communities, including a court ban157. Recent court 
order against resuming operations at the Ohi nuclear plant could affect other similar lawsuits 
across the country158 [NHK World, May 21, 2014].  
There have been numerous protests and a lawsuit against reopening Sendai nuclear 
station in Kagoshima prefecture scheduled to be the first resuming operations [NHK World, 
May 30, June 1, June 13, 2014]. Recently the hosting city assembly and prefectural 
government approved the Sendai plant restart, and operations will likely resume early next 
year after all safety inspections are complete [NHK World, October 20, November 7, 2014]. 
According to the March 2014 survey, 59% of the respondents opposed to the restart of 
nuclear plants, outnumbering the 28% supporting the move [The Asahi Shinbun, March 18, 
2014]. In all previous surveys (July and September, 2013, January, 2014) the majority of 
respondents (56%) opposed the restart of reactors.  
Furthermore, regarding a nuclear phase-out plan, 77% supported it while only 14% 
opposed it. Asked about how anxious they feel about the possibility of a serious accident at a 
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 since summer 2014. Government worries that it will restrict corporate activities and hinder 
economic recovery.  
153
 In fiscal 2013, a total of 169 cases of thermal power plant shutdowns, mainly due to glitches, were 
reported by 9 of 10 regional power suppliers – that is up 70% from 2010 level. 
154	  in April-Setember	  2014 TEPCO reported profit of ¥242.8 billion, a second straight profit and even 
topping the ¥201.3-billion profit before the nuclear accident. Only Hokkaido Electric Power Co. and 
Kyushu Electric Power Co. suffered recurring losses since they relied heavily on nuclear energy. 
155
 Nuclear Regulation Authority criticized the plant operators being not serious enough about 
improving safety and attitude simply aiming to satisfy screening criteria [NHK World, June 25, 2014].  
156
 E.g. formal approval by the local authorities. 
157
 Most lawsuits since late 1960s by residents seeking to halt nuclear facilities have been dismissed 
[NHK World, May 21, 2014]. On May 20, 2014 the Fukui District Court ordered Kansai Electric 
Power Co. not to restart 3 and 4 reactors at Oi nuclear power plant in Fukui prefecture becouse safety 
of the idled reactors is not ensured. It was the first court order in Japan to ban nuclear plant operations 
since 2011 nuclear accident. The lawsuit was filed by 189 local residents in November 2012 claiming 
that plant operator underestimate of possible earthquakes and reactors lack sufficient cooling systems.  
158
 there are now about 30 lawsuits pending against 16 nuclear plants and other nuclear facilities in 
Japan, including those under construction or in the planning stage.  
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nuclear power plant other than the Fukushima plant, 36% said they were “greatly” anxious, 
and 50% were anxious “to some degree”.  
August 2014 survey also indicated that more than 60% of local governments that host 
or surround a nuclear power plant159 are cautious about restarting idled reactors even if they 
meet new safety guidelines [NHK World, September 8, 2014]. About 67% report they were 
undecided whether to approve the restart of reactors, about 12% said they will approve or 
hope to approve in the future, while 8% indicated they will not approve or will never 
approve160. The major reason for opposition or cautious for 30% is because inspections by the 
nuclear regulating body have not yet finished, for 25% that the central government has not yet 
dealt with the issue, and for 23% because residents are worried. 
The basic energy plan161 of the new Abe administration defined nuclear energy as “an 
important base load electricity source” and clearly stated that nuclear power plants will 
resume operations after safety is confirmed [The Japan News, April 12, 2014]. The nuclear 
reactors will be restarted since the new safety guidelines (introduced in July 2013) are the 
strictest in the world and the safety inspections will confirm compliance.  
Energy industry reaction has been to maintain nuclear – e.g. in 2014 shareholders 
meetings of TEPCO, Kansai Electric Power Company and Kyushu Electric Power Company 
the anti-nuclear proposals of not restarting and scrapping nuclear reactors have been rejected 
[HNK World, June 26, 2014; The Japan News, June 26, 2014].  
Nevertheless, there is strong opposition to restart nuclear power plants by various 
groups, including some prominent politicians (like Ex-PMs Junichiro Koizumi and	  Morihiro 
Hosokawa)162 suggesting that nuclear power is not safe, it is the most expensive, disposal 
cites for nuclear waste are not secured, the evacuation routes not secured, and anti-terrorism 
measures insufficient [NHK World, July 7, September 24, November 2, 2014]. The lack of a 
single power outage since the nuclear reactors have been offline is evidence that people can 
live without nuclear energy and calls for more renewables.  
Anti-nuclear power groups also criticize the Nuclear Regulation Authority for the 
conflict of interests of the appointed new Commissioner (Satoru Tanaka) with close ties with 
the industry compromising the watchdog's neutrality [NHK World, July 8, July 16, 2014].  
Experts suggest that further delays in restarting reactors at the nation’s nuclear power 
plants will slow the recovery of the domestic economy, while the resumption of reactor 
operations could halve Japan’s trade deficit [The Japan News, July 26, 2014]. According to 
estimate, if all 19 reactors163 resume operations in fiscal 2015 the total nuclear power 
generation would be less than a half of the output of fiscal 2010. That will reduce the nation’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159
 Included 146 prefectures and municipalities within a 30-kilometer radius of a nuclear power plant. 
160
 There is no legal framework for the government to obtain approval from local municipalities to 
restart reactors.  
161
 which serves as a guideline for the government’s energy policy. 
162
 who launched an organization dedicated to ending Japan's reliance on nuclear power [NHK World, 
May 7, 2014]. 
163
 Nuclear Regulation Authority is currently inspecting the safety of 19 reactors at 12 nuclear plants. 
If all 19 reactors resume operations, nuclear power generation capacity would be 124.3 billion 
kilowatt-hours.	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trade deficit164 to ¥7.2 trillion, providing certain conditions (such as overseas economic 
growth) are met.  
If 19 reactors resume operations, imports of fossil fuels are estimated to total ¥25.8 
trillion in fiscal 2015. This is ¥900 billion lower than the ¥26.7 trillion in fossil fuel imports 
estimated under the scenario of having just 9 reactors in operation, and ¥1.5 trillion lower than 
when no reactors operate in the nation. In the latter case, imports were predicted to reach 
¥27.3 trillion. Under such circumstances, the cost of power generation is likely to rise to ¥11.2 
per kilowatt-hour from ¥8.2 in fiscal 2010, putting additional upward pressure on electricity 
prices165. Moreover, if the price of crude oil rises by $10 per barrel, imports of fossil fuels will 
increase ¥1.9 trillion, which is likely to lower the nation’s gross domestic product by 0.2%. 
Therefore, the progress of safety inspections at the nuclear reactors will have a significant 
impact on the Japanese economy166. 
Due to the suspension of nuclear reactors the thermal power generation accounted for 
88% of Japan’s electricity supply in fiscal 2013, increased by 26 percentage points from 2010 
[The Japan News, June 18, 2014]. The nation’s greenhouse gas emissions in fiscal 2012 
soared about 8% from those in 2010 as utilities discharged about 30% more gases 
contributing to global warming [The Japan News, May 30, 2014]. 
The government intends to diversify energy sources aiming to raise the share of 
renewable (solar, wind, hydro and geothermal) energy in the electricity supply to more than 
13.5% of the nation's electricity in 2020, and more than 20% by end of 2030, from about 10% 
in 2012 [The Japan News, April 4, 2014]. It also started reexamining the renewable energy 
purchase system making it mandatory for electric power companies to purchase electricity 
generated by renewable energy sources (solar and wind power) at fixed prices167 for up to 20 
years [The Japan News, July 8, 2014]. Large numbers of applications have been filed for solar 
power generation, which entails relatively high purchase prices. Since the utilities pass the 
costs to the consumers the amount in a typical family’s utility bill soared from ¥87 to ¥225 a 
month in 2014168.  
It is estimated that higher power costs have been also hampering pay rise of 
manufacture industry workers in average lost salary per year ¥52,000 [The Japan News, 
September 4, 2014]. In order to make up for a maximum 40% increase in electricity costs in 
comparison to pre-disaster levels, workers could see their annual pay cut by as much as 
¥100,000 while if manufacturers deal with the situation by reducing employment as many as 
180,000 jobs could be lost. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164
 which hit a record high of ¥13.8 trillion in fiscal 2013.	  In January-June 2014 Japan’s trade deficit 
hit ¥7.6 trillion, the worst since such records began in fiscal 1979. The surge is mainly accounted for 
by growing imports of such fossil fuels as oil and liquefied natural gas. 
165	  If no reactors resume operation, the power generation cost will surge to ¥13 – 60% higher than the 
price in fiscal 2010 - making it difficult to avoid further electricity rate hikes.	  
166
 NRA has given priority to safety inspections on reactors at Kyushu Electric Power Co.’s Sendai 
nuclear power plant, and they are expected to resume operations early 2015. Dates for restarting the 
remaining reactors are unknown and restarting all 19 reactors in fiscal 2015 is considered difficult. 
167
 purchase prices have been set at levels more than double those in Europe.  
168	   households and businesses will have to pay ¥38 trillion in the next two decades because of 
surcharges on utility bills [The Japan News, July 8, 2014]. 
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Another problem is that operations have started at only 10% of the approved mega 
solar power plants169. Seven of the nation’s 10 major utilities (including Hokkaido Electric 
Power Co., Tohoku Electric Power Co. and Kyushu Electric Power Co.) are freezing new 
applications by producers keen to access their grids with electricity generated through solar, 
wind and other renewable sources since they exceeded the capacity their grids can accept170 
[The Japan News, October 9, 2014]. A major weak point of solar and many other renewable 
energy sources is that output can fluctuate sharply depending on weather conditions and the 
time of day. Failure to maintain a steady balance with demand presents the risk of disrupting 
the frequency and voltage of electricity supplies, which could in turn cause power outages and 
damage equipment and facilities171. 
Calculations of independent experts also shows that the electricity from nuclear power 
is the second cheapest energy to produce at ¥8 per kilowatt-hour172 even after such expenses 
as costs related to accident compensation were factored the production cost rose to ¥8.4 [The 
Japan News, October 26, 2014]. Production cost of electricity from renewable energy sources 
is comparatively high – e.g. large mega solar power facilities generate electricity at ¥30.6 per 
kilowatt-hour, electricity from wind power cost ¥21.2 per kilowatt-hour, etc. Beside, some 
renewable energy producers have been gleaning excessive profits while users have borne the 
financial burden. 
The government has limited the role of the Atomic Energy Commission an advisory 
panel that has served to promote nuclear energy for over half a century173 [NHK World, April 
18, 2014]. The commission no longer will draw up the policy and focus to solving problems 
related to nuclear power, such as how to deal with radioactive waste and what do to with 
damaged Fukushima power plant. The number of commissioners has been also reduced (from 
5 to 3) and a new code of conduct introduced to ensure neutrality and transparency. 
A bill has been enacted for the Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation Fund’s 
reorganization to allow the state-backed body to provide financial assistance for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169
 This may be an attempt to increase profits by building facilities at a time when solar panel prices 
decrease after obtaining approval for undertaking projects when purchase prices are high. Official 
survey on 4,700 large solar power projects that have yet to begin generating electricity resulted in 
canceling certification on 144 after considered as inappropriate (The Japan News, July 8, 2014). 
170	  If renewable energy providers approved by the government were all operating, they would have a 
supply capacity of 70 million kilowatts, which is 90% of the government’s target (20%). Furthermore, 
latest survey indicates that combined acceptance capacity of utilities is up to 47% of the total 
authorized amount of 30 million kilowatts - e.g. Kyushu Electric and Tohoku Electric will only be able 
to accommodate accordingly about 8 million kilowatts and about 5-6 million kilowatts compared to 18 
and 12 million kilowatts to be generated by authorized renewable energy suppliers in their service 
areas [The Japan News, December 7, 2014]. 
171	  Greater the use of renewable energy, more adjustments must be made to the supply of electricity 
generated through such sources as thermal power generation. Greater amount of electricity from 
renewable could be accepted through installing huge storage batteries and building more transmission 
lines to share surplus. Implementing later steps on a large scale will come with a price (trillions of 
yen) but there are not even rules in place for covering such expenses. 
172
 After coal (¥7.8). All expenses including the building and maintenance of plants were factored into 
the costs of energy, including the processing of spent fuel rods in the case of nuclear power. 
173
 Commission’s role came under review following disclosures 2 years ago that it held secret 
meetings only with pro-nuclear parties (power utilities and bureaucrats) during compiling the policy. 
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decommissioning the reactors at Fukushima nuclear plant [The Japan News, May 14, 2014]. 
The government will take the lead in work to decommission the reactors and contain the 
radioactive water at the nuclear plant. The body will provide TEPCO with technical 
instructions on how to proceed with the decommissioning work, monitor whether the utility 
maintains adequate budget and manpower for decommission, and promote development of 
related technologies. The government is also planning to review the law on compensation for 
accidents at nuclear power plants according to which the power companies in principle bear 
unlimited responsibility for damage payments in the event of an accident [NHK World, June 
3, 2014]. 
The Government has been taking action to increase transparency following the failure 
to do so in the first days after the nuclear accident. It announced that will publicize interviews 
with TEPCO and government officials about the accident174 if they give consent [HNK 
World, June 5, 2014]. TEPCO shareholders are also asking the government to release 
interviews since they are important for examining responsibility for the accident, and plan to 
take legal action if it is turned down [HNK World, June 5, 2014]. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174	  A government appointed accident investigation committee interviewed 772 people after the 2011 
accident for a report. Until now they have not been disclosed on grounds that they were conducted 
with understanding that the government would not do so.	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5. Impacts on agri-food chains  
 
There have been a huge number of destructed agricultural communities, farms, and 
agricultural lands and properties from the March 2011 disasters (Picture 5).  
 
Picture 5. Minamisanriki (Shizugawa Ward) before and after 2011 tsunami 
 
Source: Tohoku Chiikizukuri 
 
The total number of damaged Agricultural Management Entities	   of different type 
(private farms, corporate entities, cooperatives, local public bodies, etc.) reached 37,700 or 
around 16% of all Agricultural Management Entities in the affected eight prefectures (Table 
14). Reported area of agricultural land damaged by the 2011 disasters in the six coastal and 
six inland prefectures is around 24,500 ha (Table 15). 
Table 14. Number of damaged Agricultural Management Entities by 2011 earthquake 
(March 11, 2012) 
Prefectures Total number of 
Agricultural 
management entities 
Damaged 
agricultural entities 
Entities damaged by 
tsunami 
Number Share, % Number Share, % 
Aomori 3,733  180   4.8  170   4.6  
Iwate 35,321  7,700  21.8  480   1.4  
Miyagi 47,574  7,290  15.3  6,060  12.7  
Fukushima 50,945  17,200  33.8  2,850   5.6  
Ibaraki 56,537  1,430   2.5  180   0.3  
Tochigi 25,010  1,330   5.3  -  -  
Chiba 17,224  1,220   7.1  430   2.5  
Nigata 5,311  1,190  22.4  -  -  
Nagano 312  210  67.3  -  -  
Total 241,967 37,700 15.6 10,200 4.2 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries               
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Table 15. Area of damaged agricultural land by the 2011 earthquake (March 11, 2012) 
Prefectures Damaged agricultural 
land 
Tsunami damaged 
agricultural land 
Share of 
completely 
restored 
agricultural 
land (%) 
Share of 
restored 
tsunami 
damaged 
land (%) 
Area 
(ha) 
% in total 
cultivated 
land 
Area 
(ha) 
% in 
damaged 
land 
Aomori 107 0.1 77 72 94.4 92.2 
Iwate 1,209 0.8 725 60 22.2 3.9 
Miyagi 14,558 10.7 14,341 98.5 33.3 32.5 
Fukushima 5,927 3.9 5,462 92.1 9.3 4.1 
Ibaraki 1,063 0.6 208 19.6 90.1 97.1 
Chiba 1,162 0.9 663 57.1 100.0 100 
Total coastal 24,026 2.7 21,476 89.4 32.9 27.3 
Yamagata 1 0.0 - 0 100.0 - 
Tochigi 198 0.1 - 0 98.0 - 
Gunma 1 0.0 - 0 100.0 - 
Saitama 39 0.0 - 0 100.0 - 
Niigata 117 0.1 - 0 73.5 - 
Nagano 95 0.1 - 0 69.5 - 
Total inland  451 0.1 - 0 85.8 - 
Total 24,477 1.6 21,476 87.7 33.8 27.3 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries       
 
There have been registered damages in 36,092 places including: damaged agricultural 
land in 18,186 areas, damaged agricultural facilities (mainly storage reservoirs, drains, pumps, 
shore protection facilities for agricultural land) in 17,317 points, damaged coastal protection 
facilities for agricultural land in 139 points, and damaged facilities for daily life in farming 
villages (mainly community sewerage) in 450 points [MAFF, 2014].  
Furthermore, there has been radioactive contamination of farmlands from the nuclear 
accident’s fallout (Map 11). Recent survey in the most affected regions shows that 
contamination with cesium of paddy fields ranges from 67 up to 41,400	  Bq/kg and other lands 
(arable, meadows, permanent crops) from 16 to 56,600 Bq/kg (Table 16).  
There has been also enormous destruction of livestock, fruit trees and crops in affected 
by the disasters regions. The total crop and livestock damages from the 2011 earthquake are 
estimated to worth 14.2 billion yen [MAFF, 2012]. In Aomori, Iwate and Miyagi prefectures 
alone the registered livestock damages include 187 dairy heads (171 drowned and 16 crushed 
or starved), 458 beef cattle (466 drowned and 12 crushed or starved), 5,850 hogs (4,037 
drowned and 1,813 crushed or starved), and 4,549,620 poultry (174,800 drowned and 
4,374820 crushed or starved) [Tohoku Agricultural Administration Office, 2011].  
Damages on farms have been particularly big in areas around the Fukushima nuclear 
plant, where most agricultural land, livestock and crops were heavily contaminated and 
destructed [Koyama, 2012, 2013; Watanabe, 2013]. In the most affected evacuation areas 
farming activity has been suspended or significantly reduced, and majority of livestock and 
crops destroyed.  
 
68	  
	  
Map 11. Farmland soil radiation (Mar. 23, 2012) 
 
 
                           Source: MAFF, 2012            
 
Table 16. Share of contaminated with Cs farmlands, as of December 28, 2012 (percent) 
Prefectures Paddy fields  Other farmlands 
range 
(Bq/kg) 
0-
500 
500-
1000 
1000-
5000 
> 
5000 
range 
(Bq/kg) 
0-
500 
500-
1000 
1000-
5000 
> 
5000 
Miyagi 72-1,310 61.9 28.6 9.5 0 110-860 50 50 0 0 
Fukushima 50-41,400 39 16.1 40.8 4 40-56,600 34.3 21.2 41.6 2.9 
Ibaraki  0 0 0 0 230-560 50 50 0 0 
Tochigi 110-1,040 50 41.7 8.3 0 62-2,630 66.7 11.1 22.22 0 
Gunma 85-170 100 0 0 0 49-560 95 5 0 0 
Chiba 67-120 100 0 0 0 < 16-190 100 0 0 0 
Total 67-41,400 43.2 17.8 35.6 3.4 16-56,600 46.2 19.2 32.4 2.2 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries               
According to the officials the number of farm households in the evacuation zones was 
5400 and the farming area 11,000 ha, including 73.3% of paddy fields, 25.6% of uplands, and 
1.1% permanent crops [Fukushima Prefectural Government, March 2012]. That comprises 8% 
of the total number of farmers and 9% of the farming area in Fukushima prefecture in 2010. 
The numbers of beef cattle in the evacuation areas was 10,836, of milk cows 1,980 and of 
pigs 40,740, accounting respectively for 15%, 12% and 22% of the overall numbers of 
livestock in 2011. The estimate figure for chickens was 1,589 or 30% of the total number in 
the prefecture in 2009. 
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A large scale contamination of crops, livestock and agri-food products by radionuclides 
has happened as a result of the direct radiation exposure, the fallouts and distributed by wind 
and rains radioactive elements, the crop and livestock uptakes from leaves, soils, waters and 
feeds, the diffusion from affected inputs, buildings and equipment, the dissemination through 
transportation and wildlife, etc.  
Up to the Fukushima nuclear plant accident there had been no adequate system for agri-
food radiation regulation and inspection to deal with such a big disaster [MAFF, 2011]. On 
the wake of the accident a number of measures were taken by the government to guarantee the 
food safety in the country. Within a week from the nuclear accident (March 17, 2011) 
Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare introduced Provisional regulatory limits for 
radionuclides in agri-food products175 (Table 17).  
 
Table 17. Provisional regulatory limits for radionuclides in agri-food products (Bq/kg) 
Products I-131  Cs-134 + Cs-137 
Drinking water 300 (100)* 200** 
Milk/Milk Products 300 (100)* 200** 
Vegetables/Fish 2000 500** 
Cereals/Meat/Eggs - 500** 
*for infants                          ** values take into account the contribution of radioactive strontium 
Source: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare 
 
On 29 March 2011, the Food Safety Commission of Japan drew up a report 
guaranteeing that the ongoing measures based on provisional regulation values are effective 
enough to ensure food safety for consumption, domestic distribution and exportation. On 4 
April 2011 the authorities decided to use the ongoing provisional regulation values for the 
time being and set up provisional regulation value for radioiodines in seafood on the next day. 
During the year after the nuclear accident officials tested 137,037 agri-food samples 
across the country and detected 1,204 cases (0.88%) exceeding the provisional safety limit in 
14 prefectures [Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare].  
Most of the contaminated food samples were in Fukushima prefecture (59.63%), 
followed by Saitama (10.55%), Ibaraki (7.14%), Tochigi (6.23%) and Miyagi prefectures 
(5.32%). The share of contaminated items in all inspected samples was highest in Saitama 
(3.64%), Fukushima (3.33%) and Kanagawa (1.98%) prefectures, and in Tokyo (1.42%).  
The majority of highly contaminated items In Fukushima prefecture were vegetables, 
fishery products and meats, in Ibaraki and Chiba prefectures vegetables, in Miyagi prefecture 
beef, in Tochigi prefecture vegetables and meats, in Saitama prefecture and Tokyo tea leafs.  
More than 3600 fishery products were tested in Fukushima prefecture during the first 
year after the accident, and 34.7% of them found above 100 Bq/kg [Fishery Agency, 2014]. In 
the rest of the country from almost 5000 inspected fish samples 4.5% were above safety norm. 
The mandatory and voluntary restrictions on shipment covered a number of products 
from designated areas of affected regions. In addition, there was a ban on rice planting on 
8000 ha of paddies in evacuation (95%) and other contaminated areas [MAFF, 2012]. What is 
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 based on intervention exemption level of 5 mSv/y and 50% contamination rate [MHLW, 2011]. 
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more, several municipalities (Minami-shi, Hirono-machi, Kawauchi-mura and Tamura-shi) 
called for voluntary restraints on planting of paddy rice on total area of 5,600 ha.  
In order to meet growing public safety concerns since April 1, 2012 new176 official 
limits on radioactive cesium177 in food items have been enforced in the country (Table 18). 
Four categories of Drinking water, Infant foods and Milk, and General foods are 
distinguished, and new safety standards are more stringent than in international ones178.  
	  
Table 18. New Standard limits for radionuclides in food in Japan (Bq/kg) 
Food item Cs-134 + Cs-137 
Drinking water 10* 
Milk 50* 
General Foods 100* 
Infant-food 50* 
* limit takes into account the contribution of radioactive strontium, plutonium etc. 
Source: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare 
 
For some raw materials and processed food (like rice, beef, soybean) were set 
transitional measures and longer periods (until December 31, 2012 or “the best before date”) 
for complete enforcement of the novel safety standards. (Figure 26). 
In the last two years the number of (official, collective, private) food inspections has 
multiplied in the 17 most vulnerable prefectures179 and around the country. Officially tested 
food items doubled in 2012, 0.85% of all samples were found exceeding safety limit for 
radionuclides, and a few highly contaminated items were detected in 4 more prefectures 
(Aomori, Nigata, Yamanashi and Hiroshima)  (Figure 27).  
The biggest number of unsafe food items was detected in Fukushima (58.05%), Iwate 
(10.96%), Tochigi (10.79%), and Miyagi (6.91%) prefectures. The portion of highly 
contaminated food items was biggest in samples from Fukushima (3.95%) and Iwate (1.03%) 
prefectures. 
Most of the detected items were fishery products, wild animal meats, vegetables and 
mushrooms. In Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, and Iwate prefectures there were also detected 
samples of drinking water exceeding safety standard. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176
 annual maximum permissible dose from radioactive cesium in foods reduced from 5mSv to 1mSv - 
the same level as Codex GLs [MHLW, 2012]. 
177
 Standard limits are not established for radioactive Iodine, which has been no longer detected (short 
half-life), and Uranium, which level is almost the same in the nuclear power plant site as in the nature 
environment [MHLW, 2012]. 
178
 e.g. maximum allowed radioactive substances in EU and USA in grains are accordingly 1250 
Bq/kg and 1200 Bq/kg, in vegetables 500 Bq/kg and 1200 Bq/kg, in drinking water 100 Bq/l and 1200 
Bq/kg. 
179
 Regular tests on 98 items have been carried out in Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Akita, Yamagata, 
Fukushima, Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo, Kanagawa, Niigata, Yamanashi, 
Nagano, and Shizuoka prefectures. 
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Figure 26. Transitional measures for enforcement of new standards for radionuclides in 
food in Japan 
 
     Source: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare 
 
Figure 27. Number of radionuclide food tests and items above safety standard in Japan 
 
Source: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare 
 
In FY 2013 the number of inspections increased further but only 0.30% of samples were 
found with level higher than the safety standard180. The bulk of highly contaminated items 
were in Fukushima prefecture (62.42%) followed by Gunma (10.99%), Tochigi (8.42%) and 
Miyagi (8.32%) prefectures. The greatest segment with highly-contaminated items was 
detected in samples from Fukushima (1.5%) and Yamanashi (1.18%) prefectures.  
Most of the detected items in Fukushima prefectures were fishery products, agricultural 
products (vegetables, soybean, rice, etc.) and wild animals meat; in Miyagi prefecture 
agricultural products (bamboo shoot, vegetables, etc.), wild animal meat and fishery products; 
in Gunma and Tochigi wild anima meats; and in Yamanashi prefecture mushrooms.  
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 No drinking water sample above safety limit was detected. 
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Official inspections results in the last two years indicate that for all agricultural food 
products, but mushrooms and wild edible plants, the number of samples with radioactive 
cesium above safety limits is none or insignificant (Table 19).  
 
Table 19. Results of inspections on radioactivity levels in agricultural products in 
Japan*  
 
Products 
March, 2011 - March 31, 
2012 
April 1, 2012 - 
March 31, 2013 
April 1, 2013 - 
March 31, 2014 
Number 
of 
samples 
Above 
provisio
nal  limit 
Above  
new 
limit 
Number 
of 
samples 
Above 
maximum  
limit 
Number 
of 
samples 
Above 
maximum  
limit 
Rice 26,464 39 592 10.4 
million 
84 11 
million 
28 
Wheat and burley 557 1 27 1,818 0 592 0 
Vegetables 12,671 139 385 18,570 5 19,657 0 
Fruits 2,732 28 210 4,478 13 4,243 0 
Pulse 698 0 16 4,398 25 6,727 59 
Other plants 498 1 16 3,094 14 1,613 0 
Mushrooms and 
wild edible plants 
3,856 228 779 6,588 605 7,583 194 
Tea/Tea infusion** 2,233 192 1,562 867** 13** 446** 0** 
Raw milk 1,937 1 7 2,453 0 2,052 0 
Beef 91,973 157 1096 187,176 6 208,477 0 
Pork 538 0 6 984 1 693 0 
Chicken 240 0 0 472 0 385 0 
Egg 443 0 0 565 0 418 0 
Honey 11 0 1 124 0 66 0 
Other livestock 23 0 0 99 1 118 0 
*	  for crops in 17 northeastern and eastern prefectures, for livestock products all prefectures 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries                
 
Test data for marine fishery products radioactive contamination also indicate that the 
number of cases above safety limit has dropped considerably (Figure 28). In Fukushima 
prefecture, in the months after the accident, the share of highly-contaminated fish was 57.7% 
but it reduced by half after one year. The portion of samples above safety limit decreased 
considerably to around 1.5-1.7% in the last three quarters.181 In other prefectures the share of 
contaminated fish decreased from 4.7% to less than 1% in 3nd quarter of 2012. 
Currently there are still a number of products from certain areas of 17 prefectures, 
which are subject to mandatory or voluntary shipment restrains182. In Fukushima prefecture 
mandatory and voluntary restrictions cover a wide range of vegetables, fruits, livestock and 
fish products grown in heavily contaminated areas. In addition, there is still a ban on rice 
planting on 2,100 ha (almost 3 times lass than in 2013) and overall production management 
restrictions on 4,200 ha paddies in the evacuation area.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181
 After the 2nd quarter of 2012, monitoring has been focusing on species that have records more than 
50 Bq/kg. 
182
 more details and updates on requests for shipment restrains and other measures are available at: 
http://www.maff.go.jp/e/quake/press_since_130327.html 
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Figure 28.	  Monitoring results for marine fishery products radioactive levels in Japan 
 
Source: Fishery Agency 
 
The official estimate for the inflicted damage on agriculture by the 2011 earthquake is 
904.9 billion yen183 (Figure 29). The biggest share of the damages is for agricultural land 
(44.3%) and agricultural facilities (30.4%), followed by the coastal farmland protection 
facilities (11.3%), community facilities (7%), agricultural livestock etc. (mainly country 
elevators, agricultural warehouses, PVC greenhouses, livestock bams, compost depos) (5.4%), 
and agricultural crop and livestock etc. (1.6%). 
Figure 29. Damages to agriculture from 2011 earthquake as of July 5, 2012 (100 million 
yen)  
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries        
The greatest amount of damage has incurred in Miyagi prefecture representing 56.5% 
of the total worth (Figure 30). The second most affected prefecture was Fukushima with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183
 Damage to Sector Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (2,426.8 billion yen) is 18 times as large as 
for 2004 Nigata Chuetsu Easrtquake and about 27 times bigger than for 1995 Great Hanshin 
Easrtquake [MAFF, 2013]. 
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26.4% of the total damage. Iwate and Chiba prefectures have also incurred considerable 
damages - 7.8% and 4.8% of the total.  
 
Figure 30. Damages to agriculture in different prefectures from 2011 earthquake as of 
July 5, 2012 (100 million yen)  
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries            
A survey on economic situation of agricultural management entities in the tsunami 
damaged areas have found out that in 2011 the sales revenues from agricultural products 
dropped by 68% comparing to 2010 and the agricultural income by 77% [MAFF, 2013]. The 
biggest decrease in sales and income experienced farmers in Miyagi prefecture, followed by 
producers in Iwate and Fukushima prefectures (Figure 31). Severe blows on sales and income 
were registered by producers in the three dominant type of farming in the region as those 
specialized mainly in facilities vegetables saw the highest decrease in sales and income (86% 
and 76% accordingly), followed by the rice and open field vegetable producers [MAFF, 
2014].  
There have been some improvements in sales and incomes in all areas but in 2013 they 
were still far bellow the 2010 level – 24% and 36% accordingly [Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries, 2014]. The fastest recovery has been registered in Miyagi farms’ sales 
and income (49% and 48% increase), followed by the Iwate (23% and 32% increase) and 
Fukushima (21% and 13% increase) producers’ results. The slower growth of income 
compared to sales (in Iwate and Fukushima prefecture) was due to the higher costs associated 
with the post-disaster cleaning and rebuilding. 
There has been a good progress in recovery of sales and income of rice and vegetable 
farms but in 2013 their levels was still considerable lower than in 2010. The fastest income 
growth was registered by the rice producers (54%) due to restoration of farmland and 
augmentation of sales (62%). The slower pace of post-disaster recovery in the facility grown 
vegetables was caused by the prolonged farmland restoration and the high (facility) rebuilding 
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costs after the land restoration is complete and operation resumed [Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries, 2014].  
 
Figure 31. Evolution of agricultural sale and income of agricultural management entities 
in tsunami-damaged areas (2010=100) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
In the first year after the disaster there was augmentation of the agricultural output 
value in 69.8% out of the 43 tsunami-damaged municipalities. In the rest of the affected 
municipalities there was no progress (11.6%) or even a reduction (18.6%) in the agricultural 
output, including in 58.3% of the damaged municipalities in Iwate prefecture, a half in 
Aomori prefecture, 26.7% in Miyagi prefecture, 16.7% in Ibaraki prefectures, and zero in 
Fukushima and Chiba prefectures [MAFF, 2013].  
There are official estimates on some of the damages from the Fukushima nuclear 
disaster as well. After the nuclear accident, the Gross Agricultural Product in Fukushima 
prefecture shrunk by 47.9 billion JPY [MAFF]. Furthermore, there has been agriculture-
related damages amounted to 62.5 billion JPY (by May 2012). The annual loss from the 
nuclear accident in the prefecture is estimated to be around 100 billion JPY [Koyama, 2013].  
Some of the direct damages to farms production and marketing have been specified with 
the compensation claims of farmers to TEPCO. By mid April 2013 demand compensation 
though the Fukushima Taskforce was 109,3 billion yen, while the received compensation 
were 97,2 billion yen or 89% of the demand (Figure 32). Most of the claims have been for lost 
work due to evacuation orders and for crops damages. 
Until May 2012 the amount of compensation demands reached 62.5 billion yen with a 
greatest portion of claims being for the untilled land (compensation for suspension of work) 
horticulture and livestock damages (Table 20). The amount of money received as 
compensation for the same period accounted for 73% of the claimed damages.  
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Figure 32. Claims for damages against TEPCO by the Fukushima Prefecture JA Group 
 
Source: Fukushima Prefectural Union of Agricultural Cooperatives 
Table 20. Breakdown of Fukushima Prefecture Union Compensation Claims (100 
million yen?  
 
Claims 
On May 1, 2012 On May 1, 2013 
Value  Share in 
total (%?  
Value  Share in 
total (%?  
Rice 11 1.8 32 2.9 
Horticulture 130 20.8 264 24.2 
Fruit 62 9.9 75 6.8 
Milk 18 2.9 20 1.8 
Livestock disposal 99 15.8 100 9.2 
Other livestock damages 85 13.6 162 14.8 
Pasture 27 4.3 50 4.6 
Untitled land (for work suspension) 163 26.1 325 29.8 
Business damages 30 4.8 64 5.8 
Total 625 100 1,092 100 
Source : Central JA Union for Fukushima Prefecture 
 
The progress in compensation payments has been slow and uneven due to the delays in 
TEPCO’s review process and demands for further documentation, lack of sufficient funds for 
satisfying all claims, multiple disputes, etc. 
Besides, there has been no amelioration in the payments of compensation due to the 
lack of funding and multiple disputes. TEPCO continues to receive claims for damages of 
farmers and agri-food business from around the country. However, up to date total amount of 
claims received by and paid to different affected agents is not easy to find.  
77	  
	  
According to JA almost 100,000 farmers lost about 58 billion yen ($694 million) by 
March 1, 2012 or 25% of production [Takada and Song, 2012]. Published information for 
TEPCO payments to Groups Representing Victims for 2011-2012 shows that Agricultural 
Cooperatives received 280,400 million yen [Nomura and Hokugo, 2013]. The greatest share 
of the groups agricultural payments went to Fukushima (29.8%), Ibaraki (13.8%) and 
Shizuoka (10.4%) prefectures. 
Nevertheless, all these assessments do not include important “stock damage” (material 
funds, damage to production infrastructure, contamination of agricultural land, facilities for 
evacuation, and usage restrictions on machinery) as well as the loss of “society-related 
capital” (diverse tangible and intangible investments for creating production areas, brands, 
human resources, network structure, community, and cultural capital, ability to utilize 
resources and funds for many years). According to experts the later losses are quite difficult to 
measure and “compensate” [Koyama, 2013].  
Likely wise, much of the overall damages from the 2011 disasters on farmers 
livelihood and possessions, physical and mental health, environment, lost community 
relations etc. can hardly be expressed in quantitative (e.g. monetary) terms. Many farms 
livelihood and businesses have been severely destructed as a result of loss of life, injuries and 
displacement, and considerable damages on property (farmland, crops, livestock, homes, 
material assets, intangibles such as brands, good reputation, etc.), related infrastructure, and 
community and business relations.  
What is more, thousands of farmers in Fukushima and neighboring regions have been 
continuing to suffer enormously from the radioactive contamination of farmlands and 
agricultural products, the official and/or voluntary restrictions on production and shipments, 
and the declined markets and prices for their products [JA ZENCHU, 2012; Koyama 2013a, 
2013b; Ujiie 2011 and 2012; Watanabe, 2011; Wataname 2013].  
There has been a significant short and longer-term negative impact of the triple 
disaster on farm management entities in the most affected prefectures and beyond. According 
to a survey disaster affected negatively almost 55% of Japanese farms (Figure 33). A 2012 
survey has found out that the most severely affected have been farmers in Tohoku and Kanto 
regions, and the least affected in Hokuriko and Kinki regions. In the worst hit Iwate, Miyagi, 
Fukushima, Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, and Chiba prefectures more than 88 89% of all farms 
“are still affected” or “were affected in the past” from the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear 
accident. 
Among different sectors of agriculture the most farms have been affected by the 
disasters in beef and facility flowers production (Figure 34).  
The major reasons for the negative impacts of the triple disasters have been “decline in 
sell prices” and “harmful rumors” while the damaged inputs supply and production affected 
less farms (Table 21). What is more, for farmers still affected by the disasters the importance 
of the first two factors increased considerably in 2012 comparing to the disaster year.  
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Figure 33. Adverse effect of Great East Japan Earthquake on farm management in 
different regions of Japan (March 2012) 
 
Source: Japan Finance Corporation 
Figure 34. Adverse effect of Great East Japan Earthquake on farm management in 
different subsectors of Japanese agriculture (March 2012) 
 
Source: Japan Finance Corporation  
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Table 21. Reasons for those who are currently adversely affected in different regions 
(August, 2011; January 2012)* 
 Damage to 
production 
Damage input 
supply 
Damage to 
distribution 
Decline in sell 
prices 
Harmful 
rumors 
2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 
Japan 24.5 23.2 41 27.1 44.4 33 65.8 74.4 52.8 60.5 
Hokkaido 12.6 14.1 55.9 39.7 34.4 31.3 63.5 79.8 44.1 46.4 
Tohoku 46.3 38.2 51.5 25.2 60.8 41 55.2 65.8 58.3 72 
Kanto 34.1 26.1 28.8 17.6 45.2 27.8 69.6 72.8 72.9 76.1 
Hokuriko 12.4 14.8 47.6 29.6 40 24.1 44.8 63 45.7 55.6 
Tokai 7.6 7.3 30.5 18.2 41.9 34.5 86.7 87.3 35.2 43.6 
Kinki 5.4 11.4 25 28.6 29.3 25.7 73.9 77.1 44.6 28.6 
Chugoku-
Shikoku 6.3 9.7 31.7 23.9 33.7 29.2 72.6 80.5 38 50.4 
Kyushu 8.6 9.1 27.9 29.9 40.5 32.5 77.5 86.8 37.5 36 
Source: Japan Finance Corporation                     *multiple answers 
 
There has been a great variation in the importance of different factors affecting 
producers in individual sectors of agriculture (Table 22). For instance, “damaged production” 
has been a major factor for the most broilers producers, “damaged input supply” for the 
majority of pigs, upland crops, and open field vegetables producers, while “declined sell 
prices” and “harmful rumors” impacted farmers in all sectors.  Furthermore, in 2012 the 
impact reduced sell prices further increased for most subsectors, while of the harmful rumors 
for all producers.  
 
Table 22. Reasons for those who are currently adversely affected in different subsectors 
(August 2011; January 2012) 
 Damage to 
production 
Damage input 
supply 
Damage to 
distribution 
Decline in sell 
prices 
Harmful 
rumors 
2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 
Rice 26.3 27.4 48.8 32.3 36.7 33.5 41.2 55.9 53.7 67.9 
Upland 
crops 10.4 16.3 63.6 55.6 32.9 34.1 50.3 73.3 41 49.6 
Open field 
vegetables 9.2 19.9 41.4 43.8 38.5 42.5 81 70.5 51.7 54.8 
Facilities 
vegetables 28.3 32.7 24 35.6 41.9 36.5 78.7 65.4 48.4 54.8 
Tea 13.5 13.4 8.7 15.9 40.4 34.1 69.2 67.1 80.8 87.8 
Fruit trees 14.7 21.3 35.3 20 42.2 41.3 56.9 65.3 49.1 61.3 
Facilities 
flowers 15.5 19.8 26.8 25.2 52.1 27 88.7 88.3 14.6 19.8 
Mushrooms 23 38.3 27 36.2 48.6 31.9 77 76.6 44.6 57.4 
Dairy 32.3 26.3 50 21.2 42.9 29.8 71.8 84 57.1 58.2 
Beef 22.4 18.4 29.5 10.5 55.9 35.6 96.7 94.8 87.4 80.8 
Pigs 49 22.8 66.9 16.5 56.6 15.2 35.2 75.9 34.5 53.2 
Hens 37 18.2 47.8 12.1 45.7 24.2 28.3 78.8 41.3 27.3 
Broilers 67.7 72.7 90.3 45.5 51.6 18.2 6.5 36.4 6.5 63.6 
Source: Japan Finance Corporation                     *multiple answers 
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One year after the disasters around a third of damaged agricultural land was completely 
restored, including 27% of the tsunami damaged farmlands. During the same period about 
90% of tsunami-afflicted farmland was cleaned of rubble, a large part of agricultural 
infrastructure reconstructed (including 100% of major draining pumping stations and 7.3 km 
priority restoration zones of coastal farmlands, and 92% of the rural community sewages) 
[MAFF, 2012]. Consequently, 70% of all damaged farms in 9 prefectures and 40.2% of 
tsunami damaged farms in 6 prefectures and 40% of resumed farming (Figure 35). 
Figure 35. Share of agricultural management entities, which resumed farming (percent) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries            
By March 2013 restoration and salt removal on 38% of the tsunami-damaged farmland 
was completed and they were available for farming (with restoration on another 63% 
ongoing) [MAFF, 2013]. That was close to the target in the 3 years plan for complete 
restoration of tsunami-damaged farming set by the Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction of 
Agriculture and Rural Communities after the Great East Japan Earthquake. The latest figures 
indicate that 63% of tsunami damaged agricultural land has been made again available for 
farming [Reconstruction Agency, 2014], and more than 55% of the affected farms resumed 
operation. 
The biggest progress in restoration of the damaged farms has been achieved in Iwate 
prefecture and for the tsunami damaged farms in Miyagi prefecture. On the other hand, in 
Fukushima prefectures restoration of operations in damaged farms has been progressing 
slowly. Until June 2014 merely 29.9% of the tsunami-damaged farmland has been restored 
and become resumeable for farming, 82.3% of damaged agricultural facilities have been 
restored, and 60.9% of agricultural management entities resume operations [MAFF, 2014]. 
Similarly, merely 69.3% of the planed agricultural lands (paddy, upland, orchards and 
pastures) from the Municipality decontamination area have been actually decontaminated 
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[Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. Moreover, some parts of heavily contaminated areas remain 
almost untouched and probably require a long time before farming can be resumed.  
Major reasons for “not resuming farming” in the three most affected prefectures have 
been the impact of nuclear accident, unavailable arable land, facilities and equipment, 
undecided place of settlement, and funding problems (Figure 36). Moreover, importance of 
most of these factors has been decreasing due to progression in reconstruction, returning of 
evacuees, restoration of farmlands and public support measures. On the other hand, the 
significance the nuclear crisis as a reason deterring effective resumption of operations by 
majority of farms has been increasing.  
Figure 36. Reasons for not resuming farming in Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima 
prefectures, multiple answers (% of farms) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2014     
Most critical factors for “not resuming farming” for majority of farms in Iwate and 
Miyagi prefectures have been unavailable arable land and facilities (Figure 37). Other 
important factors for a significant number of farms in these prefectures are that farmers have 
still not decided on the place of settlement (affecting 60% of damaged farms in Iwate 
prefecture), funding of farming activities is an issue, and equipment can not be secured. On 
the other hand, the most important obstacle to restart operations for the most Fukushima 
farmers has been the “impact of nuclear accident”. 
There is no official statistics on whether farmers have been able or not to harvest any 
produce on officially restored land in affected prefectures. However, there are reports that 
some of already desalinated and restored tsunami-damaged farmland is still unproductive. For 
instance, farmers have been unable to harvest any soybeans in a 30-hectare area out of planted 
nearly 45-hectare field in Rokugo, Eastern Sendai [Ishikawa and Ishikawa, 2014]. According 
to farmers remained high salt concentration in the farmland soils might have been reason for 
that.  
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Figure 37. Share of farms with diverse reasons for not resuming farming, multiple 
answers (%) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2014      
After March 2011 the food industry in the disaster regions and throughout the country 
was also seriously affected by the production drops, business suspensions, distribution 
ruptures, etc. due to damaged plants, rolling blackouts, packaging material production 
shortages, gasoline shortfalls, etc. [MAFF, 2011]. Regular surveys on food industries 
dynamics reviled that 71% of the country’s food companies were “affected” by the March 
disasters, including more than 35% “still affected” at the beginning of 2014 (Figure 38). 
The strongest hit were food-industry companies in Tohoku’s most affected regions 
(Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures) (92.5%) and in Northern (84.6%) and Southern 
(82.3%) Kanto region.  
Similarly, 57.9% of country’s food companies have been negatively affected by the 
Fukushima nuclear disaster as about 35% still affected in the beginning of 2014 (Figure 39). 
The most severely affected have been the companies in Northern Kanto (83.4%) and in 
Tohoku’s Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures (81.9%). 
There is difference in the adverse impact in different subsectors of food industry. 
According to 2014 survey the earthquake and tsunami have affected negatively the selling 
prices, procurement of ingredients and raw materials, and demand from trade partners of a 
good number of food industry companies [Japan Finance Corporation, 2014]. Disasters 
affected uniformly strong the Procurement of ingredients and raw materials of the majority of 
companies in all subsectors. In addition, disasters affected the Demand from trade partners of 
many companies in Wholesale trade, and the Sales volume, number of consumers, and the 
Price of ingredients and raw materials in Restaurants business. 
Fukushima nuclear disaster has also affected mostly Demand from trade partners, Sales 
volume, and Procurement of ingredients and raw materials of many food companies. 
However, while most food Manufactures and Wholesale traders suffered mainly from the 
decrease in the demand of trade partners, for the most the Restaurants operators and Retailers 
the Procurement of ingredients and raw materials has been predominately affected by the 
nuclear accident. 
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Figure 38. Earthquake-tsunami disaster effects on food industry in Japan (January, 
2012, 2013, 2014) 
 
Source: Japan Finance Corporation 
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Figure 39. Impact of Fukushima nuclear power plant accident on food industry in Japan 
(January, 2012, 2013, 2014) 
 
Source: Japan Finance Corporation 
 
Due to genuine or perceived health risk many Japanese consumers stop buying 
agricultural, fishery and food products originated from the affected by the nuclear accident 
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regions (“Northern Honshu”). Even in cases when it was proven that food is safe some 
wholesale traders, processors and consumers restrain buying products from the contaminated 
areas [Futahira, 2013; Koyama, 2013; MAFF, 2012; Watanabe 2011, 2013].  
After the nuclear accident, there was a considerable decline in absolute and relative 
prices of affected farm products and products from the contaminated regions. Fukushima 
prefecture has lost its comparative advantage to other farming regions. For instance, there was 
a considerable decline in the wholesale prices of beef cattle in Fukushima prefecture and in 
Japan after the accident (Figure 40). The prices in the country have been recovered and there 
has been gradual recovery of beef prices in Fukushima prefecture as well. Nevertheless, prices 
for different categories of beef are still 12-13% lower in Fukushima comparing to Japan. 
There have been similar trends for rice and vegetables as well [Watanabe, 2013].  
 
Figure 40. Evolution of wholesale prices for beef cattle in Fukushima prefecture and 
other parts of Japan (yen per kg) 
 
Source: Central JA Union for Fukushima Prefecture 
 
There has been significant change in the purchase behavior of a great number of 
consumers after the March 2011 disasters. The July 2011 survey found out that a good share 
of consumers decreased the purchased amount of fresh (10.6%) and processed (9.8%) food, 
ornamental flowers (21.6%), confectionary (15.2%), etc. [Japan Finance Corporation]. On the 
other hand there is an increase in purchase mineral water (17.6%). These changes were more 
dynamic in the worst affected East Japan than in the other parts of the country. 
In the months after the earthquake, the item most emphasized by the consumers at the 
time of purchase of fresh food was “production location” and for processed food the “origin 
of raw materials” [Japan Finance Corporation]. However, for the majority of consumers there 
was not change of the place to buy fresh (88.5%) and processed (89.1%) food comparing to 
the pre-duster period [Japan Finance Corporation, 2011]. 
The consumer attitude to purchase food products from the affected by the nuclear 
disaster regions has evolved in post disaster years (Figure 41). Currently, relatively more and 
more consumers do not mind the impact of the nuclear disaster when purchase agri-food 
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produce. Nevertheless, still significant share of consumers do not buy fresh (31.8%) and 
processed (28.3%) products from that regions because of the impact of the nuclear disaster. 
 
Figure 41. Awareness when purchase fresh and processed food from the region after 
Fukushima nuclear power plant accident (July 2011, January 2012, January 2013) 
 
Source: Japan Finance Corporation 
Recent data indicate that a good portion of Japanese consumers (36.5%) “often” or 
“sometimes” purchase purchase foodstuffs from affected by the 2011 disasters areas (Figure 
42). The latest figure is much higher in Tohoku region then in the other parts of the country.  
Figure 42. Purchase of (processed goods and agricultural products) foodstuffs produced 
in areas affected by the Great East Japan Earthquake (including eating out) (January 
2014) 
Source: Japan Finance Corporation 
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Nevertheless, for a great proportion of the consumers it is important to select the region 
of agro-food products and they purchase “rarely” or “not at all” from the affected regions. 
Many consumers in the affected regions and throughout Japan have seen their direct 
procurement (e.g. prices) and transaction (information, search, assurance etc.) costs for supply 
of needed safe agri-food relatively from alternative regions, countries or guaranteed sources 
increased [Bachev and Ito, 2013]. However, there are no detailed studies on these effects of 
the nuclear disaster yet. Nevertheless, some research proves that a major way to minimize the 
transaction costs for supply of radiation safe product from a big number of costumers is to use 
“origin of product” selective governance [Uijie, 2012]. A segment of consumers went even 
further to purchase only from the “guaranteed sources” like some Tokyo residents using direct 
sales contract to buy rice from Kyushu farms [Kakuchi, 2013]. On the other hand, some 
Fukushima farmers see growing new crops (like cucumbers) and opting for direct sales to 
customers (rather than supermarkets) as a way to recover operations.  
Some experts argue that both producers and consumers are victims of the “reputation 
damage” [Koyama 2013]. According to 2013 survey 26.1% of the consumers do not even 
know that inspections of radioactive contamination are being conducted [Consumer Affair 
Agency, 2013]. In order to facilitate communication with consumers, promote and recover 
Fukushima agricultural products numerous initiatives have been undertaken by farmers, 
agricultural organizations, NGOs, authorities, business, retailers etc. such as: direct sells by 
farmers, on spot radiation tests, recovery markets, Farmers’ Document and Farmers Café 
events, government “Eating for support” initiative, joint ventures with shops, promotion 
complains with participation of top officials, celebrities, journalists, and farmers in big cities, 
international fairs etc. [Fukushima Minpo News, January 27, 2014; Inoue, 2014; The Japan 
News, March 8, 2014; Koyama, 2013; NHK World, May 17, September 21, 2014; MAFF, 
2014].  
Fight against “harmful rumors” that led to plummeting prices and sales of farm products 
have been also a high priority for local and national authorities. For instance, Fukushima 
prefecture is spending about 1.7 billion yen ($16.6 million) this fiscal year to fight rumors 
about radiation - fourfold budget increase over the previous year [Inoue, 2014].  
Dynamics of demand has been a result of lack of sufficient capabilities in the inspection 
system, inappropriate restrictions (initially covering all shipments in a prefecture rather than 
from contaminated localities), revealed rare incidences of contamination in generally safe 
origins, low confidence in the official “safety” limits and inspections, lack of good 
communication, harmful rumors (“Fu-hyo”), and in certain cases not authentic character of 
traded products [Bachev and Ito, 2013]. The “reputation damage” has been particularly 
important factor for the big agri-food producing regions like Fukushima, Ibaraki etc. which 
products have been widely rejected by consumers [Futahira, 2013; Fukushima Minpo News, 
May 11, 2014; Koyama, 2013; Watanabe, 2013]. 
The 2011 disasters also affected considerably the international trade with agricultural 
products. Around 40 countries imposed restrictions on agri-food import from Japan after the 
nuclear accident, including major importer such China, United States, Indonesia, Malaysia 
and South Korea. The European Union required food and animal feed from 12 prefectures to 
be checked prior the export to prove that radioactive iodine and cesium levels do not exceed 
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EU standards. In addition, agri-food items from 35 other prefectures had to be shipped along 
with a certificate of origin to verify where the products were produced.  
Few months after the nuclear crisis some countries (like Canada, Thailand) lifted or 
eased restrictions on Japanese food imports. Rice exports to China with government-issued 
certificates of origin and produced outside the prefectures Chiba, Fukushima, Gunma, Ibaraki, 
Niigata, Nagano, Miyagi, Saitama, Tokyo, Tochigi and Saitama became possible in April 
2012. In October 2012, EU also substantially eased import restrictions from 11 prefectures but 
kept restrictions for products from Fukushima prefecture. Radioactive material tests 
certificates are usually required [MAFF, 2014]. By March 1, 2013 as many as of 10 countries 
completely lifted radionuclide related restrictions on food products from Japan including 
Canada, New Zealand, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Columbia, Guinea, Myanmar, 
Malaysia and Serbia [Reconstruction Agency, 2014].  
Due to the foreign countries’ import restrictions and the experienced damages, the value 
of Japan’s farm and livestock product exports declined substantially - in April-December 
2011 the export plunged by 40.9 billion yen (11%) from the year before [MAFF, 2012]. 
Furthermore, in January-March, 2012 the value of country’s export of agricultural products 
was 89 million (12.77%) lower than for the same period before the disaster. 
Consequently, there was a considerable decease in the overall agricultural (including 
fields crops and livestock products) as well fishery products export in 2011 (Figure 43). At 
the same time, there was a significant increase in the import of agricultural, forestry and 
fishery products as imports of farm products jumped 16% to 5.58 trillion yen in 2011 (Figure 
44). 
 
Figure 43. Dynamics of agricultural, forestry and fishery export of Japan (million yen) 
 
Source: Statistical yearbook of MAFF 
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Figure 44. Dynamics of agricultural, forestry and fishery import of Japan (million yen) 
 
Source: Statistical yearbook of MAFF 
 
In April-December 2012 it was registered a 5.98% growth in the export of agricultural 
products of the country [MAFF, 2014]. Moreover, a slight augmentation of the annual exports 
of agricultural and field crops products was reported but the export value was still bellow 
2010 level. The overall import of agricultural and crop products decreased but it was still 
above the pre-disaster levels. At the same time fish products exports continue to enlarge. 
There have been also positive effects on product, technological and organizational 
development and innovation in agriculture and related industries. The enormous public 
funding as well as the novel business possibilities (and restrictions) have created new 
opportunities for revitalization and expansion of farming and agri-business in the most 
affected regions and beyond trough technological and organizational modernization.  
There have been huge incentives for investment in soil decontamination, emergency 
aid, agri-food safety, production recovery and modernization, product and technologies 
innovations and diversification, agri-food marketing, reconstructing of business and 
infrastructure, other public and private research and development projects. All they have been 
opening up more entrepreneurial, employment and income opportunities for agricultural and 
general population, and diverse form of business and non-for profit ventures.  
According to experts there are many companies (especially from outside of affected 
areas) wanting to lease in abandoned farmland and start large-scale corporate farming. That 
will let consolidate and enlarge farm size, introduces large-scale machineries and innovations, 
explore economies of scale and scope, increase investment and efficiency, diversify and 
improve competitiveness of farming enterprises. 
In a line with new policies for agriculture (decentralization, liberalization, land 
consolidation, etc.) and intention to use Tohoku reconstruction as “a model for the entire 
country” new approaches for accumulating farmlands have been also reviewed. The goal is to 
promote land accumulation by leasing farmlands to current or future farm operators.  
For instance, since April 2013 the Sendai city in collaboration with the JA Sendai 
introduced a new approach to “bulk management of farmland” (Figure 45). Sendai city and 
JA Sendai act as intermediary by implementing bulk lease management practices of farmlands 
in the relevant areas so that borrower farmer are able to cultivate land that have been 
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consolidated in a single place according to the scale of their farming and the status of 
operations.  
 
Figure 45. Bulk management approach for farmland consolidation in Sendai 
 
        
Source: City of Sendai, 2014                                              
 
The experience with reconstruction Sendai agriculture shows a good result – e.g. the 
East Sendai District Farmland Consolidation Project covers 1,979 ha out of the 2,244 ha of 
the total District area [City of Sendai, 2014]. The ratio of consent by the landlords for 
farmland consolidation is 94.6%. 
Furthermore, new technologies have been widely experimented and introduced in 
disaster areas. For instance, a large futuristic vegetable plant has been recently opened led by 
Fujitsu Ltd. (Picture 6). Aizuwakamatsu Akisai Vegetable Factory uses renovated 2,000 m2 
idle semiconductor-manufacturing clean (free of environmental contaminants and pests) room 
facility of the company in Aizuwakamatsu, Fukushima Prefecture [Fukushima Minpo News, 
26 January 2014]. Production technology is chemical-free and completely controlled to 
maintain optimal growing and atmospheric conditions. 
 
Picture 6. Aizuwakamatsu Akisai Vegetable Plant,             Picture 7.	  Solar sharing project in  
Factory, Fukushima prefecture            Odaka district, Fukushima prefecture 
 
Source: Lisa, 2014 
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 The factory produces low-potassium leaf lettuce on a demonstration basis handling 
the whole process of production ranging from seed sowing to shipment. Initial daily output of 
1,800 heads of leaf lettuce is to be boosted to a maximum 3,500. Production space will be also 
expanded (by 1,000 m2) in the future. About 30 people are employed as staff is expected to 
increase as output grows. The product, containing 86% less potassium on average, is intended 
for people suffering from chronic kidney disease requiring dialysis. It is also kid-friendly 
since a low nitrate level makes it less bitter and more appealing to children. 
Another prospective technology invented in Japan is “solar sharing” - a process in 
which farmers generate solar power on the same land where they grow crops. Farmers in 
Fukushima prefecture have been testing that new technology and hope to sell power to help 
improve farmland or cover losses in income caused by radiation fears [Asiaone News, June 
26, 2013]. In Minami-Soma, the prefectural government has begun a model project (Picture 
7). A 2,000 square meter piece of farmland in the city’s Odaka district is an example of solar 
sharing. On the farmland, 500 solar panels, each 70 centimeters by 1.6 meters, are installed 
atop 1.9-metre poles. Below the rows of panels, eggplants, chili peppers and produce are 
grown on an experimental basis.  
Other innovations have been also experimented. For instance, Dutch bio-farming 
company Waterland International and a Japanese federation of farmers made an agreement in 
March 2012 to plant and grow camellia on 2000 to 3000 ha [The Mainichi Shimbun, Aril 4, 
2012]. The seeds will be used to produce bio-diesel, which could be used to produce 
electricity. The affected region has a big potential for production of clean energy since some 
800,000 ha could not be used to produce food anymore. Experiments have been carried out to 
find out whether camellia was capable of extracting cesium from the soil since experiment 
with sunflowers had no success. 
Increasing applications of ICT in agriculture have been also reported leading to 
precision technologies, higher farming productivity, efficient use of resources, enhanced food 
safety, and improved relations with counterparts and consumers [NHK World, July 15, 2013]. 
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6. Environmental impact 
 
The March 2011 disasters have had enormous environmental impacts [Kontar at al., 
2014; ME, 2013; NASA; Urabe et al., 2013; UNSCEAR, 2014; WWF, 2013]. 
There have been numerous surface ruptures, ground cracks, mass movements (rock 
falls and landslides), land uplifts and subsidence, alterated landscape and seacoast in affected 
by earthquake and tsunami areas. Furthermore, a huge amount of rubble and debris have been 
created after the disaster. Most of these damages and waste have been “trivial” and once the 
infrastructure is repaired, none of them will matter at all [McNeill, 2011].  
What is more, the large-scale reconstruction plans for the affected areas have included 
appropriate measures for rebuilding and better disaster protection of communities, cleaning 
and recycling of debris, and recovery and conservation of natural environment [Iwate 
Prefecture, 2011; Sendai City, 2011; Fukushima Prefectural Government, 2012; Government 
of Japan, 2014]. 
The earthquake and tsunami have caused huge destructions of soils, landscape, natural 
flora and fauna, and entire coastal ecosystems. Unknown number of wildlife have been killed, 
injured or displaced. Large land areas have been damaged by the seawaters, salinity and other 
pollutants, and become unsuitable for farming and natural habitats.  
Tsunami badly affected about 1,718 ha of coastal disaster-prevention forests in 253 
sites situated over an extensive area from Aomori to Chiba [Ministry of Environment, 2012].	  
In	  Rikuzentakata, Iwate the destruction left nothing but a single tree out of a coastal protection 
pine forest with more than 60,000 trees planted two century ago [National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, 2011]. In addition, many traditional Igune were destructed by tsunami 
and consequently cut because they were composed by badly damaged by salt water Japanese 
cedar [Ogata and Pushpalala, 2013]. 
One year after the tsunami, the landscape near the mouth of the Kitakami River184 
remains irrevocably altered, farmland north and east of nearby Nagatsura become river 
bottom, the river mouth widened, and water from Oppa Bay crept inland, leaving only a 
narrow strip of land and new islands near the river mouth [National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, 2012]. 
Similarly, tsunami tide swept away all fishing weirs and hatcheries in Kido River 
which boast large numbers of returning salmon on Honshu island185 [Fukushima Minpo 
News, April 16, 2014]. A trial study in 2013 has found out that both fish born before the and 
after disaster are returning186 to rivers significantly altered by the tsunami [NHK World, 
November 20, 2014]. Only a third of salmon born before the disaster made their way 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184	  in March 2011 wide swaths of floodwater covered the north and south banks of the river channel, 
and sediment fills the river's mouth. Research suggests that waves from the tsunami traveled nearly 50 
km upstream from the mouth of Kitakami River [NASA, 2012]. 
185
 on April 15, 2014 Naraha fisheries cooperative released young salmon into the river for the first 
time since the disaster. It is considering rebuilding hatcheries and resuming egg collection/hauling in 
fall 2015 in hope to restart release of self-hatched young salmon in spring 2016 [Fukushima Minpo 
News, April 16, 2014]. 
186	  Salmon usually returns to its river 3 to 5 years after birth.  
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upstream while 38.88% never entered rivers since environs changes (riverbeds and 
embankments) may make it difficult to find a way back.  
A study has found out that soil liquefaction in the March 2011 earthquake was more 
widespread than previously thought [The Japan Times, Match 6, 2014]. Nearly 9,700 zones in 
189 municipalities across 13 eastern and northeastern prefectures experienced soil 
liquefaction due to the earthquake, and while reclaimed land along coastlines was especially 
susceptible, it also occurred inland along rivers and land developed for housing. 
Monitoring of the changes in vegetation in areas submerged by the tsunami along the 
Pacific coastline shows that “Changed to barren land” areas (where weeds grow abundantly in 
damaged areas) occupies the greatest share - around 30% of the total area (Figure 46). This is 
followed by “Changed for artificial use” such as developed lands and debris storage areas etc. 
(10% of the overall area). After the disaster “Changed to barren land” occupies a significant 
portions in Iwate (40%), Fukushima (40%), and Miyagi (30%) prefectures while “Flowed 
out/Sink areas” are seen in about 5% of the land in these prefectures.  
 
Figure 46.  Vegetation changes in areas submerged by March 2011 tsunami  (percent) 
 
Source: Biodiversity Center of Japan, Ministry of Environment, 2013 
 
In other prefectures “No change” areas are prevailing. However, in some places like 
Sosa City and Yokoshiba-Hikari Town of Chiba prefecture “Remained Forest” and 
“Lodging/Die back” areas occupied the greater share. 
Monitoring on changes in the sandy and muddy beaches due to the tsunami also 
indicates that “Sand dune vegetation” and “Coastal forest” were vastly reduced and mostly 
were transformed through man-made developments or changed into “Barren lands” included 
under “Others” (Figure 47). “Sand dune vegetation” in Aomori prefecture, “Sand dune 
vegetation” and “Coastal forest” in Miyagi prefecture, and “Coastal forest” in Chiba 
prefecture were changed to “Others” by almost the same extent in terms of the area. 
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Figure 47.  Changes in areas of beaches                   Figure 48. Distribution of seaweed Algae in  
due to March 2011 tsunami (ha)                             Mangokura lagoon in 2006 and 2012 
 
Source: Biodivercity Center of Japan, 2013                 Source: Biodivercity Center of Japan, 2013 
 
Natural environment survey in Matsukawaura Lagoon has found out a trend toward 
recovery of species numbers and population densities of benthic animals, forest bird species 
declined due to the elimination of coastal forests, while some water bird species showed an 
increase in numbers [World Wide Fund, 2013]. Besides, a large amount of water springs is 
observed due to ground subsidence, suggesting the possibility that a sandy environment will 
be sustained.  
In Shizugawa Bay rocky-shore denudation was still observed despite the decrease in 
algae-eating animals such as sea urchins [World Wide Fund, 2013]. In surveyed two bays 
there are new kinds of places functioning as habitats for living creatures including remaining 
driftwood and concrete rubble, swamp environments that appeared on land due to ground 
subsidence, and unused rice fields. 
Monitoring of the marine environment has found out a great disturbance of Zostera 
forest caused by the tsunami (Figure 48). For instance, in Mangokuura lagoon, Ishinomaki 
City, the ground was seen to have subsided by about 0.9-1.5 meters, becoming muddy as 
sludge accumulated, distribution area of the Zostera was drastically reduced, and their 
population growing from the coast up to about 100 meters out at sea was exterminated.  
The study of Sendai Bay and the Sanriku Ria coast showed that 30–80% of taxa 
indigenously inhabiting intertidal flats disappeared after the tsunami [Urabe et al., 2013]. 
Among animal types, endobenthic and sessile epibenthic animals were more vulnerable to the 
tsunami than mobile epibenthic animals like shore crabs and snails.  
At the same time, some species reallocated or increased their population after tsunami. 
For examples, Scopimera globosa and Grandidierella japonica not seen before the disaster in 
Gamo lagoon, Sendai city have been observed and their population increased [Biodiversity 
Center of Japan, 2013]. Other study have also confirmed that tsunami not only took away 
many benthic taxa from the intertidal flats but also brought in some taxa from elsewhere 
[Urabe et al., 2013].  
Enhanced habitats in the seawater have been also reported due to reduced fishing after 
disasters [Biodiversity Center of Japan, 2013]. For instance, estimated number of chub 
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mackerel in waters near Kinkasan is now 2.6 times higher and there are 80% more adult fish 
than in the summer of 2010 [The Japan News, March 29, 2014]. 
The study on marine pollution has found out that PCBs (polychlorinated biphenyls), 
HBCDs (brominated flame retardants) and PBDEs (polybrominated diphenyl ethers, 
brominated flame retardants) were detected in all analyzed marine life [World Wide Fund, 
2013]. High concentrations of HBCDs were detected in some specimens and PCB 
concentrations in Pacific cod were found to be about four times higher than before the 
earthquake and tsunami disaster.  A positive correlation was seen between trophic level (level 
in the food chain) and concentration of PCBs, HBCD and PBDEs, suggesting 
bioconcentration throughout the food chain.  
The radiation contamination after Fukushima accident has also affected the natural 
environment. Experts suggested similar to the Chernobyl accident biological anomalies in 
plants and animals such as population decease, mutations, etc. [Akimoto, 2014; ISHES, 2011; 
Nakanishi and, Tanoi, 2013]. For instance, a study on the effects of radioactive contamination 
following Fukushima disaster demonstrated that the abundance of birds was negatively 
correlated with radioactive contamination, and that among 14 species in common between the 
Fukushima and the Chernobyl regions, the decline in abundance was steeper in Fukushima 
[Møller et al., 2012]. A year after the nuclear disaster scientists found (“unexpected”) mutated 
butterflies suggesting that mutations have been passed down from the older generations. 
Other studies have also reported a link between elevated radiation levels after nuclear 
disaster and abnormalities in insects such as pale grass blue butterfly [Hiyama et al., 2012]. 
Radioactive isotopes originating from the Fukushima nuclear reactor were found in resident 
marine animals and in migratory Pacific Bluefin tuna, which caused a worldwide public 
anxiety and concern [Fisher et al., 2013]. Diverse studies on sea and fresh water fish in vast 
areas suggest that concentration of Cs has not decreased suggesting additional uptake 
[Buesseler, 2014; Mizuno and Kubo, 2013].   
The United Nations assessment on the effects of nuclear accident on non-human biota 
inhabiting terrestrial, fresh-water and marine ecosystems concluded that radiation exposure 
have been high in the most contaminated areas, and there are risks for individuals of certain 
species, but it is geographically constrained with no long-term effects on populations  [United 
Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, 2014]. Nevertheless, 
experts warned for follow up assessments of exposure and trends in marine environment. 
More recent scientific models suggest that radiation exposures to wildlife within 100 
km of the power plant were not high enough to cause a long-term harm such as prevent 
populations of plants and animals from reproducing and surviving [Strand et al., 2014].  
Nevertheless, there have been some impacts on wildlife in contaminated areas. For 
example, evacuation zones have become home to an increasing number of wild animals like 
rats, boars and their offspring with abandoned domestic pigs, etc. [NHK World, July 11, 
2o13, May 6, 2014]. There have been reported changes in population, areas of habitation, 
behavior and eating habits of these wildlife. For instance, the wild monkey (Japanese 
macaques) population is rapidly increasing in Odaka Ward of Minami-Soma, which is under 
an evacuation advisory, and said to have reached about 390 or three times its pre-crisis level 
[The Japan News, August 22, 2014]. The monkeys and other animals found in evacuation 
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advisory areas (such as wild boars and raccoons) believed to be expanding habitats taking 
over areas formerly inhabited by people. 
During the year ending in March 2014 the average radiation level in Fukushima 
forests fell to 0.44 microsieverts or more than a half compared to two years ago [NHK World, 
May 6, 2014]. The amount of radioactive materials in new leaves is about one fifth of those 
contained in leaves that started growing before the disaster. According to forecasts the forest 
radiation will drop to around 30% from the current level over the next 20 years. Officials say 
that workers' fear of radiation has led to abandonment of some forests and that is causing 
concern about long-term management of forestry resources. 
Recently it has been found out that most of the radioactive cesium that leaked from the 
Fukushima nuclear plant settled in a common mineral that comes from granite [NHK World, 
November 11, 2014]. According to scientists it is important to identify how the element exists 
in the soil predicting that most of the radioactive cesium in Fukushima soils is likely to be 
found in black mica. That finding is expected to encourage others to develop ways to remove 
it from contaminated lands187.  
The first assessments of “health effect” on farm and domestic animals and plants in the 
most affected areas have been also completed. Many of the farm livestock in the contaminated 
area has been slathered or died. However, a farmer M.Yoshizawa kept 360 cows188 alive at his 
80-acre spread inside the nuclear evacuation zone in defiance of a government kill order 
[Uncanny Terrain; Fackler 2014]. The farmer could monitors effects of prolonged radiation 
and there are reports that white spots on the fur and skin are appearing on some of his 
Japanese black cattle [CAN, August 2013; Fackler 2014]. 
The first study of cattle abandoned in the evacuation area189 and euthanized indicates 
that in all examined specimens deposition of Cs 134 and Cs 137 was observed [Fukumoto, 
2013]. Organ-specific deposition of radionuclides with relatively short half-life was also 
detected such as Silver-110m in the liver and Te 129m in the kidney. A linear correlation was 
found between radiosesium concentration in peripheral blood190 and in each organ as the 
resulting slopes were organ dependent with the maximum value obtained for skeleton muscles 
(Figure 49). The levels of rediosesium in the organs of fetuses and infants were 1.19 fold and 
1.51fold higher than in corresponding maternal organs. Radiosesium concentration in organs 
was found to be dependent on the feeding conditions and the geographical locations location 
where cattle were caught.  
Radioactive Ag110m was detected in all the liver samples and no relation was found 
between the activity concentration in blood and liver. The data indicate that the liver is the 
primary target organ that accumulates silver. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187	  Scientists still don't know how the radioactive cesium chemically combined with minerals in soil 
around the plant. 
188
 more than half are ones that others left behind. 
189
 79 cattle, including 3 fetuses from pregnant cattle and 3 mother-infant pairs, all obtained between 
August 29 -November 15, 2011. 
190
 Thus the activity concentration d Cs in organ can ne estimated from that of blood. 
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Figure 49. Cs analysis of different groups cattle* from evacuation area  
 
*Group 1 and 3 Minamisoma, Group 2 Kawauchi. Group 1 kept in stall barge after the accident, fed 
with radionuclide-free pasture grass and contaminated rainwater. Group 2 and 3 allowed to graze 
freely on contaminated grass. 
Source: Fukumoto, 2013 
 
As far as Te129m is concerned it was detected in 62% of cattle examined. Its deposition 
in kidneys suggests that Te132191 also accumulated in kidney shortly after the nuclear 
accident. These results suggest that monitoring of Te132 and I131 warrants more attention in 
terms of assessing health risk to the thyroid. 
The study have expended to measurement of radioactivity in animals other than cattle. It 
was found that the radioactivity in each organ was higher in swine than in cattle but its 
transfer to organs from the blood was higher in cattle than in pigs. Therefore, bio distribution 
of radioactivity substances is species-specific and that further study is necessary to assess the 
effect of radionuclides in humans. The study has also revealed that the problem is not only 
radioactive caesium but also other radionuclides. 
Analyses of this type192 are extremely valuable for the assessment of environmental 
pollution, bio distribution, metabolism of radionuclides, dose evaluation and the influence of 
internal exposure as well as likely consequences for humans from long-term exposure193. 
It is estimated that the Great Japan Earthquake generated more than 20 million tons of 
debris194 in the three most affected prefectures, of which about 5 million tons is estimated to 
have been washed out by the tsunami [Prime Minister of Japan and cabinet, 2014]. A major 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191
 with half-life 3.2 days and decay product I132. 
192
 The team collected tissue samples from different animals (cattle, swine, Japanese macaque, wild 
pigs, horses) which are currently being examined. 
193
 The amount of radioactivity concentration does not reflect biological effects but it is the first clue 
for understanding the biological effect of radiation. 
194	  tsunami washed out collapsed houses, cars, woods, ships, aquaculture facilities, fixed fishing nets, 
cargo containers, etc. More than 90% of floating debris is parts of collapsed houses and driftwoods, 
which are difficult to sink. 
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portion of the later (3.5 million tons) is considered to have deposited on seabed along Japan’s 
coast, and remaining 30% become floating debris. Since 2011 some 1.5 million tons of debris 
has been collected or sunk, and the amount of floating debris still drifting is considered to be 
less than 1.5 million tons. 
By March 2014 processing of all disaster debris and tsunami deposits were completed 
with exception of some (Evacuation) areas of Fukushima Prefecture [Reconstruction Agency 
2014]. The official data indicate that almost all disaster debris were removed (99%) as 
treatment and disposal of 97% of them completed (over 80% recycled) (Figure 50). Similarly, 
around 96% of the tsunami deposit were removed and processing of 92% finished (almost all 
recycled). Approximately 85% of debris and nearly all of the tsunami deposits can be 
recycled, and materials used in public works projects in disaster-affected area [Ministry of 
Environment, 2014]. 
 
Figure 50. Processing rate of disaster waste in coastal municipalities (percent) 
 
Source: Reconstruction Agency 
 
The major issues associated with the cleaning have been the availability and selection of 
storage sites, methods of incineration, decisions about recycling, and waste treatment and 
disposal [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2012]. 
Debris swept away by tsunami are still drifting in the Pacific Ocean with much of it 
washing ashore in North America [The Japan News, March 22, 2014]. According to the 
officials western U.S. coastline will continue to see debris for years to come contaminating 
seawater and beaches. It is estimated that about 400-thousand tons of the 1.5-million tons of 
debris adrift in the Pacific Ocean could reach the US and Canada by October 2014 [NHK 
World, May 5, 2014]. 
There have been found shellfish and algae native to Japan on debris that has already 
washed ashore causing concern about the creatures' possible impact on ecosystems [NHK 
World, May 5, 2014]. Japan's Environment Ministry has launch a 3 years study (starting July 
2014) to find out whether the 2011 tsunami debris carries living organisms from Japan and 
what is their possible impact on ecosystems on North America's west coast. 
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Recently the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sent marine experts195 to 
Japan to report their analysis of the seawater off the coast of Fukushima nuclear plant, and 
compare results from Japanese and IAEA laboratories to assess accuracy of Japanese data 
[NHK World, November 1, 2014]. The IAEA has been advising Japan to disclose 
comparative analysis of the results of more than one institution to enhance transparency and 
ease concerns of neighboring countries. 
A large-scale decontamination of soils, waters, infrastructure, property etc. has been 
going on involving central and local authorities, private and collective organizations, 
individual and communities efforts, etc. Consequently, a good progress has been achieved in 
cleaning up residential and natural environment in many places.  
A pilot work for forest decontamination in 4 Fukushima localities196 started in 
September 2014 (for completion March 2015), covering a forest area tens of hectares wide in 
each selected municipality [Fukushima Minpo News, July 31, 2014]. The demonstration work 
seek to lay the groundwork for resuming forestry business and reducing anxiety among 
evacuees hoping to return to hometowns as well identify effective methods of 
decontamination and ways to minimize workers' exposure to radiation.  
According to some experts the undertaken large-scale decontamination by the 
authorities and at grass-room level197 would create new environmental problems such as: huge 
amounts of radioactive waste, removal of top soil, damage to wildlife habitat198 and soil 
fertility, increased erosion on scraped bare hillsides and forests, and intrusion by people and 
machinery into every ecosystem scheduled for remediation etc. [Bird, 2012].   
September 2014 data indicate that in temporary storage sites (in Kotakizawa, Jikenjo, 
Shin-Baba, Baba, Goshi and Ogita districts) where removed soil has been collected and 
stored, the air dose rate at the entrance of the sites shows no difference after removed soil is 
stored, and radioactive materials has never been detected from leachate or groundwater under 
the sites [Ministry of Environment, 2014]. 
In July 2014 TEPCO reported that it recovered about 80% of a radioactive substance 
that leaked with contaminated wastewater in 2013199. The substance with the highest 
concentration in the water was radioactive strontium with an estimated 45 trillion becquerels 
of radioactivity [HNK World, July 2014]. Most strontium has been recovered by collecting 
soil soaked with the contaminated water while remaining 20% likely seeped into soil below 
tanks and other facilities. According to TEPCO the substance remains in the soils and it is 
highly unlikely that it was carried into the sea by underground water. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195
 From Environment Laboratories in Monaco who collected samples in September to examine the 
effects of radioactive materials on the ocean's ecosystem. 
196
 30 ha in Tamura city's Miyakoji district (evacuation order lifted in April, 2014); 10 ha each in 
Minamisoma city's Odaka district and Iitate village's Nimaibashi district; and 30 ha in Kawauchi 
village's Modo district (last three districts are designated as areas preparing for lifting of evacuation 
orders). Locations are privately owned where the central government is to undertake decontamination. 
197
 E.g. in Iitate-mura villagers have been carrying decontamination actions and trials with support of a 
recovery group “Resurrection of Fukushima” [NHK World, December 9, 2013]. 
198
 Including negative impact on some species on the Fukushia prefecture’s Red List of endangered or 
threatened species (such as “vulnerable” grassland butterfly and the Japanese peregrine falcon). 
199
 In August 2013 about 300 tons of wastewater contaminated with radioactive substances leaked 
from a storage tank at the plant. 
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TEPCO recently revised its storage plan200 with planning to build additional tanks to 
store 100,000 tons of radioactive water at the nuclear plant. Tanks at the cite can store about 
480,000 tons of radioactive water, but 90% of the 1000 storage tanks are already full [NHK 
World, April 4, 2014]. Company expects the amount of contaminated water to be less than 
800,000 tons by March 2016. More tanks are added in case the planned one are not enough or 
preventative measures (including frozen underground walls) do not work as well as planned 
[NHK World, July 14, 2014].  
In April-November 2014 TEPCO tried to freeze radiation-contaminated water in 
underground tunnels in order to prevent water used to cool melted-down fuel to leak out of 
reactor buildings into tunnels where it mix with ground water, seep into the ground and end 
up in the sea201. In November the company gave up that plan (water did not freeze) and 
announced that underground tunnels containing radioactive water will be blocked off by 
newly developed cement202 [NHK World, November 21, 2014].  
A separate and larger project has been underway to freeze soil and create a wall of ice 
1.5 km stretch around the four reactor buildings (Picture 8). TEPCO plans to lay 1,500 meters 
of pipes around the four reactor buildings hoping to complete the construction work by the 
end of March 2015 and start circulating refrigerant of minus 30 C203. The ice walls are 
intended to prevent groundwater from coming into the reactor building basements, which are 
filled with highly contaminated water from operations to cool the overheating reactors. The 
work has been delayed due to a suspension in freezing the water in the tunnels as part of the 
work areas overlap.  
 
Picture 8. Wall of frozen soil in Fukushima plant   Picture 9. Bags with contaminated soils 
 
Source: NHK World, July 23, 2014       Source:  Yomiuri Shinbun, December 9, 2014 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200
 Previous plan included building tanks to store 830,000 tons of water by the end of March 2015. 
201
 Utility tunnels between the 2 and 3 reactors and the sea are estimated to hold a total of 11,000 tons 
of radiation-contaminated wastewater. TEPCO hopes to remove wastewater from tunnels around all 
reactors in fiscal 2014 [NHK World, June 16, 2014]. 
202	  latest plan will not affect the larger project to freeze soil and create a wall of ice around reactors. 
203	  so that two-meter thick frozen soil walls will be created within a few months.	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There has been also many technical problems such as failures in cooling systems, 
multiple leakages, high radiation at the plant cite, delays and/or changes in plans, etc. [NHK 
World, April 4, April 13, May, 31, June 4, June 9, June 10, June 19, June 22, July 8, October 
22, October 30, 2014]. All that has been coupled by high uncertainties on state of affairs and 
risks, and likely effects of undertaken actions.  
For instance, the effects of the groundwater bypass operation204 intended to reduce the 
amount of radiation-tainted water at the plant has been apparently having limited effects [The 
Japan News, June 28; NHK World, July 25, 2014]. In the first 2 months water levels at 
observation wells near the reactor buildings205 dropped by only around 10 cm at most. Water 
levels tend to rise after rains and it is vital to reduce the amount of rainwater infiltrating the 
soil but little progress has been made due to a delay in land leveling206. It has been also found 
that Cesium in groundwater rises at plant after storm as well water near the embankment was 
more than 3 times higher (251,000 becquerels of cesium per liter) the level before heavy 
rainfall from Typhoon Phanfone [NHK World October 15, 2014]. 
Similarly, some experts warns that there is no reason to place overly high expectations 
on the ice walls [The Japan News, June 6, 2014]. There are fears associated that if soil is not 
frozen evenly it could cause subsidence, or if the ice walls melt due to problems with cooling 
functions, there could be a widespread danger of radioactive water flowing outside the 
buildings. It is essential to carry out several measures in parallel. The amount of contaminated 
water has increased by 300-400 tons a day and sooner or later there will be no more sites 
available for the construction of storage tanks at the plant.  
Experts have also pointed out the need to purify contaminated water before 
discharging it into the ocean [The Japan News, June 6, 2014]. Advanced Liquid Processing 
System (ALPS) introduced for that purpose has continued to malfunction207. Recently TEPCO 
has unveiled an improved system (sophisticated ALPS) for decontaminating radioactive 
water208 planning to put 3 systems into full operation in December 2014 treating 2,000 tons of 
water daily [NHK World, October 16, 2014].   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204
 groundwater is pumped up from wells near the plant’s 1 to 4 reactors before it flows into the 
basements of the reactor buildings and mixes with high-level radioactive water there. It is temporarily 
stored at tanks and then released into the sea after radiation checks. Company began to pump up 
groundwater in early April, and the release of pumped-up water started in late May as more than 8,600 
tons of groundwater have been released into the Pacific so far [The Japan News, June 28, 2014]. The 
fishermen's federation (regardless of differences in opinions) accepted the plan [NHK World, March 
31]. Water bypass operation, once fully implemented, will reduce the the daily buildup up of highly 
radioactive water at the plant to 100 tons down from roughly 400.  
205	  3 wells located 70 to 150m from the reactor buildings.	  
206
 Current plan is to cover soil near the wells with asphalt by the end of March 2015 to keep rain from 
seeping into the ground [NHK World, July 25, 2014]. 
207
 Current system is supposed to be capable of treating up to 750 tons of water daily with its 3 
processing lines but its operation has been plagued by trouble. A second version of system started trial 
operations in September 2014. 
208	  The new system can process more than 500 tons of water a day with only one line and it is expected 
to leave less radioactive waste and be less prone to glitches.	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TEPCO has showed a system to remove radioactive substances from tainted 
underground water before releasing it into the sea. The utility plans to discharge well water 
from around reactor buildings at the facility to stem the buildup of contaminated water209. The 
officials say the system removed most radioactive materials to undetectable levels in trial runs 
but its plan has met opposition from local fishermen [NHK World, October 16, 2014]. 
One of the TEPCO’s engineers properly described the progress as “trial and error 
continues” since dealing with new technology and equipment, making mistakes, and are 
unknown results [NHK World, July 4, 2014]. 
Furthermore, the process of decommissioning the nuclear reactors is at the beginning 
stare and is expected to last 30-40 years210 and associated with many challenges such as lack 
of experiences, available technologies, uncertainties and risks, public concerns, lack of 
disposal cite, etc. [NHK World, August 2, 2014]. For instance, there is a lots of uncertainty 
related to the state and schedules of operations – e.g. it is extremely difficult to remove melted 
fuel from the No.1 to No.3 reactors. Operation schedule is to start work at the No.1 and 2 
reactors in fiscal 2020, and at the No.3 in fiscal 2021, but workers still do not know where or 
in what state the fuel lies as a result of the meltdowns at the 3 reactors [NHK World, October 
22, 2014]. 
In October 2014 it was announced that the decommissioning of Fukushima reactors may 
be further delayed [NHK World, October 16, October 22, 2014]. The work was to begin in 
July 2014, but have been delayed after radioactive dust from the plant was blamed for 
contaminating rice paddies when the operator removed debris from the plant's No.3 reactor in 
August 2013211.  
The No.1 reactor building has a cover to prevent massive amount of radioactive material 
from spreading. TEPCO began drilling holes in the ceiling and spraying chemicals inside to 
stop dust from spreading, planning partially to remove the cover in late October. The operator 
hopes to begin full-scale dismantling of the cover in March 2015 and complete the task in 
about a year212. The government and TEPCO set a timetable for removing fuel out of the 
storage pool at the No. 1 reactor from the reactor building after April 2017, but delays are also 
likely.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209	  About 300 tons of underground water is flowing into the buildings daily. Tainted water is believed 
to be leaking into the sea with underground water. 
210
 With first stage (removal of 270 tons of fuel from 3 melted reactors) around 20 years and disposal 
and dismantling another 15 years. Decommissioning work has progressed fastest at the No.4 reactor 
where nearly 90% of the fuel rods have been removed and work is to end in 2014. Removal of fuel 
from the No.3 reactor building is to begin in fiscal 2015, and work at the No.1 and 2 buildings in fiscal 
2017. Radiation levels remain extremely high in the No.2 building and there is no specific schedule for 
fuel rod removal there [NHK World, October 22, 2014]. 
211	  Recently the Nuclear Regulation Authority announced that it is highly unlikely that radioactive 
particles from the Fukushima nuclear power plant contaminated rice fields [NHK World, October 31, 
2014]. Removal work released dust particles with 110 billion becquerels of radiation with relatively 
large diameters of several micrometers. According to the authority such particles had an 
environmental impact only in the plant compound and rice paddy contamination may have come from 
river and ground water [NHK World, October 31, 2014].	  
212	  debris removal is planed to begin before October 2016.	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Last but not least important, up to date, it has been difficult to secure cites for long-term 
and permanent disposal of radioactive waste [NHK World, April 7, June 15, 2014; The Japan 
News, March 8, 2014]. Until now contaminated soil, leaves, and mud removed during 
decontamination work, and other radioactive waste have been stored at temporary sites across 
Fukushima prefecture (Picture 9) at more than 70,000 locations [The Japan News, December 
9, 2014]. 
According to expert there are 3 million tons of tainted biomass in Fukushima and its 
disposal is a big challenge [The Japan Times March 23, 2014]. In addition, there have been 
collected a huge amount of contaminated soils, debris, incinerated ash, mud from sewage, 
straw, etc. located in Tokyo and 11 other prefectures. In the end of March 2014 there are a 
total of 143,689 tons of materials defined by the Government as “designated waste” 213 [The 
Japan News, July 9, 2014]. The later contain radioactive substances measuring more than 
8,000 Bq/kg, and according to law214 should be handled in the prefecture where it originated 
under the responsibility of the central government. 
A site for the final disposal of radioactive waste has not been chosen yet. There is a 
government plan to build interim storage facilities in Okuma and Futaba to store contaminated 
soil, waste and ash from burned contaminated materials215. These sites are to operate for up to 
30 years but residents of candidate places continue to suspect that they will eventually be used 
for final disposal facilities and insist for safeguards [NHK World, May 27, June 8, 2014]. 
Some residents are also against since the storage facilities would harm the towns' image and 
make it difficult to restart farming due to consumers concerns about safety of agricultural 
products [NHK World, June 2, 2014]. Besides, some residents complained about the offered 
price, saying it's not enough to rebuild their lives216 elsewhere but government has no revised 
the planned purchase prices [NHK World, October 14, 2014]. 
Meanwhile, Government is proceeding with the plan seeking residents' understanding 
while briefing residents about safety measures related to transportation and storage of 
radioactive wastes [NHK World, May 28, June 7, June 15, September 30, 2014]. Late August 
2014 the prefectural government and the host towns formally accepted the construction of 
storage facilities on their territories [Fukushima Minpo News, August 31, 2014]. 
In November 2014 both Houses of the Diet approved Fukushima waste bill for the 
construction of temporary storage facilities217 for radioactive waste near the crippled nuclear 
plant [NHK World, November 4, 19, 2014]. The bill obliges the government to ensure to 
ensure the waste is safely stored in the facilities and complete within 30 years the final 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213
 containing radioactive substances measuring more than 8,000 Bq/kg. 
214
	  on special measures concerning the handling of pollution from radioactive materials.	  
215
 They will able to accommodate enough waste to fill Tokyo Dome more than 20 times and will 
dispose waste containing up to 100,000 Bq/kg of radioactive materials. Government plans to purchase 
16 square km of land in the area and start transporting radioactive soil to the facilities in January 2015. 
216	   Government plan to purchase land at around half of its value before the nuclear accident as 
compensation for housing would depend on the age of buildings [NHK World, September 30, 2014].  
Landowners who decline to sell but allow usage of plots would be paid 70% of the purchase price. 
Prefecture would cover the difference between pre-disaster value and the amount of compensation. 
217	  The	  government acquires all shares in a state company (Japan Environmental Safety Corporation) 
that will run the business of storing nuclear waste  
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disposal of radioactive waste (including contaminated soil) after moving it outside Fukushima 
prefecture.  
Furthermore, the government announced it will set superficies (surface) rights for land 
allowing landowners to keep property rights for the land218 to be used for building temporary 
storage facilities [NHK World, July 28, 2014; The Japan News, July 29, 2014]. In addition, 
820-million dollars of grants will be handed over directly to the 2 towns as a part of the 3 
billion dollars in subsidies that will be given to the prefecture and municipalities to help 
rebuild communities and peoples' lives [NHK World, August 26, 2014]. 
A little progress has been also made in deciding on final disposal facilities locations for 
handling more than 146,000 tons radioactive waste from the Fukushima nuclear crisis in 
Tokyo and 11 other prefectures (Figure 51). For instance, up to date one of the warehouses 
storing rice straw (supposed to be used as livestock feed) covered in sheets of silver foil to 
protect against the sun’s rays, stands in area of farming paddy in Tome, Miyagi Prefecture219 
[The Japan News, September 12, 2014]. 
  
Figure 51. Amount of Designated waste in Japan, June 30, 2014 (tons) 
 
Source: Ministry of Environment 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218
 Initially, the government planned to buy land for the temporary facilities to ensure stable 
management but some landowners refuse to sell. Local communities claim attachment to ancestral 
land and fear that temporary facilities would become final disposal sites if the land is nationalized. 
219
 City government initially explained that the warehouses would be kept in the farmer’s vicinity for 
only two years (until January 2014). 
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The central government220 plans to construct a safe concrete double-walled structure 
underground to contain buried designated waste (Picture 10). Waste will be put into 
containers and bags, which will then be stored inside a concrete double walled structure to be 
buried underground, and after being buried that the structure will be covered with a second 
layer of concrete and soil221 [The Japan News, July 9, 2014].  
The government has been considering locations to newly build final disposal in five 
prefectures (Miyagi, Tochigi, Ibaraki, Gunma and Chiba) because there are large amounts of 
“designated waste”222 [The Japan News, July 9, 2014]. Local residents have been strongly 
opposing to the construction of facilities due to fears about radiation, environmental threat, 
and risk that agricultural products will become unsellable (Picture 11). In 2014 the 
Environment Ministry officials held meetings with officials from Miyagi prefecture and the 
three “candidate” municipalities (Kurihara, Taiwan and Kami) on one of which territory it 
aims to construct the final disposal facilities but all municipalities opposed.  
 
Picture 10. Plans for final disposal facility for      Picture 11. Kami residents against construction        
designated radioactive waste                                  of final disposal facilities 
 
Source: Ministry of Environment     Source: The Yomiuri Shimbun, July 9, 2014                
 
There are nine temporary storage facilities for designated waste on the premises of the 
Teganuma sewage treatment facility in Chiba prefecture. Each of them stores 526 tons of 
designated waste generated in Matsudo, Kashiwa and Nagareyama in the northwestern part of 
the prefecture. Since the later do not have adequate storage facilities, the prefecture accepted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220	  The central government is responsible for the disposal of “designated waste” in each prefecture.	  
221
 Amount of additional radioactivity along the borders of facilities’ premises is expected to be less 
than 0.01 millisievert a year and “health risk negligible” (average radiation dosage in nature is 2.1 
millisieverts per year).  
222	  Material from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident that has radiation levels exceeding 8,000 
Bq/kg.	   For prefectures with small amounts of designated waste plans are to bury the waste 
underground in existing disposal facilities [The Japan News, September 12, 2014]. 
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their waste at the sewage facility on a “temporary basis”, with a time limit set for the end of 
March 2015 [The Japan News, July 9, 2014].  
In Tome, storing Miyagi prefecture’s largest amount of designated waste (like straw), 
the difficulty of securing storage sites has led to some waste being stored by individuals. 
Much of the radioactive waste in Nasu-Shiobara, Tochigi prefecture is also temporarily stored 
on private property. Local officials and people in these places fear that if situation is 
prolonged for a long period of time waterproof sheets used to store designated waste will 
deteriorate. Residents near the sewage facility in Chiba prefecture filed a lawsuit demanding 
the elimination of the storage facilities.  
The government needs to create the disposal facilities223 because storage is reaching 
capacity in 5 prefectures [NHK World, July 30, 2014]. In response to the failure of previous 
administration to select cites “without consulting local residents”, the current government 
revised the process as municipal councils were set up in every prefecture to decide on 
selection methods while taking into consideration local residents preferences [The Japan 
News, July 9, 2014].  
Up to now only three prefectures (Chiba, Tochigi and Miyagi) decided on their selection 
process of candidates. The government was able to propose the candidate sites in Miyagi 
Prefecture (Kami, Kurihara and Taiwan) but local opposition is strong, and final decision is 
not made and planned field surveys blocked by residents [NHK World, October 24, 2014].  
The government has also chosen a state-owned property in Shioya town, Tochigi 
prefecture as a possible final disposal site for radioactive waste [NHK World, July 30, August 
18, 2014]. The local government and citizens have been opposing saying it will have a 
negative effect on natural water resources and local agricultural and food products224. The 
mayor suggested a counterproposal on radioactive waste225 calling for all radioactive waste to 
be stored at an intermediate facility in a no-entry evacuation zone on the Daiichi plant 
compound [NHK World, November 7, 2014]. 
Recently government allocated ¥5 billion in 2014 fiscal year’s budget to five prefectures 
(Miyagi, Tochigi, Ibaraki, Gunma and Chiba) to carry out regional developments and take 
measures to counter harmful rumors hoping it will help win understanding of local residence. 
The Atomic Energy Agency is reported to be looking at the direct disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel instead of reprocessing it226 [NHK World, July 29, 2014]. The government has 
long maintained the policy of reprocessing all spent nuclear fuel227 and conducted few studies 
about disposing it as waste. A basic energy plan adopted in April 2014 upholds the nuclear 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223	  They are for sewage sludge, incinerated ash, and other waste contaminated with more than 8,000 
Bq/kg of radioactive materials.	  
224
 In September 2012, the ministry chose a state-held forest in Yaita City as the prefecture's candidate 
site but the plan faced criticism and it had to start the selection process again. In October the mayor of 
Shioya and the leader residents group handed petition to the Minister - population is 12,000 but the 
petition was signed by about 173,000 from across Japan [NHK World, October 29, 2014]. 
225
 state should pay sufficient compensation to Fukushima and dispose radioactive waste in one place. 
226
 Agency's draft report says it is technically possible to directly dispose of spent nuclear fuel at a low 
radiation level. If spent nuclear fuel is buried 1,000 m underground for 1 million years, the radiation 
level at the earth's surface will peak in 3,000 years, at 0.3 microsieverts per year.  
227	  extract plutonium and reuse it as fuel at nuclear power plants.	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fuel recycling policy but for the first time it called for studies on ways to directly dispose of 
spent fuel without reprocessing it [NHK World, July 25, 2014].  
A series of challenges led to the later move: a reprocessing plant in Rokkasho Village, 
Aomori prefecture has suffered numerous troubles being unable to start full operation more 
than 20 years since construction began; nuclear power plants have accumulated 17,000 tons of 
spent nuclear fuel; fast breeder reactor Monju, Fukui prefecture is designed to use recycled 
plutonium but facility has been plagued by troubles228 and its future is uncertain. 
The agency's analysis is expected to lead to greater discussions on how to deal with the 
stockpile of spent nuclear fuel and wastes. Spent nuclear fuel is known to have higher 
radiation levels than high-level radioactive waste, and compared to reprocessing, direct 
disposal would mean more than a 4-fold increase in nuclear waste volume. Besides, the 
government lacks any prospect of finding a place that would accept a nuclear dumpsite. 
Top officials at the Nuclear Waste Management Organization of Japan charged with the 
selection and construction of the final disposal facilities, were replaced recently in view of the 
planned restart of nuclear power plant operations. Since 2002 the Organization charged with 
the selection and construction of the final disposal facilities has been asking municipal 
governments to indicate willingness to accommodate the final disposal facilities [The Japan 
News, July 23, 2014].  
Until now only one local government (Toyo, Kochi prefecture) has announced its 
candidacy (2007) but its efforts have been buckled under opposition from local residents. In 
December 2013 the central government switched to a policy in which it would play a leading 
role in narrowing down prospective candidate sites beforehand and then requesting two or 
more municipal governments to accommodate the facilities.  
The central government plans for radioactive waste to be mixed with glass, and the 
vitrified waste to be stored in metal containers buried at least 300 m deep underground229. 
Some in the government voiced a cautious view that presenting candidate sites before the 
local elections next spring will cause disarray, and the candidate sites will most likely be 
presented after that [The Japan News, July 23, 2014]. 
All these difficulties and uncertainties make it difficult to access the full environmental 
impact of the March 2011 disasters, and require a long-term monitoring of effects on the 
individual components and entire ecosystems [ISHES, 2011; ME, 2012a; UNSCEAR, 2014; 
WWF, 2013].  
A 2014 government report points out that the release of radioactive materials following 
the Fukushima nuclear accident remains Japan's biggest environmental problem [NHK World, 
June 6, 2014]. What is more, Japan emitted the largest amounts of greenhouse gases on 
record230 in the fiscal 2013 (a climb of 1.6% since 2012) blamed on the increased use of fossil 
fuels (including coal) since the 2011 nuclear disaster [NHK World, December 5, 2014].  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228	  including a fire and failed inspections.	  
229	  Final disposal facilities are to be about 6 sq. km to accommodate at least 40,000 metal containers. 
Existing amount of spent nuclear fuel is equivalent to 25,000 such metal containers (stored at nuclear 
plants and other sites). Many nuclear plants already have no more room to store spent nuclear fuel.  
230	  1.395 billion tons - most since comparable data are available (1990) and 1.3% up from the 2005 
levels. By 2020 the target is to cut emissions by 3.8% from the 2005 levels.  
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At the same time, people’s enthusiasm for power saving fades down from increased 
willingness to save power after rolling blackouts following Fukushima crisis. Recent survey 
shows that 60.7% of respondents wanted to save power, set air conditioning temperatures at 
appropriate levels or take other measures to curb global warming (down from 71.9% in June 
2012 survey) while purchasing environmentally friendly products was cited by 36.9% (down 
from 47.4%) [The Japan News, September 25, 2014].  
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Conclusion 
The unprecedented triple disaster in Northeast Japan in March 2011 was among the 
worst in the Japanese and world history. The earthquake, tsunami and Fukushima nuclear 
accident have had immense impacts on diverse aspects of people life in the most affected 
regions, the rest of the country, and beyond. Agriculture, food industry and food consumption 
have been among the worst hit. 
The excellent individual and community disaster preparedness, and well-established 
national system of disaster management, have been a major reason for the adverse impacts to 
be much lower that it would have been elsewhere in a similar disaster. Furthermore, a superior 
disaster recovery experience, good organization, and enormous public support from 
government, other organizations, volunteers, etc. have allowed a rapid recovery and a 
successful reconstruction of a great part of devastated regions and sectors. For home country 
of one of the book coauthors (Bulgaria) a recovery from such a disaster certainly would have 
taken decades. 
Almost four years after the disaster there are still a number of challenges associated 
with the recovery and reconstruction in Tohoku region and elsewhere. They are mostly related 
with a big number of evacuees with destructed life and businesses (temporary 
accommodation, health problems, lost relations and employment, etc.), continuing 
outmigration from the badly affected areas, slow pace of rebuilding of devastated 
infrastructure, housings and businesses, prolong decontamination process in some places, on-
going crises in Fukushima nuclear plant, consumer reluctance to visit and buy products of 
affected regions, etc.  
In addition, the 2011 disasters have considerably aggravated some already existing 
problems of the rural regions such as: aging and shrinking population, lack of labor and young 
entrepreneurs, low competitiveness and efficiency, income and services disparities, etc. 
Subsequently, the speed and extent of disaster recovery and post-disaster reconstruction differ 
quite substantially among individual agents, (sub)sectors, and (sub)regions. Besides, there are 
great uncertainties associated with the long-term social, health, economic, environmental, 
policy etc. consequences of the 2011 disasters. 
On the other hand, the disasters have had positive impacts on the development of 
certain (more resilient, adaptive) sectors in the most affected regions and some (traditional, 
prospective) sectors in other parts of the country. The post disaster recovery and 
reconstruction have also given opportunities and induced considerable policies and 
institutional modernization in various (energy, agricultural, security) sectors, and improve 
disaster prevention and management, food safety information and inspection, technological 
and product innovation, jobs creation and investment (including in “new” areas such as 
research and innovation, ICT, renewable energy, robotization), farmlands consolidation and 
enhancement, infrastructural amelioration, organizational restructuring, etc. 
Not least important, the failures of government bureaucrats to foresee, prevent, 
communicate, and deal with the March 2011 disaster and its consequences have thought 
individual agents to take decentralized actions – self-recovery and reconstruction, community 
and business initiatives, private and collective safety checks and decontamination measures, 
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voluntary shipment restrictions, new production and marketing methods, movements for 
fundamental policies change, etc. 
This study was just an attempt to assess the overall impact of the March 2011 disasters 
Understandably the research is incomplete due to the “short” period of time after the disasters, 
insufficient and controversial data, difficulties to adequately assess longer term implications, 
etc. Therefore, more future studies are necessary to evaluate and update the “known” impacts 
of the 2011 disasters. Besides, further in depth “micro” studies are needed to fully understand 
and estimate the impacts of the disasters in each location and community, type of enterprises 
and productions, and component of supply chain, etc.  
There are a number of major lessons that can be learned from the study of the March 
2011 disasters’ impact on and post disaster reconstruction of agri-food sector in Japan. 
First, the triple March 2011 disaster was a rare but a high impact event, which came as 
a “surprise” even for a country with frequent natural disasters and well-developed disaster risk 
management system like Japan. Therefore, it is necessary to “prepare for unexpected”, and 
design, build and test a multi-hazard disaster risk management for the specific conditions of 
each country, region, sector, etc. Accordingly appropriate measures and sufficient resources 
(funding, personnel, stock piles, shelter cites, transportation means) have to be planed for the 
effective prevention, early warning, mitigation, response, and post disaster relief and recovery 
from big disasters and accidents. Besides state resources it is important to mobilize huge 
private, community, NGOs, and international capabilities, expertise and means. For instance, 
a public-private partnership is necessary to properly identify and designate available public 
and private resources (accommodations for a longer stay, relief supply, etc.) in case a big 
disaster occurs and evacuation needs arise. 
Second, the risk assessment is to include diverse (health, dislocation, economic, 
behavioral, ecological, etc.) hazards and complementary, (food, supply, natural, biological) 
chain, spin offs, and multilateral effects of a likely (natural, man made, combined) disaster. 
Modern methods and technologies are to be widely employed (mass and social networks, 
computer simulation, satellite imaging, etc.) for effective communication, preparation of 
disaster maps, assessment of likely impacts, planning of evacuation routs, relief needs, and 
recovery measures, secure debris and waste management, etc. It is crucial to involve 
multidisciplinary and multi-stakeholders teams in all stages of risk management to guarantee 
a holistic approach, “full” information and transparency, adequate assessment of risks, 
preferences and capabilities, and maximum efficiency. 
Third, the risk management system is to be discussed with all stakeholders, and 
measures taken to educate and train individuals, organizations and communities for complex 
disasters and all contingencies. The individual responsibilities are to be well-specified and 
effective mechanisms for coordination of actions of authorities, organizations, and groups at 
different levels put in place and tested to ensure efficiency (speed, lack of duplication and 
gaps) during emergency. Individual and small-scale operators dominate in the agri-food sector 
of most countries around the world, and their proper information, training, and involvement is 
critical. The later is to embrace diverse agri-food and rural organizations, consumers, and 
population of each age group, which all commonly have no disaster management “culture”, 
knowledge, training, and plans (particularly for large disasters like earthquakes, tsunamis, 
nuclear and industrial accidents). 
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Forth, it is necessary to modernize the specific and overall formal institutional 
environment (property rights, regulations, safety standards, norms) according to the needs of 
contemporary disaster risk management. A particular attention is to be put on updating agri-
food safety, labor, health, and animal welfare standards, and ensure adequate mechanisms, 
qualified agents, and technical instruments for effective implementation and enforcement. 
Establishment of an accessible cooperative, quasi public or public agricultural (crop, 
livestock, machineries, building, life and health) insurance system, including assurance 
against big natural, nuclear etc. disasters is very important for many countries for rapid 
recovery of affected agents and sectors. Modernization of the out of dated (often informal) 
lands, material, biological and intellectual property registration and valorization system is also 
important for effective post disaster compensation, recovery and reconstruction. That is 
particularly true for the great number of subsistent and “semi-market” holdings dominating 
the agro-food sector around the globe, which usually suffer significantly from disasters (often 
losing all possessions) but get no market valuation, insurance and/or public support.  
Sixth, it is important to set up mechanisms to improve efficiency of public resource 
allocation, avoid mismanagement and misuse of resources as well as reduce individual agents’ 
costs for complying with regulations and using public relief, support and dispute resolution 
(e.g. court) system. That would let efficient allocation of limited social resources according to 
agents needs and preferences, intensify and speed up transactions, improve enforcement (of 
rights, laws, standards) and conflict resolution, decrease corruption, and eventually accelerate 
recovery and reconstruction. In this respect it is obligatory to involve all stakeholders in 
decision-making and control, increase transparency etc. at all levels and stages of disaster 
planning, management, and reconstruction. In the case of a post-disaster evacuation it is 
essential to secure proper (police, voluntary group) protection of private and public properties 
from thefts and wild animal invasion in disaster and evacuation zones.  
Seventh, different agents and elements of agri-food chain are affected unlikely from a 
disaster and have dissimilar capability to recover. Most farming assets (multiannual crops, 
irrigation facilities, building, brands, biodiversity, landscape) are interlinked with the land, 
and if the later is damaged a rapid recovery (rebuilding, relocation, alternative supply) is very 
costly or impossible. Similarly, smaller-scale and highly specialized enterprises, small-
member communities and organizations, and visitors and tourists to the disaster regions, are 
all more vulnerable and have less ability to protect, bear consequences and recover. All that 
require differential public support (intervention, compensation, funding, assistance) to various 
types of agents it order to provide emergency relief, accelerate recovery and diminish 
negative long-term consequences.  
Eight, there is also a strong “regional” specificity (interdependency) of agrarian, food 
and other rural assets. Subsequently, if a part of these assets/products is damaged or affected 
(e.g. destruction of critical transportation, communication, distribution, electricity and water 
supply etc. infrastructure; a nuclear, chemical, pathogen etc. contamination) the negative 
externalities impact all agents in the respective region (including undamaged lands, livestock, 
produce and services). In order to minimize damages it is important to properly identify 
(locate) risk and take prevention measures, recover rapidly critical infrastructure, strictly 
enforce quality (safety, authenticity, origin) of products and adequately communicate them to 
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all interested parties (producers, processors, distributors, consumers, international 
community). 
Ninth, good management of information and communication is extremely important in 
emergency, recovery, and post disaster reconstruction operations. The March 2011 disasters 
have proven that any delay, a partial release or controversies of official information have 
hampered the effective (re)actions of agents, and adversely affected public trust and behavior 
(e.g. buying products from disaster regions). Before, during and after a disaster all available 
(risk, monitoring, measured, projected) information from all reliable sources is to be 
immediately publicized in an understandable by everyone form through all possible means 
(official and community channels, mobile phones, social media, etc.). It is essential always to 
publish alternative (independent, private, scientific, international) information as well, 
including in foreign languages, which would build public trust and increase confidence. In 
Japan it has not been easy to find all available information related to the Match 2011 disasters 
in a timely and systematized way (updates, diverse aspects, unified measurement, time series, 
alternative sources), which make many foreigners and local alike skeptical about accuracy. 
Tenth, a big disaster like the Match 2011 in Japan often provides an extraordinary 
opportunity to discuss, introduce and implement fundamental changes in (agricultural, 
economic, regional, energy, disaster management) policies, improve disaster management and 
food security, modernize regulation and standards, relocate farms and houses, consolidate 
lands and operations, upgrade infrastructure, restructure production and farming 
organizations, introduce technological and business innovation, improve natural environment, 
etc. All such opportunities are to be effectively used by central and local authorities through 
policies, programs, measures, and adequate public support given for all innovative private and 
collective initiatives in the area. 
Eleventh, it is important to learn from the past experiences and make sure that “lessons 
learned” are not forgotten. The impacts and factors of a disaster, disaster management, and 
post disaster reconstruction are to be continuously studied, knowledge communicated to 
public, and “transferred” to next generation.  It is critical to share “good” and “bad” 
experiences with disaster prevention, management and recovery with other regions and 
countries, in order to prevent that happening again. It is particularly important to share the 
advance Japanese experience at international scale through media, visits, studies, conferences, 
etc. and turn Tohoku in a disaster risk management hub for other regions and countries. It is 
essential not to copy but adapt the positive Japanese experiences to the specific (institutional, 
cultural, natural) environment and risks structure of each community, subsector, region, and 
country. 
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